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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is a single-case study of Puerto Rico’s experience with Hurricane 
Maria and its catastrophic impacts. As the nation faces more complex and frequent 
catastrophic disasters, practitioners must consider how to build resilience in a meaningful 
way by beginning with the community. America’s approach to disaster preparedness and 
response outlined in the National Preparedness Goal (NPG) and the National Response 
Framework (NRF) has respectively produced “whole community” concepts and a tiered 
response approach to disasters. However, the NPG has yet to realize the concept of 
“whole community” fully by effectively integrating community-based actors and other 
non-governmental entities into disaster preparedness, response, and recovery cycles. The 
NRF also does not outline contingencies for the collapse of the framework in catastrophic 
disasters when mutual aid, state, and federal resources become unavailable or insufficient 
for lengthy periods of time, leaving communities isolated. To examine these issues, 
Puerto Rico’s disaster impacts are examined via the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency’s community lifelines as a categorical method of organization. By synthesizing a 
large body of literature, this study provides disaster preparedness and response 
conclusions for all lifelines and identifies overarching themes centered upon a need for 
holistic disaster preparedness, integration of non-governmental actors, decentralization, 
and redundant critical infrastructure systems. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
In 2017, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) administrator 
testified on Capitol Hill that America is a nation unprepared for disasters.1 The current 
American emergency management structure exhibits an overreliance on federal disaster 
aid and too little focus on American communities. This dynamic is problematic amid 
catastrophic disasters that threaten the integrity of the tiered National Response 
Framework, which stipulates that higher levels of government and outside disaster 
response resources fill resource voids. When truly catastrophic disasters strike, American 
communities will be “on their own” for significant periods and must consider how to 
prepare for such contingencies. Preparing for and surviving such catastrophes requires 
what FEMA commonly refers to as a “whole community approach” to disaster 
management.2 
This thesis employs a single case study methodology of Puerto Rico’s 2017 
experience of a catastrophic disaster, Hurricane Maria, a Category 4 hurricane at landfall 
on September 20. This thesis seeks to answer one primary research question via two 
supporting questions:  
How can the whole community prepare to manage the consequences of 
catastrophic disasters without the aid of organizations beyond their borders?
a. What were the preparedness gaps in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in
2017 following Hurricane Maria?
b. How did communities and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico overcome
disaster preparedness gaps amid catastrophe through formal and informal
networks?
1 The former FEMA Administrator, Brock Long’s, exact words were, “We don’t have a true culture of 
preparedness in this country. Our citizens are not prepared.” “2017 Hurricane Disaster Lessons,” C-SPAN, 
video, March 15, 2018, 3:17:03, https://www.c-span.org/video/?442612-1/federal-state-officials-testify-
lessons-learned-2017-disasters. 
2 Federal Emergency Management Agency, A Whole Community Approach to Emergency 
Management: Principles, Themes, and Pathways for Action, FDOC 104-008-1 (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2011), 3, https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1813-
25045-3330/whole_community_dec2011__2_.pdf. 
The two elements supporting the primary research question—
response shortcomings and improvisations—are cataloged in the context of 
FEMA’s seven community lifelines. This structure allows communities and 
emergency management practitioners to view Hurricane Maria’s impacts as component 
parts whereby the whole community response actions can be retrospectively examined 
to understand better and inform more effective approaches to build community 
preparedness and disaster resilience against future catastrophic disasters. Puerto 
Rico’s shortfalls and adaptations, considered collectively, will contribute to informing 
how communities cope when the National Response Framework enters partial or 
total collapse when outside response resources become unavailable or otherwise 
inadequate to meet the needs of those impacted by disaster.  
The results of this study highlight that Hurricane Maria occurred in the context of 
many systemic issues plaguing the island, primarily rooted in extractive industries, 
and associated divestment in the island’s business sector when favorable tax 
structures “sunsetted” in legislation. The resulting fragile roadways, power grid, 
communications systems, water networks, and other infrastructure served as amplifiers of 
disaster impacts. Additionally, Puerto Rico faces significant public health 
challenges that presented increased population vulnerability to disaster impacts and 
response challenges.  
However, the study also indicated highly cooperative and determined 
communities that came together to survive collectively in the days, weeks, and 
months following Hurricane Maria. Community cooperation was facilitated by long-
standing community-based organizations (CBOs). Since Maria, many other 
CBOs have surfaced to address population needs, such as food, housing, medical care, 
solar energy, farming, etc. 
The conclusions of this study center upon four distinct themes and the seven 
community lifelines. Each of the four themes was derived from findings common across all 
lifelines and included holistic disaster preparedness, integration of non-governmental 
xx 
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actors, decentralization, and redundant systems. These themes appeared to reside at the 
root of all critical response and recovery shortcomings throughout the study. 
In brief, the following represents a brief summation and crosscut of conclusions 
reached for each community lifeline:  
• Safety and Security Lifeline—The near-total collapse of disaster
response capabilities in Puerto Rico suggests the island should reimagine
community safety and security by reaching deeply into communities and
involving them in disaster preparedness so they can operate as assets at
times when government resources are overwhelmed.
• Food, Water, and Shelter Lifeline—In a catastrophic disaster,
community needs will outpace available resources, which calls for more
resilient communities and that “slack” be built into available supply chains
to boost resiliency. Puerto Rico also maintains a heavy and risky reliance
on imported food goods due to the long-term degradation of its
agricultural sector.
• Health and Medical Lifeline—Puerto Rico faces a stark public health
situation that will continue to exacerbate an effective disaster response in
the future if not viewed as a priority. It is also necessary to bolster
dispersed medical capacity to ensure it is in close proximity to those in
need, which can be accomplished by local medical networks and non-
government organizations (NGOs) or paramedicine providers.
• Energy Lifeline—Puerto Rico’s power sector filed for bankruptcy just
months before Hurricane Maria struck the island. Amid the storm, both
distribution and transmissions lines were devastated, which resulted in the
largest power outage in U.S. history and second-largest outage in recorded
xxii 
history.3 The widespread power outage, lasting nearly a year in many 
areas, affected and complicated all other community lifelines. The power 
grid remains financially plagued as the island seeks to repair the system, 
and solar has become a favorable alternative in many communities.  
• Communications Lifeline—A near-total loss of communications
capability left communities uninformed, unable to communicate resource
needs, and hindered first responders’ operational coordination. Non-
governmental actors, such as the American Radio Relay League (ARRL),
and Google’s X-Lab, proved able to bridge critical gaps in
communications capabilities. The ARRL provided HAM, or amateur radio
operator assistance, and Google was able to field experimental technology
in an attempt to re-establish communications rapidly across the island.4
• Transportation Lifeline—Puerto Rico’s transportation infrastructure was
in a state of decline and disrepair for years preceding Hurricane Maria.5
Maria caused a record 40,000 landslides across the island that isolated
many communities and prevented commodity distribution.6 Many pre-
disaster debris management contracts also failed to deliver required
services to re-establish access quickly to hard-hit communities. This
3 New York Power Authority et al., Build Back Better: Reimagining and Strengthening the Power Grid 
of Puerto Rico (Albany, NY: State of New York, Office of the Governor, 2017), 11, 
https://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/files/atoms/files/
PRERWG_Report_PR_Grid_Resiliency_Report.pdf; American Society of Civil Engineers, 2019 Report 
Card for Puerto Rico’s Infrastructure (San Juan, PR: American Society of Civil Engineers, 2019), 28, 
https://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/state-item/puerto-rico/. 
4 American Radio Relay League, 2017 Hurricane Season After-Action Report (Washington, DC: 
American Radio Relay League, 2018), 2, http://www.arrl.org/files/file/Public%20Service/ARES/
2017%20Hurricane%20Season%20AAR.pdf; Jessica Guynn, “Google Parent’s Project Loon Delivers 
Internet to 100,000 in Puerto Rico,” USA Today, November 9, 2017, https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/
2017/11/09/google-parents-project-loon-delivers-internet-100-000-puerto-rico/849627001/. 
5 American Society of Civil Engineers, 2019 Report Card for Puerto Rico’s Infrastructure, 38. 
6 Erin K. Bessette-Kirton et al., “Landslides Triggered by Hurricane Maria: Assessment of an Extreme 
Event in Puerto Rico,” GSA Today 29, no. 6 (June 2019): 4–10. 
xxiii 
capability gap prompted many communities to search for basic supplies 
and band together to clear debris in their own communities.7 
• Hazardous Materials Lifeline—Puerto Rico faces various hazardous
materials (HAZMAT) risks primarily from long-term infrastructure
degradation due to fiscal constraints and divestment from the island.8 The
poor safety track records of drinking and wastewater facilities and high
rates of exposure to HAZMAT from several industries, such as farming,
pharmaceutical production, petroleum facilities, coal plants, and others,
serve as major public risk factors requiring consideration in planning for
future catastrophic disasters.
In total, the experience of Puerto Rico illustrates what occurs when the national 
response framework is under extreme stress. Local and state response apparatuses 
collapsed, and mutual-aid and federal resources were slow to respond within that 
unexpected context. The response delay compelled informal actors, the private sectors, 
and communities to fulfill often unconventional roles and to provide critical resources 
and services to bridge resource shortfalls until a sense of normalcy could be returned to 
the island.  
The study indicated that despite informal and community actors rising to the 
occasion, their inclusion in disaster response and recovery was mostly unplanned, which 
likely resulted in under-leveraged resources. Since Hurricane Maria, many groups have 
renewed energies on disaster preparedness and resilience to foster greater synergy in 
future disasters. Still, the island faces systemic preparedness obstacles on many fronts. 
7 Associated Press, “Puerto Ricans Hunt for Precious Wi-Fi and Cell Signals,” Boston Globe, 
September 25, 2017, https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/world/2017/09/25/puerto-ricans-hunt-for-
precious-and-cell-signals/umetMJbhJ46QgMmO9D10tM/story.html; Patrick J. Holladay et al., “Utuado, 
Puerto Rico and Community Resilience Post-Hurricane Maria: The Case of Tetuan Reborn,” Recreation, 
Parks, and Tourism in Public Health 3 (2019): 5–16, https://doi.org/10.2979/rptph.3.1.02. 
8 Jordan R. Fischbach et al., “After Hurricane Maria: Predisaster Conditions, Hurricane Damage, and 
Recovery Needs in Puerto Rico,” RAND, 275, September 30, 2020, https://www.rand.org/pubs/
research_reports/RR2595.html. 
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This thesis is a single-case study evaluating the impacts of Hurricane Maria on 
Puerto Rico to extract lessons learned in catastrophic disaster preparedness and resilience 
when standard response structures collapse or struggle to meet the humanitarian needs of 
impacted populations. As the nation peers into the future, various disasters capable of 
collapsing traditional response and recovery models exist. By examining cases in which 
partial collapse occurred, valuable lessons may be gleaned that communities can utilize in 
crafting preparedness strategies that elevate catastrophic disaster resilience.  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In 2017, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) administrator 
testified on Capitol Hill that America is a nation unprepared for disasters.1 These 
comments came shortly after the record-setting 2017 disaster season. Six years prior, in 
2011, FEMA had attempted something novel by calling on every American to join in a 
“whole of community” approach to prepare for disasters. The same year, FEMA issued a 
doctrine titled, Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management that envisioned 
an integrated, all of nation approach, to disaster preparedness and response, and identified 
pathways for realizing the vision.2 However, years of preparedness data indicate FEMA 
has been unable to increase individual and community preparedness. In a 2014 report, 
 
1 The former FEMA Administrator, Brock Long’s, exact words were, “We don’t have a true culture of 
preparedness in this country. Our citizens are not prepared.” “2017 Hurricane Disaster Lessons,” C-SPAN, 
video, March 15, 2018, 3:17:03, https://www.c-span.org/video/?442612-1/federal-state-officials-testify-
lessons-learned-2017-disasters. 
2 Federal Emergency Management Agency, A Whole Community Approach to Emergency 
Management: Principles, Themes, and Pathways for Action, FDOC 104-008-1 (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2011), 19, https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1813-
25045-3330/whole_community_dec2011__2_.pdf. 
2 
Preparedness in America, FEMA indicated that the proportion of Americans taking 
tangible preparedness actions had remained virtually static since 2007.3  
In 2018, FEMA again envisioned a more fundamentally prepared nation and set 
forth to achieve it with two of its three strategic goals, (1) build a culture of preparedness, 
and (2) ready the nation for catastrophic disasters.4 However, the agency largely set forth 
to accomplish these goals by utilizing the same methods as it always has in the past. In a 
2019 report, the FEMA Higher Education Program stated, “Ready.gov, America’s 
PrepareAthon, and National Preparedness Month, all aimed at individual households and 
communities, have not produced the desired results.” 5 In recent household surveys, most 
Americans believe first responders will arrive to provide rescue, supplies, and aid within 
72 hours following any disaster despite being more skeptical of local, state, and federal 
government competency.6 Over half of Americans believe help will arrive within one 
hour of a “major emergency.”7 These survey results are interesting since the public is 
almost always the real first responders. 
Approximately 87% of those in the twin towers on 9/11 survived. A majority 
were evacuated to safety by their officemates. Ferry services and private boat owners 
self-organized the largest maritime evacuation in recorded history by evacuating lower 
Manhattan immediately after the towers fell. The Cajun Navy made the critical difference 
 
3 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Preparedness in America: Research Insights to Increase 
Individual, Organizational, and Community Action (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2014), 1, https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=764015; Katherine E. Browne and Laura Olson, 
Building Cultures of Preparedness: Report for the Emergency Management Higher Education Community 
(Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2019), 6, 
https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=820838. 
4 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Strategic Plan: 2018–2022 (Washington, DC: Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, 2018), 4, https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=808818. 
5 Katherine E. Browne and Laura Olson, Building Cultures of Preparedness: Report for the Emergency 
Management Higher Education Community (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
2019), 6, https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=820838. 
6 Lori Uscher-Pines et al., “Citizen Preparedness for Disasters: Are Current Assumptions Valid?,” 
Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness 6, no. 2 (June 2012): 170–73, https://doi.org/10.1001/
dmp.2012.23; Earth Institute, “Ready for Natural Disasters? Not So Much,” State of the Planet (blog), 
February 9, 2016, https://blogs.ei.columbia.edu/2016/02/09/ready-for-natural-disasters-not-so-much/. 
7 Elisaveta P. Petkova et al., The American Preparedness Project: Where the U.S. Public Stands in 
2015, Briefing Report no. 2 (New York: Columbia University, 2016), 22, https://doi.org/10.7916/
D84Q7TZN. 
3 
in waterborne search and rescue efforts amid catastrophic flooding in Louisiana in 2016 
and Houston, Texas, following Hurricane Harvey in 2017. Nearly all rescues from 
structural collapse following the 2010 major earthquake in Haiti were executed by the 
general public, and not by highly specialized urban search and rescue teams.8 Latent 
capability continues to remain absent in governmental planning frameworks and is rarely 
if ever, anticipated, or well integrated into response operations. In light of the threats of 
the 21st century and their catastrophic potential, America must discover new pathways to 
cultivating citizen preparedness meaningfully for catastrophic disasters.9 In the words of 
former FEMA Administrator Craig Fugate, “Government can and will continue to serve 
disaster survivors. However, we fully recognize that a government-centric approach to 
disaster management will not be enough to meet the challenges posed by a catastrophic 
incident. That is why we must fully engage our entire societal capacity.”10 
Catastrophic threats and hazards jeopardize the integrity of current national 
preparedness and response models developed and led by FEMA, and by extension,  
 
8 Russell R. Dynes, “Social Capital: Dealing with Community Emergencies,” Homeland Security 
Affairs 2, no. 2 (July 2006): 5; “Boatlift—Tom Hanks Narrates ‘An Untold Tale of 9/11 Resilience’,” 
American Waterways Operators, September 2014, https://www.americanwaterways.com/media/videos/
boatlift-tom-hanks-narrates-untold-tale-911-resilience; Tricia Wachtendorf and James Kendra, “‘Cajun 
Navy’ Rescuers in Hurricane Harvey Show Vital Role of Volunteer Boats,” Salon, September 3, 2017, 
https://www.salon.com/2017/09/03/cajun-navy-rescuers-in-hurricane-harvey-show-vital-role-of-volunteer-
boats_partner/; Charles Perrow, The Next Catastrophe: Reducing Our Vulnerabilities to Natural, 
Industrial, and Terrorist Disasters, paperback ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 4, 
https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400838516. 
9 The Department of Homeland Security has previously defined a catastrophic disaster as “any natural 
or manmade incident, including terrorism, that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or 
disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or 
government functions . . . [that] could result in sustained national impacts over a prolonged period of time; 
almost immediately exceeds resources normally available to State, local, tribal, and private-sector 
authorities in the impacted area; and significantly interrupts governmental operations and emergency 
services to such an extent that national security could be threatened.” Department of Homeland Security, 
National Response Plan (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2004), 43, 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=450766. 
10 Federal Emergency Management Agency, A Whole Community Approach to Emergency 
Management, 2.  
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every American community.11 FEMA’s 2019 National Threat and Hazard Identification 
and Risk Assessment (THIRA) has outlined various catastrophic threats and hazards 
facing the nation, including a cumulative effect of plausible concurrent operations, 
Cascadia and San Andreas earthquakes, a New Madrid earthquake, Texas, Florida, and 
Hawaii hurricane scenarios, a pandemic, and even a space weather event threatening the 
power grid.12 
FEMA’s National Response Framework (NRF) outlines the foundation for the 
national approach to disaster response. The framework indicates that federal, state-to-
state, private-sector, and non-governmental organization (NGO) disaster response and 
recovery resources can respond to a disaster to render aid to a location when local 
response and recovery resources are overwhelmed.13 However, when outside resources 
become unavailable, such as during a major power outage, after a major hurricane or 
earthquake, or other climate change-fueled catastrophe, American communities must 
manage disaster consequences with the resources they have locally available. To date, a 
lack of decentralized and widespread citizen involvement in disaster preparedness and 
response has placed an overwhelming burden on top-down, government-centric disaster 
aid. If communities have not adequately recognized the limitations of government 
resources and prepared for this situation, they will be vulnerable in a catastrophic 
disaster.  
Traditionally, when a disaster affects a community, local responders are the first 
on the scene. When local resources reach their limits, many communities look to 
neighboring communities for support and state-level emergency management agencies 
 
11 The National Response Framework defines catastrophic disasters as “one of such extreme and 
remarkable severity or magnitude that the Nation’s collective capability to manage all response 
requirements would be overwhelmed” and “potential threats to national security, national economic 
security, and/or the public health and safety of the Nation.” Department of Homeland Security, National 
Response Framework, 4th ed. (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2019), 4, 
https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1572366339630-0e9278a0ede9ee129025182b4d0f818e/
National_Response_Framework_4th_20191028.pdf. 
12 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2019 National Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk 
Assessment (THIRA): Overview and Methodology (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2019), 19, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-06/fema_national-thira-overview-
methodology_2019_0.pdf. 
13 Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework, 6. 
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for additional resources. In rarer instances, when a state’s response apparatus is 
overwhelmed, FEMA intervenes by providing support and coordinating resources from 
around the nation. Under typical emergency and disaster demands, most American 
communities can self-sufficiently manage common emergencies, and FEMA can 
adequately coordinate national resources in response to disasters. The NRF outlines this 
approach to disaster response by illustrating a multi-tiered system reliant upon bringing 
resources into an affected area after a disaster.14 However, in a nationally catastrophic 
disaster, this approach may not be feasible. A fundamental NRF assumption—that 
outside resources have the capacity and capability to respond to support communities 
across the nation—drives national preparedness for disasters and constitutes a 
preparedness gap worthy of consideration.15  
As the nation peers into the future, it faces various potential disasters that could 
swiftly sap the existing government response capability, which is something FEMA’s 
whole-community policy has recognized.16 Americans are remarkably unprepared for 
catastrophic disasters that may result in the collapse of the NRF.17 In each case, the 
disaster would affect a vast region of or the entire United States, and thus affect both the 
states’ ability to aid each other and the federal government’s ability to mount an adequate 
response to meet all critical needs.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This thesis seeks to answer one primary research question via two supporting
questions: 
14 Department of Homeland Security, 6. 
15 Department of Homeland Security, 6; For an overview of the National Preparedness Goal, see 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Preparedness Goal, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2015), 3, https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1443799615171-
2aae90be55041740f97e8532fc680d40/National_Preparedness_Goal_2nd_Edition.pdf. 
16 Federal Emergency Management Agency, A Whole Community Approach to Emergency 
Management, 2. 
17 Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan, 43. 
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 How can the whole community prepare to manage the consequences of 
catastrophic disasters without the aid of organizations beyond their borders?
a. What were the preparedness gaps in the Commonwealth of Puerto 
Rico in 2017 following Hurricane Maria?
b. How did communities and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico 
overcome disaster preparedness gaps amid catastrophe through 
both formal and informal networks? 
C. RESEARCH DESIGN
FEMA’s 2018–2022 Strategic Plan holds three strategic goals. This study
addresses two of them, (1) build a culture of preparedness, and (2) ready the nation for 
catastrophic disasters. The most outstanding question is how to achieve these goals, and 
this study seeks answers to this question, in small part, in the context of Puerto Rico 
following the devastating impacts of Hurricane Maria. This thesis employs a single case 
study methodology focused on Hurricane Maria’s lessons, uncovered by examining the 
shortcomings in disaster response resources and improvisations employed to compensate 
for resource shortages so that Puerto Rico and other communities can learn from the 
Hurricane Maria experience to reduce future disaster risk.  
The two elements supporting the primary research question—response 
shortcomings and improvisations—are discussed in the context of FEMA’s seven 
community lifelines. This format allows communities and emergency management 
practitioners to view Hurricane Maria’s impacts in their component parts. The whole 
community response actions can be retrospectively examined to understand better and 
inform more effective approaches to build community preparedness and disaster 
resilience against future catastrophic disasters.  
Taken collectively, Puerto Rico’s shortfalls and adaptations will contribute to 
informing how communities cope when the NRF enters partial or total collapse when 
outside response resources become unavailable or otherwise inadequate to meet the needs 
of those impacted by disaster. The study’s ultimate intent is to determine the challenges 
communities will face in catastrophic disasters when external response and recovery 
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resources are unavailable to respond. By examining how communities in Puerto Rico 
adapted in the absence of external support, other communities and disaster practitioners 
can craft new strategies aimed at catastrophic disaster preparedness, primarily at the 
community level. This study compiles and utilizes secondary data sources. Secondary 
data includes government reports and academic studies specifically related to Hurricane 
Maria’s impacts from September 2017 to September 2018.  
The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico was selected as the single case to evaluate 
based on several criteria. Following Hurricane Maria, the island experienced two 
catastrophic hurricanes in close sequence and endured the most extended power outage in 
the U.S. recorded history, the disaster occurred recently in 2017, the Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico presents a geographically isolated and resource-constrained environment, 
literature is widely available documenting the impacts of Hurricane Maria and the 
subsequent catastrophic effects, and the author has spent a considerable amount of time 
operating in Puerto Rico as an emergency management professional.18  
The author is conscious of the unique aspects of Puerto Rico’s pre-existing fiscal 
and infrastructure status before Hurricane Maria and its limitations on the generalization 
of the study findings. However, Puerto Rico was selected as a literal island to explore the 
reliance on outside resources to offer lessons to Puerto Rico and other jurisdictions that 
may one day become figurative islands in a catastrophic disaster. This case study is 
conducted in a structured educational environment respective to existing resource 
constraints. The study is designed to offer relatively generalizable knowledge and case-
specific insight into the reliance on outside resources likely to be unavailable in a major 
national disaster and how Puerto Rico overcame adversity. 
 
18 This source indicates the durations of several major power outages linked to disasters. President’s 
National Infrastructure Advisory Council, Surviving a Catastrophic Power Outage: How to Strengthen the 




D. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The following is a brief thesis overview that affords a roadmap for this chapter 
and the following chapters.  
Chapter I reviews catastrophic disaster preparedness, and presents the research 
questions and the research design as a single case study.  
By defining the problem, positing research questions, and building a research 
design to answer the research questions, readers are led to Chapter II. This chapter 
addresses the literature review and presents the background of Puerto Rico and Hurricane 
Maria. Chapter II also provides insight into literature influential to the topic of 
catastrophic disaster preparedness spanning national frameworks, strategies, plans, 
emerging trends, and various other literature, such as after-action reports (AARs), books, 
research articles, and media accounts.  
Chapter III serves as the core of this study and details Hurricane Maria’s impacts, 
the various preparedness, response, and recovery gaps, and where possible, illustrates 
community adaptations to resource shortfalls. The chapter reviews FEMA’s seven 
community lifelines and their respective sub-components to organize large volumes of 
information into a useable format.  
Chapter IV offers themes and conclusions derived from the case study. Themes 
presented emerged through grounded theory and were consistently observed across all 
community lifelines. The study’s conclusions are more tactile and are also organized 
according to the lifeline format. 
While this study focuses on Puerto Rico, the themes and conclusions are likely 
useful to other jurisdictions around the nation when considering how to prepare for, 
respond to, and recover from catastrophic disasters. In total, this study aims to transition 
the governmental concept of “whole community” into more tactile findings and to 
contextualize emerging trends in society and disaster preparedness by grounding them in 
the real-world example of Puerto Rico.  
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II. HURRICANE MARIA AND PUERTO RICO 
This chapter provides the case study context in the form of a literature review, the 
historical background of Puerto Rico, and a brief overview of Hurricane Maria. The 
literature review evaluates preparedness concerning governing doctrine before turning to 
emerging trends in disasters, preparedness, and modern society. The review then 
evaluates available literature that offers a historical record of Hurricane Maria’s nature 
and impacts.  
The following sections relating to historical context, and Hurricane Maria, are 
intended to stress that disasters do not occur in a vacuum. Instead, factors, such as 
geography, economy, politics, and public health, play influential roles in disaster 
preparedness, response, and recovery outcomes. The case of Hurricane Maria and Puerto 
Rico illustrates a convergence of underlying risk factors coupled with a catastrophic 
disaster that informs the research questions in this specific case and may also provide 
useful application in other contexts in communities considering how to become more 
prepared for, and resilient to, disasters.  
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review focuses on several key areas concerning community 
preparedness for catastrophic disasters. The first section addresses current government 
doctrine, such as strategies, frameworks, and plans outlining the national approach  
to disaster preparedness and response. The second section focuses on provides context 
and insight by evaluating literature addressing emerging trends that affect the way  
society will manage disasters in the 21st century. The third and final section considers 
available AARs, academic studies, media accounts, and published non-fiction accounts  
of Hurricane Maria. A review of this literature reveals a well-developed multi-tiered 
emergency management framework, primarily driven by government-centric solutions 
that may be ill equipped to face 21st-century realities without adapting to an  
evolving world.  
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1. National Frameworks, Strategies, and Plans 
After 9/11, the federal government actively pursued an organized, systematic 
approach to national preparedness and response, beginning with the 2003 Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 5, Management of Domestic Incidents, which 
established the National Incident Management System, and HSPD 8, National 
Preparedness, which called for the formation of a national preparedness system.19 The 
former is how the nation “work [s] together to share resources, integrate tactics, and act 
collaboratively,” and recognizes the need to develop an “interoperable approach to 
sharing resources, coordinating and managing incidents, and communicating 
information” when responding to disasters.20 The latter serves the same purpose of 
providing a national organizing framework for the preparedness mission. 
Following the devastating impacts of Hurricane Katrina in August 2005, which 
claimed more than 1,800 human lives, Congress issued an essential piece of legislation, 
the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006. As a central theme, this 
act refocused FEMA on “all-hazards” preparation and response and mandated that FEMA 
adopt a risk-based approach to assessing national preparedness.21 President Obama 
reinforced his predecessor’s mandates in 2011 by issuing Presidential Policy Directive 
(PPD) 8, National Preparedness.22 PPD-8 called explicitly for not only a national 
preparedness system but also a national preparedness goal; importantly, it also recognized 
the shared mission of disaster preparedness and response, “All levels of government, the 
private sector and nonprofit sectors, and individual citizens” should endeavor to create 
“an integrated, all-of nation, capabilities-based approach to preparedness.”23 PPD-8 was 
 
19 George W. Bush, Management of Domestic Incidents, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 
(Washington, DC: White House, 2003), 3, https://www.dhs.gov/publication/homeland-security-
presidential-directive-5; George W. Bush, National Preparedness, Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive 8 (Washington, DC: White House, 2003), 1747, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-8.html.  
20 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Incident Management System, 3rd ed. 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2017), 1, https://www.fema.gov/media-library/
assets/documents/148019. 
21 Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act, S. 3721, 109th Cong., 2nd sess. (2006). 
22 PPD-8 rescinded HSPD-8 except for paragraph 44 of Annex I. 
23 Barack Obama, National Preparedness, Presidential Policy Directive 8 (Washington, DC: White 
House, 2011), 1, https://www.dhs.gov/presidential-policy-directive-8-national-preparedness. 
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the first time “individual citizens” were mentioned in federal disaster directives in the 
context of limited federal government response capacity. All prior frameworks had 
implied that the federal government was the last resort, whereas PPD-8 recognized that 
an effective response to a catastrophic disaster requires a whole-of-community approach 
due to inherent limitations of the federal government response capacity. 
While each piece of legislation aspired to the common goal of readying America 
for disasters, each also maintained a federalist worldview that supported the 10th 
Amendment and recognized state sovereignty. For instance, the National Preparedness 
Goal (NPG) provided direction toward a more prepared nation while issuing no state or 
local mandate to perform any specific action other than via federal grant requirements.24 
To influence community preparedness action without directing it, the Obama 
administration followed PPD-8 with A Whole Community Approach to Emergency 
Management: Principles, Themes, and Pathways for Action, which offered a 
philosophical approach and definition of “whole community.” The whole-community 
approach recognizes that “government at all levels cannot manage disasters alone” and that 
“the issue of social capital becomes an important part of encouraging communities to own 
and lead their own resilience activities.”25 The guidance maintained six “strategic themes,” 
all centered on a bottom-up approach to build up capability in recognition of resource 
constraints at all levels of government. While the Whole Community document 
successfully changed the mindset of the nation’s emergency management community to 
be more inclusive in disaster preparedness and response, the practical implementation of 
the approach has not been systematically evaluated.26 The “whole community approach” 
 
24 The first iteration of the National Preparedness Goal (NPG) was issued in 2012 following the 2011 
issuance of PPD-8. A subsequent update to the NPG, which added a core capability and modified several 
other core capability names and definitions, was issued in 2015. Regarding the federal prescription of 
action, state and local requirements typically derive from the federal government as a condition of 
receiving a variety of preparedness, mitigation, and disaster recovery grants made available to state and 
local entities, which are administered by FEMA. 
25 Federal Emergency Management Agency, A ‘Whole Community’ Approach to Emergency 
Management (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2011), 14, 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=776745. 
26 The mindset shift is noted in emergency management courses and FEMA doctrine and is commonly 
used in the emergency management lexicon.  
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to emergency management was an open and honest admission of the limitations of 
government in the face of catastrophic disasters and represented a genuine interest in 
involving all Americans in preparing for disasters. The policy clearly stated that to 
survive and thrive amid catastrophe, the entire nation would need to work together to 
achieve common goals. Both the document and the administration that created it made 
efforts to bring the policy to life; however, clearly defined roles for non-governmental 
actors, particularly every American community, remain absent from subsequent policy 
and doctrine. 
Instead, the Whole Community Approach operates as a “philosophical” document, 
and avoids over-prescribing specific action in recognition that each American community 
possesses unique characteristics, a reality that makes blanket approaches impracticable. 
Other agencies have adopted a similar ethos. For instance, the U.S. Agency of 
International Development (USAID) has developed the “Journey to Self-Reliance,” 
which the agency describes as “a framework for the future” aimed at making 
international aid unnecessary.27 In addition, in partnership with the Office of Foreign 
Disaster Assistance, the USAID has co-championed the “neighborhood approach,” whose 
aim is increasing service effectiveness in urban environments.28 Nearly a decade since its 
inception, FEMA’s adoption and implementation of the Whole Community Approach has 
not been formally evaluated. However, the USAID has formally researched the 
implementation of its urban policy and issued findings in a June 2019 report.29 This 
report is offered as a contrast between FEMA’s philosophical approach and the USAID’s 
more concrete approach to common problems of resilience. 
 
27 “The Journey to Self-Reliance,” U.S. Agency of International Development, August 6, 2020, 
https://www.usaid.gov/selfreliance. 
28 U.S. Agency of International Development and Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, The 
‘Neighborhood Approach’: A Means of Improving the Delivery of Humanitarian Assistance in Urban 
Areas” (Washington, DC: U.S. Agency of International Development, 2011), 1, 
https://www.humanitarianlibrary.org/sites/default/files/2014/01/USAID-
OFDA%20Neighborhood%20Approach%20One-Pager%20’11%20Sept%2023.pdf. 
29 U.S. Agency of International Development, Assessment of the Implementation of USAID’s Urban 
Policy (Washington, DC: U.S. Agency of International Development, 2019), 7, https://urban-links.org/
assessment-of-the-implementation-of-usaids-urban-policy/. 
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National frameworks are another key requirement outlined in PPD-8.30 The NRF, 
for example, “provides foundational emergency management doctrine for how the Nation 
responds to all types of incidents.”31 In the latest edition of the response framework, 
published in October 2019, FEMA recognized that due to both the unparalleled impact of 
recent natural disasters and potential threat actors developing weapons and tactics that 
threaten national infrastructure, an urgent need emerges to “build resilient capabilities to 
respond to disasters of increasing frequency and magnitude.”32 The framework also notes 
that disaster responses should be “federally supported, state managed, and locally 
executed.”33 It is the first time the NRF placed this much emphasis on local response 
capacity and its ability to drive rapid, effective solutions in disaster response and 
recovery and noted, “local partners know their community’s needs, capabilities, and 
resources best and are positioned to have the most effective impact in the aftermath of an 
incident.”34 This approach is noteworthy for its ideological departure from the former 
FEMA administration under Craig Fugate who strived to mold FEMA into an 
“expeditionary organization” in the agency’s 2014–2018 Strategic Plan.35 While FEMA 
in 2014 was intent on responding faster and more comprehensively, the FEMA of 2020 is 
placing greater focus on levels of capability and building capacity leading up to the 
federal level. The fourth edition of the NRF was a timely reflection on the increasing 
scope, scale, frequency, and complexity of disasters and the limitations of government at 
all levels. The framework also presents a continuation of PPD-8’s recognition of the 
limitations of the federal government through an emphasis on foundational resilience of 
American communities. 
 
30 Frameworks included national prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and disaster recovery. 
“National Planning Frameworks,” Federal Emergency Management Agency, October 30, 2019, 
https://www.fema.gov/national-planning-frameworks. 
31 Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework, ii. 
32 Department of Homeland Security, ii. 
33 Department of Homeland Security, 7. 
34 Department of Homeland Security, 16. 
35 Federal Emergency Management Agency, FEMA Strategic Plan 2014–2018 (Washington, DC: 




A contingency for the collapse of support structures is absent in all the governing 
legislation, directives, and frameworks. For example, the NRF references the ability to 
scale disaster responses from local capabilities to state and federal resources. The key 
assumption in the NRF and all policies is that the federal government exists as a bulwark 
against system overload, yet policies remain silent on threats that may well collapse even 
a multi-layered support structure. In a major disaster with widespread impacts, the federal 
government’s resources may be overburdened, and vital support mechanisms, such as the 
Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) network, may not be viable 
options to communities across America.  
Beyond all-hazards frameworks, the federal government has also developed 
incident-specific plans aimed at catastrophic power outages. FEMA’s Power Outage 
Incident Annex provides the agency a concept of operations when managing a 
catastrophic power outage.36 Written in 2017, the plan is a step in the right direction 
toward acknowledging the threat to the national grids. However, the plan is designed only 
to provide “guidance for federal level responders to provide response and recovery 
support to local, state, tribal, territorial, and insular area efforts.”37 The plan provides a 
roadmap for the coordination of federal resources but does not serve as a local 
preparedness guide nor prescribes catastrophic preparedness actions. Similarly, the 
National Cyber Incident Response Plan, developed by the DHS, is “the strategic 
framework for operational coordination among federal and SLTT governments, the 
private sector, and international partners.”38 While limited in their scope, each of these 
plans is the bedrock that allows subsequent planning to occur at the regional, state, and 
local levels; however, little evidence indicates it has been a widespread or coordinated 
effort to date. Thus, communities are left vulnerable to catastrophic power outages, such 
 
36 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Power Outage Incident Annex to the Response and 
Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2017), 15, https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=806536. 
37 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 3. 
38 Department of Homeland Security, The National Cyber Incident Response Plan (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2016), 6, https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/ncirp/
National_Cyber_Incident_Response_Plan.pdf. 
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as the one suffered amid Hurricane Maria, which will cripple vital power-reliant critical 
infrastructure components that drive and sustain modern life.  
Disaster preparedness and response doctrine have evolved significantly over the 
years and represent a far more holistic approach to disaster management as the field 
continues to professionalize. Presidential directives and post-disaster legislation appear to 
be the most influential catalysts in effecting systemic change. The tiered disaster 
preparedness and response system built and honed since 9/11 has offered a great deal of 
resiliency to the nation’s ability to manage the consequences of a wide range of disasters 
of varying severity. However, national disasters, particularly widespread and long-term 
power outages, represent a key vulnerability to the overreliance on the perennial viability 
of outside resource availability. Literature available on the nature of evolving and 
emerging threats provides the impetus to look beyond the NRF and the progress made 
within the field of disaster management to scenarios in which local communities cannot 
rely on disaster aid beyond their borders, thus necessitating that they manage the 
consequences of the outages only with local resources for an extended period.  
2. Emerging Trends 
The world is changing, and the nation faces a variety of catastrophic threats, some 
of which are long-standing while others are new and emerging. A growing body of 
evidence suggests that decentralized, distributed networks offer the resilience needed to 
face 21st-century challenges. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
(ODNI)’s report titled Global Trends: Paradox of Progress outlines how societies will 
need to evolve to meet future threats. The report states, “Tomorrow’s successful states 
will probably be those that invest in infrastructure, knowledge, and relationships resilient 
to shock—whether economic, environmental, societal, or cyber,” noting that “openness  
to mobilizing a wide range of commercial, religious, civil, and advocacy organizations at 
all levels of government will be key to sustaining positive outcomes.”39 Although the 
report assumes a global view, its adaptation concepts apply to the United States as well. 
 
39 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends: Paradox of Progress, NIC 2017-001 (Washington, 
DC: National Intelligence Council, 2017), 66, https://www.dni.gov/files/images/globalTrends/documents/
GT-Main-Report.pdf. 
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The document’s underlying philosophy centers upon the decentralization of human 
networks and the inherent resilience of such an approach. Decentralization does not 
necessarily equate to a loss of coordination or chaos; instead, it supports the idea  
of building capability at the lowest levels possible in communities to bolster flexibility 
and resilience.  
Societal evolutions have also been captured via the lens of emergency and disaster 
management and arrived at similar conclusions. In 2012, FEMA published a forward-
looking document titled Crisis Response and Disaster Resilience 2030: Forging Strategic 
Action in an Age of Uncertainty. Much like the ODNI’s report, FEMA’s report offers 
foresight into future challenges. The report forecasts that “future operating environments 
may well be characterized by significant decline in governmental resources for 
emergency management,” and considers existing and future vulnerabilities to national 
and global supply lines.40 FEMA’s report also offers insight into how the emergency 
management field should engage its constituents. For instance, the report suggests that 
“community institutions [be] further empowered and routinely contribute to emergency 
management” and proposes, “emergency management programs connect to communities 
through the social, economic, and political structures that are part of daily life.”41 The 
report’s philosophical center of gravity is the devolution of top-down approaches to more 
community-led, self-reliant endeavors that may be vital to communities withstanding 
catastrophic disasters. 
In keeping with the spirit of decentralized networks, community engagement and 
resilience, various authors offer their views on the topic. Author and founding Director of 
the Global Resilience Institute at Northeastern University, Stephen Flynn, opines that 
America made a misstep in investing in the DHS instead of focusing on national 
resilience, and offers that just as important as America’s ability to deliver a “punch” is its 
 
40 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Crisis Response and Disaster Resilience 2030: Forging 
Strategic Action in an Age of Uncertainty (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
2012), 14, https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=697458. 
41 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 22. 
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ability to take one.42 Likewise, author Joshua Cooper Ramo advocates for a renewed 
focus on societal resilience.43 Ramo’s main argument is that shocks to human systems 
occurred because “complexity accumulated” and arrived at seemingly unpredictable 
breaking points. He used theoretical physicist Per Bak’s work and “sandpile” experiments 
to illustrate his point. Bak’s studies revealed that seemingly stable systems “evolve into a 
poised ‘critical’ state” where insignificant occurrences can lead to severe 
consequences.44 Ramo’s recipe for avoiding unpredictable system shock is to build 
resilient distributed systems throughout society. It is a “Department of Resilience” as a 
partner to the Department of Defense that Ramo feels would “bind Americans into a 
compact of responsibility and a network of personal relationships sealed by working hand 
in hand.”45 However, challenges surround Ramo’s Department of Resilience, particularly 
as it relates to the nation-state’s role of offering its citizens security and protection.46 In 
the post-World War II world, Fjäder offers that the nation-state offers positive political 
goods, such as “security, health care, education, law and order, economic opportunity and 
critical infrastructure, i.e., the protection of the overall well-being of its citizens,” and 
assumes a role in citizens’ lives that is both “pervasive and persistent.” Fjäder further 
argues that the globalized world beginning in the 1990s has resulted in greater 
“deterritorialisation” and increased the interconnectedness of states. This change has 
made providing security a more complex matter resulting in “cultural, security, social and 
political impacts,” which therefore presents a need for national resilience, for which 
Ramo and Flynn also advocate that aligns with national security objectives.47 In one way 
or another, all these works point to a need for more agile, adaptable, and resilient human 
networks. Furthermore, they point to a growing dialogue surrounding resilience as a 
 
42 Stephen E. Flynn, The Edge of Disaster: Rebuilding a Resilient Nation (New York: Random House, 
2007), Loc. 183, Kindle. 
43 Joshua Ramo, The Age of the Unthinkable: Why the New World Order Constantly Surprises Us 
(New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2009), 190. 
44 Ramo, 49.  
45 Ramo, 191. 
46 Christian Fjäder, “The Nation-State, National Security and Resilience in the Age of Globalisation,” 
Resilience 2, no. 2 (2014): 114–29, https://doi.org/10.1080/21693293.2014.914771. 
47 Fjäder, 115–6. 
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national concept supporting national security and not merely a characteristic of people or 
communities. While the precise nature of resilience is still debated, broad consensus feels 
it facilitates rapid community recovery to normal or near-normal conditions from 
catastrophic disasters.  
3. After-Action Reports, Academic Studies, Oversight Reports, Media 
Accounts, Media Accounts, and Published Non-fiction 
The events surrounding Hurricane Maria’s impact on Puerto Rico have been 
covered extensively in agency AARs, academic studies, government oversight reports, 
media accounts, and published non-fiction books. While each source provides valuable 
information, nearly all references provide agency-specific viewpoints, examine a single 
subset of issues, or offer a snapshot in time.  
AARs contain a wide range of topic-specific information offering critical insight 
into the challenges and successes of responding to and recovering from Hurricane Maria. 
These documents also often tangentially shed light or imply upon the state of pre-disaster 
preparedness. FEMA, as the lead agency for large-scale disaster responses, drafted the 
2017 Hurricane Season After-action Report. While not solely focused on Hurricane 
Maria and Puerto Rico, it does offer a wealth of information on topics, such as 
observations on responding to concurrent, complex operations, whole community 
logistics, long-term infrastructure outages, mass care operations, and disaster staffing.48 
This report turned a corner in the agency’s willingness for self-reflection and recognition 
of the role of complexity in disaster responses. Moreover, it stands as one of the most 
thorough AARs the agency has produced to date.  
FEMA was joined by a wide range of agencies and organizations—both 
governmental and non-governmental—that produced their own AARs. Some of these 
entities include the Puerto Rico Department of Health, Americares, the American Red 
Cross (ARC), the ARRL, TRACIE Healthcare Emergency Preparedness Information 
Gateway, the Medical Reserve Corps, the Puerto Rico National Guard, the National 
Emergency Management Association (NEMA), the Heritage Foundation, the World 
 
48 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2017 Hurricane Season, iv.  
19 
Meteorological Organization, Oxfam America, the Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), 
and many others.  
Similar to AARs, a wide range of academic institutions have conducted studies on 
the state of Puerto Rico and the aftermath of Hurricane Maria. Some organizations that 
have conducted studies include the Milken Institute School of Public Health, the Journal 
of Recreation, Parks, and Tourism in Public Health, the Journal of Agriculture, Food 
Systems, and Community Development, the Geological Society of America, the Institute 
for Food and Development Policy, the Journal of Environmental Science and 
Technology, the Emergency Medicine Clinics of North America, the International 
Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, the Homeland Security Affairs Journal, the U.S. 
Geological Survey, the New England Journal of Medicine, the Urban Institute, the 
International Journal of Climatology, and many other publications. Each study provides 
valuable insight into specific issues over isolated periods that, when taken together, offer 
a more holistic account of the impacts of Hurricane Maria.  
Governmental oversight reports also provide helpful insight into what worked 
well and what proved challenging in response to Hurricane Maria. Several reports from 
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the RAND Corporation (or RAND) 
contain the most valuable information as each monitor and report specific issues 
pertaining to the preparedness for, response to, and recovery from Hurricane Maria. 
Helpful topics include RAND’s review of U.S. Army North’s response in the Caribbean 
and general observations of how FEMA can improve for future disasters. Likewise, the 
GAO published initial 2017 seasonal findings regarding disaster response, addressed 
issues pertaining to disaster contracting, integration of non-governmental actors into 
disaster response, reports specific to the role of Health and Human Services (HHS), 
challenges unique to major emergencies, federal support of electrical grid restoration, and 
other older reports that offered important context for the events of 2017. Each of these 
reports operates as a harbinger of issues to be cognizant of as other sources of 
information are reviewed throughout the course of this study; they also offer an 
authoritative source on the issues. 
20 
Complimentary to official reports and academic studies, a wide range of media 
outlets also prove valuable in examining the topic of Hurricane Maria because stories in 
the press often provide experiential insight directly from citizens and tell stories not 
otherwise depicted in more official reports. Given the focus of this thesis on community 
catastrophic disaster preparedness, media reports fill an important void whereby 
communities’ stories can be told while being understood in a broader context of the 
disaster itself. However, each report typically focuses on specific issues, in certain areas, 
over varying lengths of time. By combining media reports and pairing them with official 
reports, the goal is to place them in the appropriate context and allow each source to fact-
check the others.  
Lastly, works of published non-fiction provided much-needed depth on specific 
issues impacting Puerto Rican communities and community disaster resilience more 
broadly. Primary texts include Building Resilience: Social Capital in post-Disaster 
Recovery, We Fed an Island: The True Story of Rebuilding Puerto Rico, One Meal at a 
Time, When the Sky Fell: Hurricane Maria and the United States in Puerto Rico, and Out 
of the Whirlwind: Supply and Demand after Hurricane Maria. Each story offers largely 
topic-specific insight, first-person accounts, and in many cases, was founded upon the 
authors’ research. Each text’s veracity can be cross-referenced with other available 
sources in the interest of accuracy and factual accounting for the impacts and events of 
Hurricane Maria.  
Each source type discussed provides valuable insight into the preparedness, 
response, and recovery associated with Hurricane Maria; however, all were written from 
a single issue or single agency perspective, which does not detail the entirety of 
Hurricane Maria’s impact on Puerto Rico. This thesis aims to leverage all these sources 
to provide a more holistic understanding of Hurricane Maria’s impact on Puerto Rico, 
major gaps, ways in which communities overcame adversity, and promising leads to 
improve disaster resilience not only on the island but for other interested communities as 
well. Furthermore, a majority of available texts focus on the performance and shortfalls 
of agencies and entities, while this thesis focuses on the resulting outcome for 
communities in an effort to paint a community-centric picture of disaster circumstances 
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in hopes Puerto Rico’s experience instructs other communities on catastrophic disaster 
preparedness.  
4. Literature Review Summary 
A comprehensive review of the literature indicates a recognition of the challenges 
that catastrophic disasters pose to preparedness, response, and recovery, but has yet to 
transform a vision of disaster resilience from concept to application. For instance, while 
the federal government has explicitly recognized its own limitations in providing services 
amid catastrophic disaster—and consequently has expressed the desire to include the 
“whole community” in the national preparedness endeavor—the NRF and the NPG offer 
no concrete vision for including the public, comprised of communities across the nation. 
These frameworks are developed for state and local governments as primary audiences 
and do little to spur public action. Furthermore, the NRF offers no contingency for 
communities in the event they become isolated from outside disaster aid resources in a 
partial or total collapse of the framework. Ergo, Puerto Rico stands as an instructive case 
in terms of how communities prepare and cope with isolation amid resource deficits 
following catastrophic disasters.  
Literature concerning emerging trends in disasters and society indicates a growing 
intensity, frequency, and complexity of future disasters that will pose resource challenges 
on governing bodies to serve as disaster aid providers, and therefore, coalesces around 
concepts of decentralization and inclusion. Notwithstanding, these concepts lack the 
context of real-world examples that demonstrate these emerging realities that the various 
reports outlined provide.  
Lastly, scant literature is available that affords a complete picture of the events 
and consequences of Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico. Dozens of agency reports, 
academic studies, humanitarian organization updates, published books, and an array of 
media stories typically afford only one aspect of the island’s experience either through 
one discipline or over a limited period of time. This study serves as a compilation of a 
vast range of available literature and attempts to present relative information as 
completely as possible.  
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B. BACKGROUND 
The island of Puerto Rico is roughly the geographic size of the State of 
Connecticut and spans roughly 100 miles east-to-west and approximately 40 miles north-
to-south, an area smaller than the Miami, Ft. Lauderdale, and West Palm Beach metro 
statistical area.49 Roughly, 2.3–2.45 million of the island’s 3.2 million residents reside in 
the northern portion of the island surrounding the present-day capital city of San Juan.50 
Overall, 93.6% of the population resides in urban areas, and the 2020 population estimate 
is 3,189,068, which represents a -1.59% growth rate since the 2018 estimation.51 A vast 
majority of the population lives in coastal areas, predominantly in the eastern portion of 
the island. A sizeable population also lives south of the capital city of San Juan. The 
interior and western portion of the island is dominated by the Cordillera Central 
mountains and is sparsely populated.52  
1. Historical Context 
The island has a long Spanish colonial history spanning over 400 years before 
coming under the control of the United States in 1898 during the Spanish-American War. 
The first European encounter with the island was in November 1493 under Christopher 
Columbus; he named the island San Juan Bautista after St. John the Baptist.53 Over time, 
the name applied to the present-day Bay of San Juan, “Puerto Rico,” meaning “rich port,” 
began to be applied to the entire island.54 Prior to European arrival, the local population 
knew Puerto Rico as “Bonrinquen.”55 
 
49 Philip J. Palin, “Learning from H.I.M. (Harvey, Irma, Maria): Preliminary Impressions for Supply 
Chain Resilience,” Homeland Security Affairs Journal 14, no. 7 (September 2018), 
https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=816668. 
50 Palin. 
51 “The World Factbook, Central America: Puerto Rico,” Central Intelligence Agency, 2020, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rq.html. 
52 Central Intelligence Agency. 
53 Michael Deibert, When the Sky Fell: Hurricane Maria and the United States in Puerto Rico (New 
York: Apollo Publishers, 2019), 13. 
54 Deibert, 12. 
55 Deibert, 12. 
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Today, Puerto Ricans are born American citizens but still have limited political 
representation.56 The Jones-Shafroth Act granted Puerto Ricans citizenship in 1916, 
some 18 years after coming under United States control, and was heavily influenced by 
Luis Munoz Rivera, who was a renowned political figure who held office in the House of 
Representatives from 1911–1916.57 Rivera’s son, Luis Munoz Marin, was Puerto Rico’s 
Governor from 1949–1965. He is credited with bringing the island and its people into an 
“Estado Asociado Libre” (Free Associated State) that brought the island to its 
Commonwealth status allowing free travel to and from the mainland, voting in 
presidential primaries (but not general elections), and permitting Puerto Ricans to serve 
in the U.S. armed forces.58 While many Puerto Ricans have, and do, celebrate the 
island’s status in relation to the United States mainland, others feel that they are second-
class citizens still under quasi-colonial rule largely because of their continued lack of 
voting power in Congress and inability to vote in Presidential elections.59 Many Puerto 
Ricans are also disenfranchised due to the island’s Financial Oversight and Management 
Board (PROMESA by its Spanish acronym), established in 2016 to oversee Puerto Rican 
financials in light of its massive debt crisis. The board consists of seven members, all 
appointed by the President of the United States, and a majority of the members do not 
reside in Puerto Rico.60 
2. Hurricane Maria 
Hurricane Maria was the most devastating storm to strike Puerto Rico, in terms of 
intensity, since the landfall of a Category 5 hurricane known as “Segundo San Felipe” in 
1928 and is the third costliest storm in U.S. history, and trails Hurricanes Katrina (2005) 
and Harvey (2017). Its minimum central pressure of 908 millibars (Mb) is the lowest on 
 
56 Deibert, 9. 
57 Deibert, 10. 
58 Deibert, 10. 
59 Deibert, 93. 
60 Naomi Klein and Lauren Feeney, “Puerto Ricans and Ultrarich ‘Puertopians’ Are Locked in a 
Pitched Struggle over How to Remake the Island,” The Intercept, March 20, 2018, https://theintercept.com/
2018/03/20/puerto-rico-hurricane-maria-recovery/. 
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record in the Atlantic basin east of 70°W; Hurricane Irma had set the record just two 
weeks prior at 914 Mb.61 In the context of Puerto Rico, Hurricane Maria was by far the 
costliest storm on record with damages estimated to top 90 billion dollars; the next 
costliest storm is Hurricane Georges of 1998 with a mere five billion dollar price tag.62 
At landfall on the morning of September 20, 2017, Maria made landfall near Yabucoa, 
Puerto Rico with 135-knot winds (155 mph) as confirmed by the National Hurricane 
Center.63 Maria delivered localized rainfall amounts up to 38 inches across portions of 
the island and caused record riverine flooding—mainly along the La Plata River—and 
widespread landslides that severely impacted roadways, bridges, businesses, and homes. 
Early on the morning of September 20, Maria was undergoing a natural eye-wall 
replacement cycle when it struck Puerto Rico, which decreased its intensity to Category 4 
before landfall but also caused a doubling in size of the eye-wall, which exposed a greater 
portion of the island to the hurricane’s highest sustained winds found along the edge of 
the eye-wall.64 In addition to rainfall and storm-force winds, Hurricane Maria delivered a 
storm surge that, when combined with tides, amounted to 6–9 feet in the municipalities of 
Humacao, Naguabo, and Ceiba along Puerto Rico’s southeastern coast, and storm surge 
amounts of 3–5 feet along the northeastern coast.65 Throughout the day, Hurricane Maria 
tracked to the northwest for over eight hours and left a wake of destruction.  
The response to Hurricane Maria was record setting for FEMA, an agency also 
simultaneously managing the impacts of one major hurricane in Texas, two major 
hurricanes in the Caribbean, and the worst wildfire season in California’s modern history, 
as well as multiple other small-scale disasters around the nation.66 Puerto Rico also 
called on the aid of a majority of U.S. states to perform various disaster response and 
 
61 National Hurricane Center, National Hurricane Center Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Maria 
(Washington, DC: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2019), 4, https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/
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62 National Hurricane Center, 7. 
63 National Hurricane Center, 2. 
64 National Hurricane Center, 4. 
65 National Hurricane Center, 5. 
66 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2017 Hurricane Season, v.  
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recovery functions. In total, over the course of the next year, 5,659 personnel from 35 
states had responded to support residents of Puerto Rico in some form via the EMAC 
network overseen by NEMA.67 Gaps in Puerto Rico’s preparedness for this catastrophic 
disaster are quite evident; however, it is unlikely that even states with greater resources 
and more mature capabilities would have been able to mount a more effective response 
amid such devastation. An additional key factor is Puerto Rico’s inaccessibility as 
opposed to mainland states that benefit from overland response and recovery resources 
that make the application of resources logistically much easier. 
3. Background Summary 
Puerto Rico’s historical context and lived experience of Hurricane Maria helps to 
ground this study’s research questions in a specific place and time that provide context to 
the lifeline sections within Chapter III. The island’s historical economic and political 
position to the mainland United States, and its current economic realities, informs likely 
preparedness gaps while also framing likely citizen responses and ideological position 
vis-à-vis the role of the government. Hurricane Maria struck within a complex societal 
context that, in many cases, amplified disaster impacts, and in others, showed ingenuity, 
grit, and community resilience, and revealed untapped potential toward ensuring a more 
disaster-resilient future.  
The context provided for Hurricane Maria as a disaster also serves to highlight the 
gaps in existing federal preparedness and response doctrine that has thus far proven 
unable to incorporate citizens and afford them a substantial disaster preparedness, 
response, and recovery role. Hurricane Maria also illustrated the limitations of the NRF 
when mutual-aid or federal response resources experience response delays or resource 
shortages resulting in service provision gaps for the public. Overall, the background 
indicates where national planning frameworks end and community resilience begins. 
  
 
67 National Emergency Management Association, Emergency Management Assistance Compact 
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III. CATASTROPHIC PREPAREDNESS GAPS AND 
COMMUNITY ADAPTATIONS 
The following section examines Puerto Rico’s preparedness gaps and innovative 
solutions to cope with them in the wake of Hurricane Maria, which are apportioned 
according to FEMA’s community lifelines as one means of examining a wide range of 
disaster response functions.  
The FEMA community lifelines consist of: 
• safety and security 
• food, water, and sheltering 




• hazardous materials 
Community lifelines “ensure the delivery of critical services that alleviate 
immediate threats to life and property when communities are impacted by disasters.”68 
The critical services are outlined and organized into the following seven community 
lifelines. Each lifeline also consists of components and subcomponents found in Table 1. 
 
 
68 Federal Emergency Management Agency, FEMA Incident Stabilization Guide (Operational Draft) 
(Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2019), 1, 
https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=833977. 
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Table 1. Lifeline Components and Subcomponents.69 
Lifeline Components Description 
 
1. Law Enforcement and 
Security 
2. Fire Service 
3. Search and Rescue 
4. Government Service 
5. Community Safety 
Law enforcement and government 
services, as well as the associated 
assets that maintain communal 
security, provide search and rescue 
and firefighting capabilities, and 
support public safety. Includes 
impending risks to impacted 
communities, public infrastructure, 






Support systems that enable the 
sustainment of human life, such as 
food retail and distribution 
networks, water treatment, 
transmission and distribution 
systems, housing, and agriculture 
resources. 
 
1. Medical Care 
2. Public Health 
3. Patient Movement 
4. Medical Supply Chain 
5. Fatality Management 
Infrastructure and service 
providers for medical care, public 
health, patient movement, fatality 
management, behavioral health, 
veterinary support, and the 
medical industry. 
 
1. Power Grid 
2. Fuel 
Electricity service providers and 
generation, transmission, and 
distribution infrastructure, as well as 






3. Alerts, Warnings, and 
Messages 
4. Finance 
5. 911 and Dispatch 
Infrastructure owners and operators 
of broadband internet, cellular and 
landline telephone networks, cable 
services, satellite communications 
services, and broadcast networks 
(radio/television). These systems 
encompass diverse modes of 
delivery, often intertwined but 
largely operating independently. 
Services include alerts, warnings, 
and messages, 911 and dispatch, 
and access to financial services. 
 
69 Source: Federal Emergency Management Agency, FEMA Incident Stabilization Guide, 6–7. 
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Multiple modes of transportation that 
often serve complementary functions 
and create redundancy, adding to the 
resilience in overall transportation 
networks. These modes include 
roadway, mass transit, railway, 
aviation, maritime, and intermodal 
systems. 
 
1. Facilities  
2. HAZMAT, Pollutants, 
Contaminants 
Systems that mitigate threats to public 
health or the environment. These 
threats include facilities that generate 
or store hazardous substances, as well 
as all specialized conveyance assets 
and capabilities to identify, contain, 
and remove pollution, contaminants, 
oil, or other HAZMAT and substances. 
 
A. SAFETY AND SECURITY LIFELINE 
FEMA defines the safety and security lifeline as “law enforcement and 
government services, as well as the associated assets that maintain communal security, 
provide search and rescue and firefighting capabilities, and support public safety. 
Includes impending risks to impacted communities, public infrastructure, and national 
security concerns.”70 The components of this lifeline include law enforcement (LE) and 
security, fire service, search and rescue, government service, and community safety.71 
1. Law Enforcement 
The Policía Estatal de Puerto Rico, or State Police of Puerto Rico, falls under the 
Puerto Rico Department of Public Safety and maintains 13 districts throughout the 
island.72 Puerto Rico also has 13 local police departments in larger municipalities 
throughout the island. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Puerto 
 
70 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 6. 
71 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 6. 
72 The Puerto Rico Department of Public Safety oversees the Puerto Rico Police Bureau, the 
Firefighters Bureau, the Forensic Science Bureau, the Medical Emergency Bureau, the Emergency 
Management Bureau, the Special Investigations Bureau, and the 9-1-1 Bureau. “Bienvenidos,” 
Departamento de Seguridad Pública, 2020, http://www.dsp.pr.gov/Pages/default.aspx. 
30 
Rico had a total of 13,461 officers in 2017, down from a 2012 high of 17,000.73 While 
many police stations sustained damages amid Hurricane Maria, by November 2017, the 
USACE reported that 75% (148 stations) of police stations were “usable,” 23% of 
stations (43 stations) were “restricted use,” and just 2% (three stations) were deemed 
“unsafe.”74 
For many years prior to Hurricane Maria, the Puerto Rican police have been 
plagued by corruption and poor working conditions. A 2011 Department of Justice (DOJ) 
investigation reported, “far too many PRPD officers have broken their oath to uphold the 
rule of law, as they have been responsible for acts of crime and corruption and have 
routinely violated the constitutional rights of the residents of Puerto Rico.”75 Speaking in 
regard to issues facing police officers, retired FBI Agent and current Secretary of the 
Department of Public Safety, Hector Pesquera, stated, “We’re fighting different fronts 
here, salaries, benefits, they have no social security, medical plan is a pittance, and they 
passed a law several years ago that really eviscerated their pensions.”76 Issues with 
compensation and long delays in overtime payments have led to low morale and 
absenteeism among the force.77  
In December 2017, amid a brief spike in crime rates three months post-Hurricane 
Maria, police chief, Michelle Hernandez, suggested the Puerto Rico National Guard 
 
73 “Puerto Rico and Other Outlying Areas: Full-Time Law Enforcement Employees (Table 81),” 2017 
Crime in the United States, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2017, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/
2017/crime-in-the-u.s.-2017/tables/table-81/table-81-state-cuts/puerto-rico-outlying-areas.xls; Stella 
Levantesi, “Rising Crime and a Shrinking Police Force Stunt Puerto Rico’s Recovery,” Centro de 
Periodismo Investigativo, April 30, 2018, https://periodismoinvestigativo.com/2018/04/rising-crime-and-a-
shrinking-police-force-stunt-puerto-ricos-recovery/. 
74 Jordan R. Fischbach et al., “After Hurricane Maria: Predisaster Conditions, Hurricane Damage, and 
Recovery Needs in Puerto Rico,” 275, September 30, 2020, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/
RR2595.html. 
75 U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Investigation of the Puerto Rico Police 
Department (Washington, DC: Department of Justice, 2011), 110, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/
files/crt/legacy/2011/09/08/prpd_letter.pdf. 
76 Levantesi, “Rising Crime and a Shrinking Police Force.” 
77 Ray Suarez, “As Puerto Rico Rebuilds, Police Protest Working Conditions,” NPR All Things 
Considered, December 30, 2017, https://www.npr.org/2017/12/30/574810375/as-puerto-rico-rebuilds-
police-protest-working-conditions; Danica Coto, “Thousands of Puerto Rico Police Owed Overtime Call in 
Sick,” Bloomberg, December 27, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-27/thousands-
of-puerto-rico-police-owed-overtime-call-in-sick. 
31 
could fill the void in police officers amid mass absenteeism, a proposition quickly 
disregarded by Governor Ricardo Rossello.78 In February 2018, Florida Senators Marco 
Rubio and Bill Nelson wrote a letter to the DOJ urging that Attorney General, Jeff 
Sessions, offer Puerto Rico additional security support citing high rates of 
unemployment, a recent doubling in monthly homicide rates, and widespread 
unemployment.79 However, FBI crime statistics do not support the notion of a significant 
or sustained uptick in crime rates. In 2016, the bureau recorded 7,643 violent crimes; in 
2017, the FBI recorded an uptick of 119 violent crimes for a total of 7,762 incidents; in 
2018, the bureau recorded 6,417, a decrease of 1,345 incidents.80 Similar trends were 
present regarding property crimes. In 2016, the FBI recorded 35,201 property crimes; in 
2017, 31,176 property crimes were recorded; and in 2018, just 24,851 non-violent 
property crimes were recorded, which indicated a sustained and substantial decline 
despite the catastrophe of 2017 and resulting economic hardships.81 These statistics 
indicate no considerable sustained uptick in either violent or property crime surrounding 
the events of Hurricane Maria. The rallying cry of Marco Rubio and Bill Nelson seems to 
be in response to an anomalous uptick in violence, instead of a lasting trend.82 
Systemic issues in the Puerto Rican police force, and a governor’s reluctance to 
turn to the National Guard for large-scale LE support, led to a large influx of mutual-aid 
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States”; Federal Bureau of Investigation, “2017 Crime in the United States: Table 5, Crime in the United 
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LE capability following Hurricane Maria. In total, NEMA indicates that 901 mutual-aid 
officers responded who spanned 22 unique mission requests to bolster Puerto Rico’s LE, 
security, and incident management capability.83 By comparison, only 38 mutual-aid LE 
officers responded to Texas following Hurricane Harvey, and just six responded to 
Florida following Hurricane Irma.84 Puerto Rico National Guard units also provided 
communities with security and responders with force protection over the course of the 
response; in total, approximately 6,200 National Guard members originating from 38 
states supported disaster relief operations during Hurricane Maria, and 7,893 federal Title 
10 troops deployed from various bases.85 While not all National Guard personnel were 
performing security missions strictly, many elements offered vehicles, access, conducted 
search and rescue operations, provided medical equipment and services, performed 
maintenance on facilities, and distributed commodities.86 A majority of mutual-aid LE 
officers filled in at posts to afford Puerto Rican police officers much needed rest.  
This duty often included working traffic control at busy intersections void of operating 
traffic lights.87 
a. Discussion 
Hurricane Maria does not appear to have led to a systemic rise in crime rates, but 
underlying LE dysfunctionalities led to operational challenges. In 2012, Puerto Rico had 
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17,328 sworn officers and only 13,461 in 2012.88 This 22% reduction in the workforce 
led to a heavy reliance on mutual-aid LE capabilities to maintain 24-hour operations. This 
workaround solution appears to have largely met the needs of communities across Puerto 
Rico. However, the island is likely to sustain further reductions in the LE workforce void 
of salary increases, pension reform, and aggressive recruiting campaigns. This increase 
will lead to future reliance on mutual-aid LE amid other major disasters occurring over 
the near-term.  
b. Review 
A review of the literature did not reveal established community watch groups or 
other citizen-led security initiatives in Puerto Rico, nor did the review suggest a particular 
need for such programs due to increased crime. Most post-disaster literature and media 
reports indicated a cooperative environment of neighbor-helping-neighbor to assure the 
safety of others and aid in the procurement of critical resources. LE was thus able to 
provide support to search and rescue operations, welfare checks, and general services, 
such as traffic control and critical facility security. Each community will have different 
dynamics at play in disasters; therefore, post-disaster community security and LE from 
the individual citizen level to local, state, and federal government resources remains a 
key consideration within the local context.  
2. Fire Service  
Puerto Rico’s fire service is structured as a state agency, as well, under the 
umbrella of the Department of Public Safety. The department operates under a 
framework of six zones and 11 districts and maintains 91 fire stations throughout the 
island.89 The department’s Special Operations Division operates as an additional district 
 
88 “2012 Crime in the United States: Table 81, Puerto Rico and Other Outlying Areas,” FBI Uniform 
Crime Reports, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2012, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-
the-u.s.-2012/tables/81tabledatadecpdf/table-81-state-cuts/
Table_81_Full_time_Law_Enforcement_Employees_Puerto_Rico_and_Outlying_Areas_by_State_Tribal_
Other_Agencies_2012.xls; Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Puerto Rico and Other Outlying Areas: Full-
Time Law Enforcement Employees (Table 81).” 
89 “Cuerpo de bomberos de Puerto Rico: Organización,” Puerto Rico Fire Department, 2015, 
http://www.agencias.pr.gov/agencias/bomberos/SobreNosotros/Pages/Organizaci%c3%b3n.aspx. 
34 
and performs first response functions in cooperation with medical and ambulance 
personnel.90  
Many fire stations lost power, water, and or communications, which complicated 
the ability to coordinate operations; floodwaters damaged or destroyed other stations, 
although precise accounts of damage are not available.91 In reviewing FEMA public 
assistance (PA) applications, it appears that approximately $3.3 million in total fire 
station claims with roof damages accounted for roughly 23% of the costs and building 
contents for approximately 70%.92 This number may suggest a greater share of flood 
versus wind damage, but it is difficult to confirm. 
Impacts to the island’s emergency land-mobile radio (LMR) system resulted in 
only 40 of 99 fire stations being able to maintain communications capabilities.93 In total, 
approximately 50% of all primary radio systems were damaged.94 In addition to the loss 
of communications, FEMA noted in its 2017 AAR, “many critical facilities struggled to 
gain temporary power,” and stated that numerous critical facilities had no generators, 
experienced generator failure, or were otherwise afflicted by non-operational temporary 
power options.95 Facing the coupled inability to power fire stations, and communicate, 
many fire stations sought assistance from HAM radio operators to support a continuity of 
operations (COOP). ARRL radio operators established communications at the Fire 
Department Headquarters in Juncos that allowed direct communications with the Joint 
Field Office (JFO) in San Juan.96 HAM radio operators also installed portable radio 
stations on all fire stations to include the islands of Vieques and Culebra to allow first 
 
90 Puerto Rico Fire Department. 
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responders to continue communicating resource needs to San Juan and to continue 
coordinating operations.97 
To reduce long-term vulnerability, the Puerto Rico Fire Department (PRFD) has 
opted to work with donors to install solar panels on numerous fire stations.98 With solar 
installations ongoing, the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) reinforced the 
need for “smart grid technologies, redundant power delivery, and hardened 
communications” on critical infrastructure, specifically police and fire stations, and 
hospitals. The ASCE also recommended building power redundancy and resilience via 
local microgrids.99 
a. Discussion  
Responding to Hurricane Maria did not call for conventional firefighting 
capability. Instead, a large portion of the mission focused on search and rescue, which is 
covered in the next section. However, fire facilities proved to be important community 
assets. Once FEMA established operations, restoring communications and power to both 
fire stations and hospitals became a high priority in the initial response. Some firehouses 
proved to be vulnerable to flooding and lacked backup power generation and survivable 
communications capability, which presented a COOP shortfall. 
b. Review 
The COOP shortfalls drove the fire service to seek external support for generators 
and turn to the non-profit sector, such as the ARRL, for communications continuity. The 
PRFD has also decided to take action for future disasters by installing secondary power 
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sources and communications capabilities to stations in each of the fire districts.100 Fire 
stations across the country operate very closely with the communities they serve, which 
make continuity of these facilities and fire department services of particular importance 
to initial disaster response and transition to recovery operations.  
3. Search and Rescue  
In the days following Hurricane Maria, Puerto Rico received heavy mutual-aid 
assistance. Twelve urban search & rescue (US&R) teams deployed to the island and are 
credited with saving 837 lives “save or assisted” in the initial response.101 FEMA points 
out that US&R team rescue estimations are among additional rescues performed by the 
Department of Defense (DOD), Coast Guard, state and local rescue teams, and individual 
citizens aiding their neighbors.102  
A very wide array of government organizations conducted search and rescue 
operations. Some included FEMA Type 1 US&R teams, Puerto Rican Type 4 US&R 
Teams, MH-60 helicopters and MV-22 Osprey from the USS Kearsarge (CV 33), and 
USS Oak Hill (LSD 51), a naval P-8 Poseidon maritime surveillance aircraft from Naval 
Air Station Jacksonville, federal LE officers from San Juan, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
and Firearms (ATF) Quick Reaction Teams (QRTs), U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), 
 
100 Higgins, “A Fire Department in Puerto Rico”; Umair Irfan, “Puerto Rico Is Starting to Take Solar 
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101 Note: It is unclear how these statistics are spread between Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, 
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and others.103 Each FEMA Type 1 US&R consists of 70 members and is capable of 
splitting into two independently operating Type 3 US&R teams for greater coverage in 
either time (such as around-the-clock operations) or space (such as spreading out 
geographically).104 In all, FEMA maintains 28 US&R teams to respond nationally, and 
on occasion, internationally. 
The response to Hurricane Maria was unconventional for US&R teams. US&R 
teams are equipped to perform heavy rescue, such as needed following a major structural 
collapse, but the mission in Puerto Rico called for different operations. Initially, US&R 
teams established field operations in the Intercontinental Hotel in San Juan and weathered 
the storm there.105 When winds subsided, the US&R teams performed incident 
management functions and were vital to performing wide-area searches, health and 
welfare checks, and accessing hard-to-reach locations throughout the island.106 By 
September 28, FEMA reported that its teams had reached 90% of the island and was 
aiding in assessing the condition and needs of medical facilities.107 
None of these unconventional responses was planned and was often chaotic, 
which resulted in a non-systematic, comprehensive, or rapid means of helping those most 
 
103 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Overview of Federal Efforts to Prepare for and Respond 
to Hurricane Maria,” Department of Homeland Security (blog), September 29, 2017, https://www.dhs.gov/
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in need. The response amounted to a wide variety of actors attempting to assist but often 
operating independently with little coordination. Puerto Rico did not have a complete 
catastrophic disaster plan when Maria struck, and one year after Hurricane Maria, the 
Centro de Periodismo Investigativo filed a lawsuit against the government claiming it still 
did not have a plan to deal with another disaster on the same scale as Hurricane Maria.108 
The disaster also grossly exceeded FEMA’s planning assumptions based upon a Category 
3 hurricane versus two close-succession Category 4 storms (Irma and Maria).109 
Relatedly, Georgetown researchers identified a need for FEMA’s work to focus on 
community resilience and statewide plans post-Hurricane Maria.110 
Despite records and claims of vast resources reaching nearly all portions of the 
island, many residents claimed they had no contact with relief organizations of any kind 
for over a week.111 By September 29, FEMA’s daily operations brief indicated that 843 
individuals had been saved or assisted, 2,647 structures had been searched, and US&R 
teams had accessed all 78 Puerto Rican municipalities.112 While this briefing affords 
insightful statistics, the numbers alone do not indicate whether all rescue needs had been 
met. Slow access to communities and complications of resource distribution, given the 
logistics of the response operation, does not directly indicate a lack of US&R coverage 
but does serve to highlight the challenges inherent in the operating environment. Among 
communities least likely to receive rapid aid, were those of the island’s mountainous 
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interior most impacted by collapsed bridges and roadways, heavy vegetative debris, and 
located far from state highways and critical transportation nodes. The US&R teams 
played a key role in these areas, given their ability to utilize the scarce air assets they had 
available and smaller vehicles to penetrate isolated areas.  
a. Discussion 
Regardless of the influx of outside responders, void of high levels of coordination 
and pre-planning, individual communities will face unmet needs, sometimes for extended 
periods of time. While US&R teams rescued many Puerto Ricans more often than not, 
residents had transportation, logistics, and other resource issues that US&R teams were 
not mandated to perform or were equipped to support. The primary purpose of the US&R 
teams was to perform rescues as needed, conduct welfare checks, and to be the eyes and 
ears for San Juan in hard-hit and hard to reach areas.113 Notwithstanding, many 
communities reported not having contact with government officials in any form for over 
a week, and in some cases, much longer.114  
b. Review 
These same issues are likely to manifest in future disasters, as conditions in 
Puerto Rico remain largely unchanged. Many areas of the island’s interior remain 
mountainous, have limited cellular service, and are navigated by narrow, steep roadways 
perennially susceptible to landslides and flooding. Puerto Rico also still struggles with 
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4. Government Service 
The Puerto Rico Emergency Management Agency (PREMA) maintained a 
headquarters in San Juan, and in 2017, maintained 12 emergency management zones 
linked collectively to each of the 78 local municipalities.115 Since Hurricane Maria, the 
agency has been consolidated into the Department of Public Safety and is now known as 
the Puerto Rico Emergency Management Bureau (PREMB in English) and operates 10 
emergency management zones.  
According to the NRF governing emergency response in the United States, each 
of the 78 municipal emergency operations centers (EOCs) would communicate needs to 
each of the 12 PREMA zones, who further communicate resource needs to PREMA 
Headquarters located in San Juan. The state EOCs in San Juan would then communicate 
needs to assisting agencies, organizations, and the federal government. However, given 
the extent of destruction on the island, this ideal construct essentially collapsed due to a 
lack of power, communications, and viable transportation, which inhibited the local and 
state government’s ability to both ascertain the situation and communicate needs to San 
Juan.116 The Washington Post quoted Department of Public Safety Director, Héctor 
Pesquera as saying, “Everything collapsed. Everything collapsed simultaneously.”117 
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FEMA was placed in the non-traditional role of performing as the first responder to the 
entire island.118  
The collapse of the local and commonwealth emergency management structure 
prompted FEMA and the Puerto Rican government to establish joint operations at the 
Pedro Roselló Convention Center in San Juan. The consolidated footprint was far less 
efficient than the original design but afforded an otherwise crippled system the ability to 
continue. By achieving face-to-face interaction between FEMA and the commonwealth, 
the two parties were able to coordinate the delivery of personnel and resources around the 
island, albeit at a hobbled pace. The Convention Center quickly became an island hub of 
information and resources for reporters, NGOs, locals, citizens, and the private sector.  
a. Discussion 
The state emergency management structure appears to have largely collapsed 
amid Hurricane Maria, which thrust the federal government into a first responder role. It 
was not a pre-planned approach to disaster response in Puerto Rico, which led to delays 
and coordination challenges. The breakdown has largely been attributed to the loss of 
power supply and an inability to communicate.119 COOP must be taken particularly 
seriously in isolated environments, such as an island in the Caribbean where resupply and 
disaster aid are more delayed than in the continental United States. Failure of power and 
communications, coupled with chaotic initial responses, challenging coordination, and an 
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inability to access hard-hit areas, are both predictable and partially preventable if proper 
preparedness measures are taken pre-disaster.  
b. Review 
In the absence of robust government response in the initial days and weeks post-
landfall, Puerto Ricans across the island resorted to creativity and helping each other to 
cope with the disaster’s impacts. Residents would often check on neighbors, travel long 
distances to find cell service, charge phones, and procure food, water, and other essential 
supplies. In some areas, such as Utuado, where roadways and bridges had collapsed, 
community members erected pulley systems rigged with hardware and a shopping cart to 
ferry much-needed supplies to populations cut off from the outside world.120 The 
community began referring to itself as “el campamento de olvidados,” the camp of the 
forgottens, in English.121 In Toro Negro, a community that was completely isolated, area 
residents have started a community foundation focusing on solar power generation, 
establishing a safe mountain aqueduct, and installing footbridges across a river to avoid 
future disaster vulnerability and isolation.122 While representing community ingenuity, 
this communal support function can also be cultivated under steady-state conditions via 
community preparedness programs to afford a more reliable, robust system of self-
reliance until such a time that local, state, and federal authorities, as well as their private 
sector and non-profit partners, can erect a functioning incident management structure and 
free-flow of critical supplies. In the words of one Utuado residents, “The important thing 
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here is personal readiness—that you and your family are ready to survive for three weeks 
or a month without government help.”123 
5. Community Safety 
This lifeline component is inclusive of other subcomponents, such as flood 
control, “other hazards,” and protective actions.124 Following Hurricane Maria, the most 
acute public threat was the potential collapse of the aging Guajataca Dam. Built in 1929, 
the Lago Guajataca earthen dam is an aging piece of infrastructure that suffered a 
structural fissure that threatened the safety of approximately 70,000 Puerto Ricans two 
days post-landfall on September 22. The dam flood area borders the municipalities of San 
Sebastian, Quebradillas, and Isabela. In an address to residents, Governor Ricardo 
Rosselló said, “To those citizens … who are listening: Please evacuate. We want your life 
to be protected … Please, if you’re listening, the time to evacuate is now.”125 The dam’s 
release gates had been damaged amid Hurricane Maria, which prevented the off letting of 
excess water volume that then created a situation the National Weather Service (NWS) 
identified as an “extremely dangerous situation” that drove fears the dam may structurally 
collapse.126 The NWS later issued an urgent warning stating, “All Areas surrounding the 
Guajataca River should evacuate NOW. Their lives are in DANGER! Please SHARE!” 
on its Twitter account.127 The threat posed by the Guajataca Dam first appeared in 
FEMA’s September 23, Daily Operations Brief, which noted the evacuation of roughly 
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70,000 residents.128 The dam failure was later determined not to be imminent, but severe 
erosion was occurring by floodwaters overtopping the dam. In the days following, the 
government supplied buses to evacuate residents in high-risk areas.129 
a. Discussion 
At the time of the dam’s possible collapse, FEMA’s reports indicated that the 
island was experiencing 95% cellular service outages, and Hurricane Maria remained an 
off-shore Category 3 hurricane anticipated to produce another 1–3 inches of rainfall 
across large portions of the island.130 This rainfall posed significant challenges to 
alerting and warning the 70,000 residents comprising the at-risk population, not only 
because of cellular outages but also because many in the flood risk area experience 
sporadic cellular service under normal conditions.131  
b. Review 
These challenges highlight the importance of local and state governments 
understanding areas of acute risk and limiting factors, as well as having alternative means 
to alert and notify the public. Following Hurricane Maria, PREMA began to procure alert 
and warning sirens for the Guajataca Dam flood hazard area. As of August 2019, 
however, reports indicated only three of seven sirens had been installed due to 
bureaucratic delays, and it remains to be seen if these sirens adequately cover the entire 
alert area or not.132  
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Providing services in the safety and security lifeline proved impossible for an 
extended period of time and was very challenging thereafter. While Puerto Rico did not 
experience widespread or sustained crime increases, LE was strained most by long-term 
systemic problems related to finances, failing pensions, and understaffing. Likewise, 
challenges to the fire service did not directly conflict with its core mission of firefighting 
but more generally concerned the department’s ability to continue operations and a state 
of readiness amid failed communications platforms and structural damage to stations. The 
disaster also called for the department to execute unconventional responses. For instance, 
search and rescue teams were consumed not by dramatic rescues or building extractions, 
but instead by a need to perform reconnaissance that provided San Juan with situational 
awareness in remote areas of the island, wide area searches, and welfare checks. Both  
the fire service and its search and rescue elements suffered from unconventional 
requirements and a lack of redundancy in key areas concerning COOP. In much the same 
way, communities were at elevated risk due to a lack of redundancy in alerts and 
warnings concerning the potential collapse of the Guajataca Dam. Amid major 
challenges, certain non-governmental actors, such as ARRL operators, proved adept at 
filling critical capability gaps despite no direct prior planning for their participation in 
disasters.133 Had non-governmental actors been included in disaster planning, it is 
reasonable to assume they could have contributed far more to bridging critical gaps in 
governmental response capabilities.134  
Taken collectively, these impacts illustrate a system overwhelmed. The initial 
lack of situational awareness across the island due to destroyed communications, coupled 
with staffing issues and shortages, as well as a disaster requiring rapid restructuring of 
mission sets, had a ripple effect in communities in need of food, water, and shelter. As 
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the safety and security lifeline experienced overload, so too did the food, water, and 
shelter lifeline, which resulted in many unmet needs of disaster survivors for extended 
periods. Resource shortages spurred communities to develop crude and often creative 
solutions cooperatively to provide life-sustaining services for themselves, their neighbors, 
and their communities. 
B. FOOD, WATER, AND SHELTER LIFELINE 
FEMA defines the food, water, and shelter lifeline as “support systems that enable 
the sustainment of human life, such as food retail and distribution networks, water 
treatment, transmission and distribution systems, housing, and agriculture resources.”135 
The components of this lifeline include food, water, shelter, and agriculture.136 
1. Food 
Puerto Rico’s food shortage following Hurricane Maria appears to have been 
caused by a collapsed distribution system rather than a lack of supplies. The island has a 
higher density of supermarkets compared to the mainland United States. At the time of 
Hurricane Maria’s impact, Puerto Rico had an estimated 471 supermarkets, which 
represented a 1:7,500 supermarket to resident ratio; the mainland U.S. average ratio is 
1:8,800.137 With an estimated decline of 400,000 people leaving Puerto Rico between 
2000 and 2016, and an additional 200,000 estimated to have relocated to the mainland 
after Hurricane Maria, market consolidation is likely to occur.138 Despite Puerto Rico’s 
high-density supermarkets, shelves quickly went empty when the power failed, resupply 
shipments did not arrive, and employees failed to report to work. For stores able to re-
open on generator power, resupply shipments continued to lag as the island’s ports 
(primarily via San Juan) struggled to re-establish a functioning distribution network.139 
Once distribution began to operate at comparably normal levels, supermarkets began re-
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opening. One month post-impact, 417 of the 471 (89%) store locations had re-opened  
for business.140 
In the interim, the feeding and water mission requirements in Puerto Rico 
following Hurricane Maria were grossly underestimated. The agency anticipated a need 
to distribute food and water to 500,000 residents following a major hurricane impact, not 
the entire island population of over three million people, which prompted the agency to 
lean on an earthquake and tsunami plan instead of one that contained higher planning 
assumptions for food and water distribution.141 Plans also did not account for the total 
loss of communications capabilities.142 Consequently, Puerto Rico’s needs quickly 
outpaced FEMA’s 15 pre-established contracts for “tarps, water, blankets, meals, etc.”143 
What resulted was the longest sustained airborne food and water distribution mission in 
the agency’s history.144 By February 2018, all federal agencies had obligated roughly $2 
billion in for food, water, and shelter supplies, across all 2017 disasters.145 By April 
2019, FEMA had obligated $115.4 million for food and water supplies for Hurricane 
Maria alone.146 Between September 23 and December 23, FEMA distributed 48 million 
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meals to the public.147 One month later, FEMA reported it had distributed 57 million 
meals in total.148  
Before Hurricane Maria’s impact, FEMA had distributed 80% of commodity and 
disaster supply stockpiles housed in Puerto Rico to the U.S. Virgin Islands in response to 
Hurricane Irma two weeks before Hurricane Maria. Therefore, the shelves of FEMA’s 
Caribbean Area Division (CAD) distribution center were nearly empty with no cots or 
tarps, fewer than 20 “blue roofs,” less than 98,000 meals, and just 70,000 liters of 
water.149 Thus, few supplies and commodities were available for immediate distribution 
in Puerto Rico, or its islands of Culebra and Vieques, which required island residents to 
await resupply from the mainland. Beyond initial warehouse shortages, as noted under 
the energy lifeline, Puerto Rico’s supply shortages were associated more with issues of 
distribution, not supply.150 Puerto Rico’s ports were full of commodities with roughly 
9,000 shipping containers within one week following Hurricane Maria, but responders 
struggled to deliver items quickly to those most in need.151 Distribution difficulties 
primarily stemmed from a lack of communications, road blockages, a lack of truck 
drivers, confusing restrictions on fuel sales and curfews, and FEMA’s inability to track 
supply shipments via its Logistics Supply Chain Management System (LSCMS).152 
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Additionally, many containers arrived at the Port of San Juan generically labeled 
“disaster relief,” which made distribution of the right materials to the right place nearly 
impossible.153 A recent DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) report indicated that in 
total, FEMA lost track of approximately 38% of commodity shipments worth about $257 
million and that it took an average of 69 days for FEMA shipments to travel from point-
of-origin to final destinations in Puerto Rico.154 The specific breakdown of this timeline 
shows that it took FEMA 13 days to ship from the contractors’ point of origin in the 
Continental United States (CONUS) to Puerto Rico.155 Once on the island, commodities 
remained in FEMA’s custody for approximately 48 days, and onward distribution 
timelines took an additional average of 7.5 days to reach the final destination where 
commodities were needed.156 This issue spurred FEMA to pursue a significant overhaul 
and upgrades to its logistic tracking technology. The agency has updated staffing, 
training, and in August 2019, procured 2,000 solar satellite transponders that drastically 
improve remote monitoring and commodity tracking capability.157 In June 2020, FEMA 
also undertook an integration project with UPS and FedEx aimed at increasing real-time 
product shipment information.158 
Overall, FEMA was adhering to its planned distribution methods but did not 
anticipate the scale of the need and storm damages or that the agency would be the 
primary food and water provider. In basic terms, FEMA and federal partners moved 
disaster supplies, including food items, from ports of entry to several large incident 
support bases (ISBs) then onward to smaller regional staging areas (RSAs) where the 
commodities were transferred to the Puerto Rican National and State Guard for further 
movement to Puerto Rico’s 78 municipalities.159 FEMA also worked with federal 
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partners, contracted box trucks and drivers to make community commodity deliveries, 
and directly delivered commodities to impacted residents via federal workers and NGO 
staff.160 Additionally, local municipalities also shared responsibility for community 
commodity distribution.  
With scant disaster supplies available, particularly early in the response phase, 
many residents were left to seek their own food, water, and shelter. In some parts of the 
island, food aid did not arrive for over two weeks, particularly in hard to access areas that 
were heavily impacted by landslides.161 Amid major supply shortages, some municipal 
mayors resorted to extreme measures, such as ordering that schools’ food storage be 
broken into and utilized to feed local communities.162 When food did arrive, many 
received what was described as “junk food” in boxes containing such items as cookies, 
pudding, crackers, Skittles, processed meats, and Cheez-It crackers.163 FEMA and 
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) spokespersons explained that snack packs were 
delivered in addition to more nutrient shelf-stable meals that can last up to nine months 
and contain at least 600 calories consisting of the main meal, a starch item, a fruit, and a 
snack.164 The exact caloric makeup of meals delivered, exact quantities of meals, and 
whether meals made it to the areas most in need, remains a difficult topic to reverse-
engineer with precision.  
In addition to government distributed meals, communities also came together to 
feed those in need. As seen in Figure 1, in the isolated village of Utuado, residents of the 
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remote village of Charco Abajo erected a pulley system to span the Río Viví as a means 
of shuttling food and other supplies where a lone bridge used to stand.165  
 
Figure 1. Pulley System to Span the Río Viví.166 
In the village of Mariana, the site of an annual food festival, local women came 
together to pool the food they could find and cook 400 meals per day, and continued their 
operation long-term.167 Other examples of community-led disaster relief involved 
existing community groups assuming new roles. One organization serves as an example, 
Proyecto Enlace del Caño Martin Peña, founded in 2002 to promote health and 
environmental justice alliance in eight communities in the Santurce area of San Juan. 
Years of pre-established connectivity allowed the group to mobilize amid Hurricane 
Maria to provide a variety of services from employing water pumps, temporarily 
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replacing roofs, clearing debris, and providing 5,000 hot meals to neighbors.168 On a 
much larger scale, award-winning chef José Andrés began scaling his operation in San 
Juan to feed the island with two groups he founded, World Central Kitchen, and Chefs 
for Puerto Rico.169 Andrés’ scaled his operation to serve 100,000 meals a day at more 
than a dozen sites around the island in a time of critical need.170 Collectively, community 
members and pre-existing groups took tangible actions and called upon the Puerto Rican 
diaspora to help relieve suffering on the island.171 Within three months, José Andrés and 
his team had served over three million meals islandwide.172 
a. Discussion 
The commodity distribution issues faced in Puerto Rico offer concrete evidence 
that government capabilities alone cannot manage catastrophic disasters.173 It also 
supports former FEMA Administrator Craig Fugate’s assertion that “a government-
centric approach to disaster management will not be enough to meet the challenges posed 
by a catastrophic incident. That is why we must fully engage our entire societal 
capacity.”174 To meet the needs of disaster survivors adequately, the disaster response 
truly needs to be a top-down and bottom-up approach that coalesces around the critical 
needs of impacted communities. Full reliance on governmental disaster relief in future 
disasters is likely to be met with similar outcomes. Communities must consider other 
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means of building food supply resiliency. To provide one tangible example, a group 
calling itself the “Center of Mutual Support” in the community of Las Carolinas, in the 
municipality of Caguas, set up community kitchen operations in an abandoned school 
building and began distributing meals.175 Since Hurricane Maria, the community has 
petitioned the government for ownership of the building, which they hope to continue 
using as a community kitchen in the event of another major disaster, next time with solar 
panels installed.176 The group also prepared and delivered warm meals to elderly 
residents for an extended period of time.177 
b. Review 
As FEMA maintains the role of coordination with state and local governments, it 
is up to communities to assume a role in catastrophic disaster preparedness as well. The 
lived experience of Puerto Rico aligns with evidence that indicates communities that 
display higher levels of social capital pre-disaster suffer lower rates of food insecurity 
and prove better able to leverage physical capital.178 Furthermore, communities of high 
social capital can decrease the impacts felt by communities of lower social capital by 
providing bridging capital inclusive of said communities.179 The relationship between 
social capital and food security is important as matters of disaster resilience are 
considered in Puerto Rico. Despite the record-setting feeding mission of FEMA and 
federal agency partners, many across the island went without food for extended periods 
or spent larger portions of their time seeking rations. In addition, much like the health and 
medical lifeline, close proximity to needed resources proved decisive in the days and 
weeks following the catastrophic disaster when the government provided aid failed to 
meet disaster survivor basic needs. Since 2017, FEMA has made efforts to bolster on-
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island stockpiles. In 2017, the agency reported having 50,000 meals available; in August 
2020, the number of on-hand shelf-stable meals had risen to 6.6 million.180 
2. Water 
Much like the island’s power grid, the water system was also plagued with issues 
prior to Hurricane Maria. Puerto Rico is served primarily by the Puerto Rican Aqueduct 
and Sewer Authority (PRASA), which provides 97% of the island’s water supply; the 
remaining water supply is afforded by approximately 240 very small water systems, 
collectively referred to as “non-PRASA” systems, that supply the remaining 3% of island 
residents with water.181 Non-PRASA systems serve roughly 126,000 residents in rural 
Cordillera Central mountainous areas throughout the island’s interior.182 Per capita, 
Puerto Rico’s water systems have the highest number of safe drinking water 
violations.183 Collectively, 201 out of 406 water stations committed 545 health-related 
violations in 2015 that primarily related to a lack of testing for water quality, safety 
standards, and failure to report safety issues.184 Between 2005 and 2015, the island had a 
total of 33,842 recorded violations of the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA).185 The 
most violated rules were “Total Coliform Rule, the Synthetic Organic Contaminants 
Rule, the Volatile Organic Contaminants Rule, and the Surface Water Treatment 
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Rule.”186 Puerto Rico’s small water systems also ranked second in the nation for having 
Tier 1 water safety violations in October 2011.187  
When Hurricane Maria struck the island, destroying the power supply, water-
pumping facilities without backup generation power also went offline and quickly 
became a FEMA priority for emergency generator installations.188 Peak outages  
resulted in roughly 80% of PRASA customers losing water service.189 One month 
following Hurricane Maria, living conditions for many Puerto Ricans remained dire. 
Roughly 4,300 residents remained in shelters, 80% of residents remained without power, 
and 30% remained without running water.190 Temporary water provision suffered the 
same distribution issues as food products and other commodities because the bottled 
water was shipped in tandem with food supplies in the same shipping containers that 
were stuck in ports.191  
Until water systems were reconstituted, Puerto Rican residents relied upon 
distributed water bottles and whatever untreated natural water source were accessible 
near their homes. Those who were fortunate had rainwater runoff from the hillsides, or 
spring water, to use for laundry, bathing, house cleaning, and to flush toilets.192 Others 
went to local rivers to fetch water for daily needs.193 However, not everyone was 
fortunate enough to have water sources near their residences or the physical ability to 
seek it out. For example, just outside of San Juan, in Carolina, an elderly community in a 
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multi-story building called Las Teresas went without water resupply for roughly two 
weeks until discovered by a group of volunteers organized in coordination with the local 
San Juan municipality.194 When the power failed in Carolina, elevators in the high-rise 
building stopped working, and many residents were too frail to utilize the stairs, which 
left them trapped in their apartments with no means of resupply.195 Retirement home 
administrators had left the area preceding the storm, and elderly residents’ families were 
either not in the area or otherwise unaware of their condition.196 The San Juan relief 
brigade consisted of 50 to 100 volunteers per day made up of local residents wanting to 
provide help to those in need. Once located, volunteers continued to bring food, water, 
and medical supplies to elderly residents.  
When water service was restored, residents continued to struggle with water 
quality and service reliability.197 Nearly one-third of wastewater treatment plants went 
offline following Hurricane Maria, which resulted in widespread contamination of 
waterways many residents were using as emergency water supplies.198 Health 
complications stemming from contaminated water sources, such as skin and soft-tissue 
infections, as well as gastrointestinal, respiratory, zoonotic, and vector-borne diseases, 
are known to spike following extreme hydrological weather events.199 By November 
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2017, 99 suspected cases of leptospirosis, 18 confirmed cases, and four fatalities were 
reported; the island typically sees between 63 and 95 cases over a 12-month period.200  
In terms of reliability, once restored, the water supply was only as reliable as the 
power line or generator that provided water pumps with electricity. As the grid remained 
fragile, basic water provision did so also. Particularly outside of urban areas, reliable 
water supply remained intermittent and of questionable purity. FEMA addressed the issue 
by installing some 700 generators supplying power to water pumping stations and 
installing 161 water storage units in remote areas that the National Guard assumed 
responsibilities for refilling and maintaining.201 
a. Discussion 
Research since Hurricane Maria has identified a positive correlation between 
communities’ “remoteness” and the length of time spent without power, water, and cell 
phone service.202 On average, residents throughout the island went without water service 
for 68 days.203 Many communities in rural areas went much longer periods without 
water. For instance, when FEMA shut down its food and water distribution mission in 
late January 2018, a full third of the island remained without power—and therefore, 
water—and the USACE estimated it would take until the summer to restore power 
fully.204  
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b. Review 
FEMA gauged that since markets were back open from which residents could 
procure resources, the state and non-governmental partners could meet other unmet 
needs.205 This assumption proved problematic for interior mountainous communities, 
such as Morovis, where the median household income is just $18,000 per year, and 
families were spending $25–40 per day on fuel to run household generators.206 This 
dynamic represents a critical break in the reliable water supply chain that impacted 
remote, hard-to-reach areas of the island that have yet to see a permanent resolution. In 
2017, FEMA reported having 800,000 liters of water on-hand in stockpiles; that number 
has increased to seven million liters of water as of August 2020.207 
3. Shelter 
Determining the precise number of shelters opened for Puerto Rican residents, 
and their population numbers is difficult to ascertain, as reported numbers and 
timeframes vary by source. According to one source, on Tuesday, September 19, the 
Puerto Rican government opened roughly 500 schools as emergency shelters while the 
GAO reported just eight shelters open with a population of 306 persons on the same 
date.208 FEMA first reported shelter statistics beginning on September 20 and reported 
172 open shelters with a population of 9,981.209 According to FEMA, Puerto Rico 
reached a maximum official shelter population of 11,359 on September 25.210 However, 
unofficial conversations with a senior member within the Puerto Rican government place 
their estimation at closer to 15,000. As late as November 10, FEMA reported 62 open 
shelters with 2,374 occupants. This report represented a reduction of 86 from the 
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placed by FEMA into the Temporary Sheltering Assistance (TSA) program, or were 
moving elsewhere either on or off-island.211 The number of open shelters and individual 
shelter population counts steadily declined beyond this point. Regardless of the ultimate 
shelter statistics, it is clear that less than 1% of the island’s more than three million 
residents did not seek refuge in a public shelter. 
Public shelters were established in the island’s public school network. Many of 
the schools were not of remarkably resilient design in that they lacked backup generation 
capability and varied in physical sturdiness. A lack of power poses challenges to the 
medically dependent and otherwise frail as temperatures rose steeply during daylight 
hours. Additionally, the water systems servicing schools require electrical power to cycle 
drinking and sewage water. When the power failed, the water systems did so as well, 
which created unsanitary conditions in shelters.212 
Eventually, residents needed to transition from emergency shelters to more 
permanent housing solutions. Emergency shelters were primarily located in public 
schools and were only designed to serve as a temporary congregate sheltering option until 
residents could go home or be transitioned to other housing programs. From public 
shelters, many residents transitioned to the TSA program, which is a government-funded 
program whereby displaced disaster-impacted residents are placed in private hotels. As of 
2018, FEMA indicated that approximately 7,000 families had been brought into the 
program and housed at 1,000 hotels in 41 states, Washington, DC, and within 
participating hotels in Puerto Rico.213 To facilitate the migration from public shelters to 
the TSA program, FEMA implemented Multi-Agency Shelter Transition Taskforces 
(MASTTs).214 As the name suggests, MASTTs bring various agencies together as a 
means of merging disaster solutions for displaced residents. 
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a. Discussion 
Despite the devastating storm forecast, most Puerto Rican residents did not seek 
public shelter. Instead, most residents sought shelter with those in their own social 
networks. By the official peak estimate, 11,359 Puerto Ricans sought public shelter in the 
lead up to and aftermath of Hurricane Maria, which represented just .003% of the island’s 
population.215 This percentage indicates that nearly all Puerto Rican residents weathered 
the storm in private dwellings. Puerto Rico has an estimated 1,237,180 million homes, of 
which 1,138,843 sustained hurricane damages, according to the American Bar 
Association, which represents 92% of all homes on the island.216 However, by FEMA’s 
damage inspection standards, the agency recorded only 357,492 damaged homes, of 
which only 1% had greater than $30,001 in damages.217 In February 2018, Puerto Rico’s 
Housing Secretary indicated that by his count, approximately 250,000 homes sustained 
major damage, 70,000 of which were destroyed, and at that time, he anticipated the 
number to raise another 50,000-damaged homes as inspections continued.218 These 
numbers display a vast disparity in housing stock damage estimations from 23–92% 
between FEMA and the American Bar Association. Most severely damaged homes were 
unsurprisingly in the direct path of the storm or stood in flood-prone areas.219 The larger 
point is that no matter the measure of damaged homes, nearly 100% of island residents 
did not go to public shelters. This percentage indicates that a vast majority of Puerto 
Rican residents weathered the storm in their own homes or those of friends, family, or 
neighbors, which highlights a need for strong community planning, risk mitigation, 
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floodplain management, and up-to-date, well-enforced building codes. Since nearly half 
of the dwellings in Puerto Rico were built without a government permit or according to 
any official building code standard, this task will be daunting.220 
b. Review 
In the wake of Hurricane Maria, the GAO found that mass care services, such as 
food, water, and shelter, left the needs of many unmet because local agreements did not 
always detail what services voluntary agencies could provide. In total, the GAO made six 
recommendations based upon findings. A majority of the recommendations involved 
FEMA and mass care partners better understanding the needs of local communities, 
capabilities of voluntary agencies, and a need for better leveraging existing local 
community groups that can meet the needs of survivors near to their homes.221 These 
recommendations appear to respond well to the lived experience in Puerto Rico, where 
despite massive amounts of resources available, many needs went unmet in the wake of 
this catastrophic disaster, and the reality that community groups appeared able to fill this 
void when government resources could not.  
4. Agriculture 
Like all other community lifelines, Hurricane Maria pummeled Puerto Rico’s 
agricultural industry. More than one-fifth of Puerto Rico’s landmass is dedicated to 
agricultural use; 6.6% is arable land, 5.6% is for permanent crops, and 9.8% is designated 
as permanent pastureland.222 Puerto Rican agriculture represents .8% of the island’s 
GDP, and primary crops and livestock include sugar cane, coffee, pineapples, plantains, 
bananas, and livestock products, such as cattle dairy and chicken farms.223 
 
220 Viglucci, “Half of Puerto Rico’s Housing Was Built Illegally”; Nick Brown, “Special Report: In 
Puerto Rico, a Housing Crisis U.S. Storm Aid Won’t Solve,” Reuters, February 6, 2018, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-puertorico-housing-specialreport-idUSKBN1FQ211. 
221 Larin, Disaster Response, 36–7. 
222 The current estimate is 22%. Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook, Central America: 
Puerto Rico.” 
223 Central Intelligence Agency; Frances Robles and Luis Ferré-Sadurní, “Puerto Rico’s Agriculture 
and Farmers Decimated by Maria,” New York Times, September 24, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
09/24/us/puerto-rico-hurricane-maria-agriculture-.html. 
62 
For nearly 400 years, Puerto Rico had an agriculturally based economy consisting 
largely of sugar cane, tobacco, and citrus fruits.224 The sector began to decline rapidly 
after WWII as the economy rapidly industrialized under the 1947 Operation Bootstrap led 
by the U.S. federal government and the Puerto Rico Industrial Development Company 
(PRIDCO).225 However, since the island’s rather recent economic downturn, many have 
returned to farming and a growing “farm-to-table” movement increased 3–5% annually 
from 2011–2017.226  
According to Carlos Flores Ortega, Puerto Rico’s Secretary of Agriculture, nearly 
Hurricane Maria destroyed 80% of Puerto Rico’s agriculture that resulted in an 
approximate $780 million dollar loss.227 These losses have created a near-total reliance 
on imported foods and were coupled with an estimated $45 million in losses from 
Hurricane Irma’s impact two weeks prior to Hurricane Maria.228 Relying on importing 
foodstuffs creates a subsequent reliance on functioning and reliable supply chains for 
food security. In an island environment, its position is particularly precarious, given 
ample threats and hazards facing the food pipeline. Under normal conditions, 
approximately 85% of Puerto Rico’s food is imported primarily from the mainland 
United States; the percentage of imported foods rose to approximately 95% following 
Hurricane Maria.229 Puerto Rico also imports produce from the Dominican Republic, 
Dominica, and St. Martin, which were also heavily impacted by hurricanes in 2017 that 
further complicated the island’s supply chain struggles.230 For dairy farmers whose 
farms were not destroyed by Hurricane Maria, the consequent collapse of distribution 
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networks led to an inability to market their products; some farmers reported disposing of 
up to 4,000 liters of fresh milk per day that could not be sent to market shelves.231 
a. Discussion  
Secretary of Agriculture, Mr. Flores, pointed out that agriculture is one of the 
most disaster vulnerable sectors but is also one of the fastest rebounding.232 According to 
a survey of 405 farmers, nearly 43% indicated suffering from total crop losses, and over 
45% indicated significant losses.233 By late October 2017, 59% of those surveyed 
indicated they were food insecure; standard farmer food insecurity in Puerto Rico prior to 
Hurricane Maria was just 1%.234 According to the same survey, 49% of respondents 
indicated that the largest hurdle to recovery was a lack of government aid or insurance 
payouts.235 
Secretary Flores felt that government funds that are dispersed provide the 
opportunity to modernize farming practices on the island by applying federal recovery 
funds to new farming equipment and techniques.236 Puerto Rico’s agricultural exports 
currently stand at 15% of what it produces. Senator Eduardo Bhatia Gautier feels that 
rebuilding Puerto Rico’s agricultural sector will provide an opportunity to increase that 
percentage to a much higher level, and bring revenue to the island while servicing the 
mainland’s fresh food supply demands.237 This vision aligns with an ethos gaining 
momentum before Hurricane Maria centered upon food justice and sovereignty.238 The 
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experience of Hurricane Maria is thought to have laid bare the vulnerability of Puerto  
Rico’s food supply chain that is near entirely reliant upon mainland imports.239 For 
example, 66% of surveyed farmers indicated they felt the Jones Act negatively impacts 
Puerto Rico’s food security, and 81% felt that food imports prevented Puerto Rican 
farmers from selling on the local economy.240 Since Maria, many farmers increasingly 
feel that private sector insurance agencies, big business, such as Monsanto, and the 
federal government, do not operate in the best interests of Puerto Rican farmers and are 
not offering needed recovery aid. This upset is leading many to turn to their local 
communities, particularly those of the younger generation. They are self-organizing more 
resilient farming models while also campaigning for greater self-determination through 
food sovereignty.241  
The end result of the collective trauma of Hurricane Maria’s farming sector, 
coupled with the continued financial struggles, is likely to result in increased interest and 
political action toward greater food sovereignty for the island. The future of farming in 
Puerto Rico may be in small, tightly connected farms serving local communities, 
operated by those of a young generation with fresh memories of the island’s precarious 
position and extreme reliance upon regular food imports, and the impacts when that 
supply chain collapses.  
One such example of this turn toward self-reliance and community-led recovery is 
in an organization called “Tetuan Reborn” in the remote municipality of Utuado. Tetuan 
Reborn is a self-organized movement focused upon farm rehabilitation, agritourism, and 
agrotherapy. The overall mission of the movement is to build resilience to promote 
“sustainability, public health, and risk reduction through higher levels of community 
cohesiveness, social capital, and coordination.”242 The Tetuan Reborn movement is 
guided by the Corporación de Servicios de Salud Primaria y Desarrollo Socioeconómico 
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El Otoao (COSSAO) and is viewed as a socio-economic endeavor that pairs sustainable 
agro-ecological farming with agro-tourism and primary health services that exist within a 
regional context.243 Divided across three neighborhoods, Tetuan Reborn encompasses 
roughly 40 farms producing coffee and other crops on land plots that are all 
approximately 15–20 acres in size.244 The project involves the procurement of 
abandoned farms and repurposes existing structures to fit the new vision of localized 
farming and agro-tourism.245 The project will also center on providing health and well-
being to local community members via a variety of services to include providing medical 
services, training, and an education center, building local partnerships, and serving local 
communities in times of disasters by performing tasks, such as debris and route 
clearance, and rebuilding of local infrastructure.246 
While it is difficult to predict precise outcomes, it is safe to conclude that the 
underlying perceived deprivation in many Puerto Rican communities is sufficient to drive 
further self-organization and encourage local co-ops to become less reliant upon 
traditional economic and governance norms that are predominantly outlined by large 
corporations, the state, and the federal government. Initiatives, such as Tetuan Reborn 
and Casa Pueblo, discussed in the energy lifeline, are likely to become more common and 
scale to meet local needs over the long-term.  
b. Conclusion 
Food, water, and shelter represent basic human needs. These needs were in short 
supply in many Puerto Rican communities for an extended period of time following 
Hurricane Maria. Food and water distribution were limited by a major disruption to the 
supply chain and rapid influx of additional disaster relief shipments, which inhibited the 
island’s collective ability to deliver vital commodities efficiently to those most in need. 
Such shortages drove communities to pool available resources, go in search of food, care 
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for each other, and manually procure water, often from sources of questionable safety. 
Much of the supply bottleneck appears attributed to San Juan serving as a centralized hub 
for imported goods. Had Puerto Rico employed a more decentralized import model or 
invested more in on-island stockpiles, it is logical to assume that more time may have 
been bought for communities before food and water stocks ran low.247  
The impact to, and actions of, the agricultural sector indicate a need to think more 
holistically about what it means to be prepared for catastrophic disaster. Puerto Rico’s 
current reliance on outside support of critical food needs has driven community-based 
organizations, such as Tetuan Reborn, and the Center of Mutual Support, to reconsider 
their position in communities and campaign for greater self-reliance.248 Following 
Hurricane Maria, hunger, thirst, and shelter needs were coupled with a need for access to 
definitive medical care in the wake of Hurricane Maria, which also proved to be in a 
frantic state and short supply. 
C. HEALTH AND MEDICAL LIFELINE 
FEMA defines the health and medical lifeline as “infrastructure and service 
providers for medical care, public health, patient movement, fatality management, 
behavioral health, veterinary support, and the medical industry.”249 The components of 
this lifeline include medical care, public health, patient movement, medical supply chain, 
and fatality management.250 
The health and medical lifeline suffered the same consequences as other elements 
of critical infrastructure with the added challenge of maintaining responsibility for the 
care and treatment of ill residents amid a crisis. Puerto Rico’s hospital network includes  
67 to 75 hospitals depending upon the source of information. The Centers for Disease 
Control (CDC) recognizes 67 hospitals, FEMA’s AAR, and other analyses, reference 69 
hospitals; FEMA’s geographic information system (GIS) planning tool indicates 75 
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hospitals across the island.251 Regardless, each hospital dealt with unprecedented disaster 
impacts, many navigated similar challenges, and several implemented creative solutions 
to complex problems. It is important to note that hospitals are not nearly the totality of 
the health and medical system that support communities. Other actors, such as 
pharmacies, labs, health clinics, behavioral health offices, substance abuse clinics, and a 
wide range of other institutions, afford community health services. 
A variety of actors collaborated in the wake of Hurricane Maria to provide life-
saving medical care to many in dire need amid widespread destruction to communities 
and their critical infrastructure. While a vast number of entities were involved in the 
provision of care from those operating at point-of-care to those supporting the the supply 
chain, the primary providers discussed as follows include FEMA, the CDC, HHS, federal 
DOD and National Guard troops, EMAC resources from around the nation, the Medical 
Reserve Corps, NGOs, community hospitals, and others, such as a faith-based entity that 
stepped up to serve its community in a time of need. 
1. Medical Care 
Due to the severity of Hurricane Maria, one week after post-impact, FEMA 
remained unable to establish communications, and therefore, determine damage and 
resource status of 37 of the 69 hospitals it was tracking in the network at the time.252 All 
hospitals experienced a loss of primary power sources, and subsequently, access to clean 
water. The Mayor of Guayama, Eduardo Cintron, reported that one hospital he was 
personally aware of remained without power for 53 consecutive days that resulted in 
unbearable clinical conditions.253 While federal regulations require hospitals to maintain 
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adequate backup power generation capability, only seven Puerto Rican hospitals had 
functioning backup generation allowing them to operate fully after Hurricane Maria.254 
FEMA noted that many hospitals either lacked backup generators, or the generators were 
simply inoperable, which left a majority of hospitals in the dark.255  
Shortly after landfall, the CDC activated the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) to 
begin shuttling critical supplies to Puerto Rico. Initial shipments included six federal 
medical stations (FMS) spread throughout the island, refrigerators, meals ready to eat 
(MRE), water, and vaccines.256 FMS are to have a three-day supply of medical 
equipment and pharmaceuticals capable of sustaining up to 250 “stable primary, or 
chronic-care patients.”257 In total, the SNS shipped 347 tons of cargo to Puerto Rico, 
including the FMS units that contained 1,500 beds, 177,000 bottles of water, and 42,000 
MREs.258 The SNS also aided in coordinating the purchase and shipment of over 
$540,000 in medical supplies and $2.4 million in needed vaccinations.259 In addition to 
deploying large quantities of medical equipment and supplies, the HHS deployed a 
number of Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs), each comprised of 
approximately 35 medical professionals.260 DMATs are staffed by medical volunteers 
from medical organizations around the nation and stand ready to deploy to disasters upon 
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request.261 Due to severe transportation, communication, and energy impacts throughout 
the island, the HHS opted to divide the full 35-person DMAT teams into smaller, and 
more agile, six-person “health medical taskforce teams,” which allows them to disperse 
across the island to hard-hit areas and provide “acute medical care, stabilize patients, and 
call for the transport of patients, when needed.”262 In total, the Office of the Assistant 
Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR), within the HHS, indicated that over 
16,000 Puerto Rican residents were provided medical treatment in the month following 
Hurricane Maria.263 The ASPR also placed “field medical stations” adjacent to numerous 
hospitals to provide emergency room decompression.264 
The DOD provided a substantial amount of resources in support of Puerto Rico, 
including a combat support hospital, an expeditionary medical support system, a patient 
movement detachment, mortuary affairs personnel and equipment, medical support to 
triage, treat, stabilize, hold, and transport patients, the National Disaster Medical System 
(NDMS) for aeromedical evacuations, rotary-wing aircraft for patient medevac, and 
supported DMATs with area support medical companies.265 The DOD also provided a 
great deal of maritime support. On September 21, the USS Kearsarge, USS Oak Hill, and 
USS Wasp (CV 18) deployed to the area and provided support to Puerto Rico and the  
U.S. Virgin Islands under the U.S. Fleet Forces Command, the 24th and 26th Marine 
Expeditionary Unit (MEU), and a Naval Expeditionary Combat Command Maritime 
Command Element.266 The USS Kearsarge and others provided a wide range of 
capability from housing USACE personnel, amphibious landing capability, and rotary-
wing aviation assets.267 On September 27, the USNS Comfort (T-AH 20) deployed as 
 
261 Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, “Disaster Medical Assistance 
Teams,” Public Health Emergency, September 2017, https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/responders/ndms/
ndms-teams/Pages/dmat.aspx. 
262 Denigan-Macauley, Disaster Response, 16. 
263 Denigan-Macauley, 16. 
264 Denigan-Macauley, 17. 
265 Larson et al., U.S. Army North in the Hurricane Maria Response, 53–4; Denigan-Macauley, 
Disaster Response, 30. 
266 Larson et al., 43. 
267 Larson et al., 42, 45. 
70 
well and would stay on-station until November 17.268 The Comfort is a medical vessel 
capable of providing a wide range of medical care for up to 1,000 patients, houses 12 
operating rooms, 80 intensive care wards, a pharmacy, a computerized tomography (CT) 
scan unit, dental clinic, and x-ray machines.269 While the USNS Comfort packs immense 
capability, the vessel is widely regarded as being underutilized due to coordination issues, 
including a tedious patient referral process and transfer to the vessel.270 Ultimately, over 
a 53-day deployment, the USNS Comfort admitted 290 patients (six per day), and treated 
an additional 1,625 as outpatients.271 The National Guard of Puerto Rico and other states 
was also a key asset in medical provision. The Puerto Rico National Guard assigned 47 
personnel to assist the Puerto Rican government in supporting vulnerable communities, 
and ultimately, provided various forms of care to 7,242 patients in 15 communities 
throughout 11 municipalities.272 Overall, DOD support was pivotal in the ability to  
continue patient care due to the military’s ability to move equipment and operate in 
austere environments, although proving unable to treat all those in need.  
While the DOD did much of the heavy lifting, the Medical Reserve Corps (MRC) 
served as a valuable national resource comprised of medical professionals from around 
the nation rostered to serve in disaster situations and was able to provide medical support. 
The ASPR indicates that approximately 175,000 volunteers are in 850 community-based 
units around the nation.273 The MRC, under HHS, provided 14 MRC units consisting of 
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212 medical volunteers who served a cumulative total of 2,524 hours in Puerto Rico in a 
variety of functions, such as behavioral health, medical, supportive care at shelters and 
clinics, dialysis support, support services to call centers and reception and evacuation 
centers, patient movement support, commodity distribution support operations, 
community education and outreach, evacuee support at disaster assistance services 
centers, and recovery support, such as disaster case management, first responder 
vaccinations, and donations management.274 In addition to MRC volunteers, many of 
Puerto Rico’s twenty health centers experienced staffing shortages that they sought to fill 
with volunteer medical professionals.275 
NGOs also provided supplemental medical support to Puerto Rico in the early 
response phase. These organizations were often able to fill gaps in formal, governmental 
response operations and reach remote portions of the island home to underserved 
populations. One such organization, Americares, based out of Stamford, Connecticut, has 
offered over $40 million in aid since Hurricane Maria, aided in rebuilding 11 health 
centers, delivered over 290,000 prescriptions, and has trained over 8,400 health 
workers.276 While NGOs would be challenged to replace the robust capability of  
military and government assets, they do play a vital and complementary role in disasters 
that should be recognized and accounted for in governmental disaster responses and 
recovery planning. 
In addition to large metropolitan healthcare networks, Puerto Rico’s community 
hospitals and health centers played a vital role amid Hurricane Maria due to their 
proximity to the communities they served. At a time when communications and 
transportation were severely degraded, island residents relied upon close proximity 
treatment, particularly in rural areas. In 2016, 20 federally funded community health 
centers were providing service to 86 urban and rural communities administrating full 
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primary health care for more than 10% of the population.277 By mid-October, only 13% 
of 70 medical sites assessed by the Milken Institute School of Public Health had power 
restored, although 83 out of 93 community health centers reported by Health Resources 
and Services Administration (HRSA) were open on generator power, or at least, in some 
limited capacity.278  
One such facility was the Southwestern Regional Academic Medical Center (SW-
RAMC) comprised of the Ponce Health Science University and affiliates. SW-RAMC 
spent a great deal of time and energy preparing for hurricanes, and therefore, was able to 
continue operations throughout Hurricane Maria with a particular focus on intensive care 
units and emergency room patients.279 As many hospitals lost power and water, SW-
RAMC was operating on generator power based upon systems emplaced during steady-
state conditions. The network was also able to communicate effectively by word of 
mouth with their residents according to a plan, several were in possession of functioning  
satellite phones, and hospital management arranged to purchase fuel for physician 
residents, allowed close family members of staff to stay at the hospital, paid staff cash 
stipends in advance, and offered rides to and from the workplace to staff support.280 The 
SW-RAMC stated that one of the largest lessons learned was that “after a major disaster, 
there may be a need to operate the ‘old way’—without technology, at least temporarily,” 
and that while disasters cannot be avoided, having a plan can help mitigate their 
impacts.281 Other lessons learned focused heavily on ensuring the ability to communicate 
internally and externally, having cash on-hand, and maintaining at least two weeks of 
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supplies of food and water for patients and staff to bridge supply chain collapses.282 SW-
RAMC illustrates that grassroots preparedness can lead to resilience and does not require 
government permission or mandates to be effective. Through forethought and prioritizing 
preparedness, SW-RAMC was able to continue as a vital community resource in an 
extraordinary time of need. Void of community hospital networks, such as SW-RAMC, 
many residents would have gone untreated for a wide variety of injuries and ailments, 
and others would have added strain to metropolitan medical facilities, networks, and 
mutual-aid resources.  
Lastly, but certainly not least, other community actors bridged gaps in standard 
medical provision through proactive and innovative means. Despite the exceptional 
actions of SW-RAMC, and many other actors performing similar roles, many citizens 
went without life-sustaining treatment and vital medications. This void in medical 
provision prompted community resources to fill the gap. For example, a Methodist 
Church in the municipality of Barranquitas, set up a makeshift medical clinic staffed by  
church employees, volunteers, and medical doctors. Eileen Rivera Diaz, the pastor’s 
spouse, explained that people with chronic conditions, such a kidney disease, diabetes, 
and heart disease, were especially impacted, and noted little to no federal presence in the 
area despite critical shortages of life-sustaining supplies, such as prescription medication, 
food, water, and power.283  
a. Discussion 
Catastrophic disasters require significant outside resources to manage medical 
consequences inflicted on communities void of long-term, highly effective, systemic 
preparedness. Much of the aid to Puerto Rico that filled early critical gaps was sourced 
from the DOD, which is particularly concerning due to the possibility that other national 
security concerns in the future may render the same DOD assets unavailable to provide 
the same level of support in a natural disaster. Other sources of mutual-aid might also 
prove unavailable in other circumstances, such as during a national disaster much like 
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that of the SARS CoV-2 pandemic that could render state mutual-aid resource (such as 
the HHS’ DMAT teams being unavailable). Such events may challenge the priorities of 
sending agencies that have a duty to provide for their own communities first. Heavy 
reliance on outside support continues to be a Puerto Rican vulnerability. 
Functioning medical infrastructure is also highly dependent upon other critical 
infrastructure sectors, such as power, open roadways, water, and communications. 
However, the localized and proactive efforts of the SW-RAMC network show what can 
be accomplished when local leaders value and prioritize disaster preparedness and 
business continuity practices. Healthcare providers that make the ability to provide 
temporary power, material stockpiling, water storage, and maintaining survivable 
communications a priority are far more resilient to disaster impacts. The case of 
Hurricane Maria also shows that informal actors, such as churches establishing makeshift 
medical clinics, and dedicated community groups, can act on their own accord and serve 
as a community asset.  
Hurricane Maria also illustrated that patient proximity to point-of-care is a vital 
factor in successful medical intervention. In the early days following disasters, traveling 
or communicating long distances is often not feasible. Regardless of record-setting 
deployment of resources, many residents of Puerto Rico went untreated, or received 
delayed and inadequate levels of care, which highlights the need for well-prepared and 
decentralized community healthcare networks that exist in close proximity to residents to 
afford ease of access. This model also offers healthcare networks opportunities for more 
personalized care. The distance between communities and point-of-care can be reduced 
by strong support of community hospitals and clinics, faith-based first-aid capability, and 
community para-medicine. The SW-RAMC, and the HHS, both highlighted the need for 
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their respective organizations to re-organize to offer expeditionary medical treatment to 
impacted communities.284  
Lastly, underinvesting in medical infrastructure results in low resiliency and has 
long-lasting impacts. As shown in Figure 2, Puerto Rico’s island of Vieques still lacks a 
permanent medical facility, as the permanent facility was destroyed in the storm that 
forced patients with serious ailments to fly to the main island for medical treatment.285 
Such disaster vulnerabilities have a layering effect in subsequent disasters. Damages  
and reductions in community functionality left unresolved from prior disasters are sure  
to further complicate the next response and recovery operation, and pose risks to  
human lives.  
 
Figure 2. The Primary Hospital on the Island of Vieques, Shuttered 
and in Disrepair as of April 2019.286 
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2. Public Health 
Puerto Rico’s healthcare infrastructure was compromised long before Hurricane 
Maria’s arrival in September 2017. The island had a state-run medical infrastructure 
consisting of four 280-bed medical facilities, and a smaller hospital in Ponce that served 
as the foundation of the medical system, and each of the 78 municipalities had a 
community hospital, clinic, or other medical care facility.287 Through the proceeding 
decades, the privatization of health plans, and the growth of private sector insurance 
policies have led to a more fragmented healthcare system, officiated by “La Reforma” in 
1993, whereby many state-run hospitals and clinics were sold to private corporations that 
caused many to seek Medicare and Medicaid treatment options.288 While Puerto Ricans 
have some of the highest insurance coverage rates in the nation, largely due to public 
health programs, residents are also among the most vulnerable populations: 43.1% of 
Puerto Ricans live in poverty, 21.3% are over the age of 65, the average household 
income is just $20,166, 15.1% under the age of 65 have a disability, and 7.9% live 
without health insurance coverage.289 Comparatively, the U.S. national average poverty 
rate is 11.8%, 16.5% are over the age of 65, median household income is $60,293, 8.6% 
live with a disability, and 10% of the population lives without health insurance 
coverage.290 In Yabucoa, where Hurricane Maria made landfall, poverty rates were 
estimated to be even higher than the island average, approximately 65%.291  
Puerto Ricans are also among the most medically vulnerable U.S. population as 
well with 34% of adults reported to be suffering from poor or fair medical conditions 
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compared to 18% across the United States. In addition, 15% live with diabetes compared 
to 11% in the mainland, and 11% reported a heart attack or living with heart disease as 
opposed to 7% of the national average.292 Puerto Rico’s public health system underwent 
reform in 2010 under the “Mi Salud” (my health) program with funding from the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009.293 The program exists 
primarily to serve medically disadvantaged populations and is funded by a combination 
of federal, commonwealth, and municipal governments.294 Notwithstanding, Puerto 
Ricans remain medically vulnerable, which leads to an acute susceptibility to disaster 
impacts. A September 2019 GAO report found that the HHS “lacked plans for the 
territories that accounted for the chronic and primary care needs in isolated 
communities,” and drew particular attention to the lack of mobility in elderly 
populations.295 Island residents also suffer from mental health issues at comparatively 
high rates. In response, the HHS supported mental health hotlines in concert with HHS’s 
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration to assist those struggling 
mentally and connect them with local behavioral health resources.296 However, 
following Hurricane Maria, Rosa Miranda Agosto of Movimiento Evitemos el Suicidio 
(Let’s Avoid Suicide Movement), noted a 21% uptick in suicides on the island following 
Hurricane Maria.297  
Upset to Puerto Rico’s critical infrastructure led Puerto Ricans also to experience 
upticks in waterborne and respiratory diseases as is common in post-disaster contexts. 
Waterborne disease, such as leptospirosis, is addressed under the water and HAZMAT 
lifelines.298 The island also noted increases in respiratory issues due to widespread 
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generator use and resulting smog conditions.299 These issues serve as a reminder that not 
only must practitioners consider the underlying public health contexts of disaster areas, 
but also understand that common disaster impacts will remain present and overlay upon 
impacted communities.  
a. Discussion 
The state of Puerto Rican public health necessitates that preparedness concerning 
healthcare provision be completely integrated at the local, commonwealth, and federal 
government levels. Other nations, such as Cuba, have done well to generate 
comprehensive lists for their medically vulnerable populations, and despite obvious 
differences in political structures, Puerto Rico may seek to do the same given the marked 
underlying medical fragility throughout the islands’ population.300 
b. Review 
Puerto Rico also requires community-led long-term health initiatives to increase 
the overall health of residents via nutrition, lifestyle, and exercise habits to reduce long-
term vulnerability. Implementation will require a great deal of political and public will, 
but serves as the best long-term strategy for decreasing health risks associated with 
disaster impacts. Many communities have already taken this initiative into their own 
hands. Small communities and networks around the island have taken up the cause of 
building community-operated medical clinics centered upon holistic care and community 
access; many have chosen to convert existing structures, such as old schools and 
agricultural buildings, to serve community health needs.301  
Lastly, the GAO found that the HHS did not well understand partner agency 
capability, which led to rather severe coordination issues amid Hurricane Maria. This 
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misunderstanding highlights a need for federal agencies to work much more closely 
together by integrating their preparedness actions. Federal agencies also presented a need 
to connect better with state resources. In turn, formal state resources are best positioned 
to establish network connections with local municipalities, community clinics, and 
informal actors that serve a public health function amid disasters. By better coordinating 
before disasters strike, Puerto Rico increases its chances for more a coordinated response 
with less loss of life in future disasters.  
3. Patient Movement 
A majority of patient movement and evacuations occurred within the NDMS 
activated by the ASPR and presented a complex challenge to responders from supporting 
agencies due to the close proximity of Hurricanes Irma and Maria.302 Following 
Hurricane Irma’s strike on the U.S. Virgin Islands, many medically fragile and dialysis 
patients were transferred to Puerto Rico between September 8 and 16, but these transfers 
were halted on September 17 due to the approach of Hurricane Maria toward the U.S. 
Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico.303 On September 19, the day before Hurricane Maria’s 
impact, some patients were evacuated from both the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico 
to the U.S. mainland; by September 22, just two days after Hurricane Maria made 
landfall the NDMS continued evacuations to the mainland and would continue to do so 
until July 1, 2018.304 Evacuated patients required specialty care not practicable to deliver 
under disaster conditions, such as cancer treatment, dialysis, and other acute care.  
The HHS was heavily reliant on the support of other agencies, specifically the 
DOD, for patient evacuation because the agency lacked its own organic medical airlift 
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capability.305 To facilitate the movement of patients, both the DOD and the Department 
of Veteran Affairs established a mainland and Puerto Rico federal coordinating center 
that registered patients with receiving NDMS facilities at their final destination.306 Due 
to delays in deployments of its Joint Patient Assessment and Tracking System (JPATS) 
personnel, the HHS experienced delays in its ability to track evacuated patients in the 
NDMS, which led to the HHS not having situational awareness of the location and 
condition of evacuated patients.307 The HHS indicated to the GAO that patient tracking 
was not a standard practice at the time, and that the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico 
had not requested pre-deployment of JPATS. Of the approximately 800 persons 
collectively evacuated from both the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico, the HHS could 
not provide the GAO with the final dispositions of 25% of the patients.308 Since 
Hurricanes Irma and Maria, the HHS has drafted lessons learned to include re-evaluating 
how patient tracking is initiated, training clinicians on operating in military aircraft, and 
building organic airlift capability.309 
a. Discussion 
Preparedness gaps were evident in regard to patient movement in addition to other 
areas of the health and medical lifeline. Patient evacuation is a task requiring 
exceptionally high levels of coordination between multiple entities from sending entities, 
transportation units, coordination elements, and receiving facilities. The level of 
coordination required to be successful in moving large numbers of patients rapidly in a 
disaster environment is difficult without thorough preparedness measures, and is made 
more difficult in communications-degraded environments, such as Puerto Rico following 
Hurricane Maria.  
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The GAO noted that the HHS appeared not to have a firm understanding of 
assisting agency capabilities and limitations, which made coordinating this mission 
challenging. Thus, a more integrated and cohesive inter-agency approach to preparedness 
is needed with all entities required to make patient evacuations successful. Moreover, 
much like the provisions for medical care, it may be prudent to decentralize patient 
evacuations as well. Washington State has capitalized on private pilots to conduct 
exercises in preparation for a major Cascadia Fault Zone earthquake in the Pacific 
Northwest. This example might be a model that could expand both patient inter and intra-
island evacuations in future disasters.310 A decentralized model affords resiliency and is 
of particular importance should standard evacuation providers not have the same 
bandwidth availability amid the next major catastrophe (i.e., the DOD).  
To facilitate communications, the same HAM radio operations who aided in the 
ARC’s Safe and Well Program may have also been able to operate as a patient tracking 
stopgap for the eventual deployment of the JPATS had it been planned in advance. These 
radio operators are trained and proficient in facilitating safe and welfare checks of those 
impacted by disasters and could be of great assistance in future disasters.  
Finally, all the stopgap measures discussed under the medical care section are 
what remains when patient evacuation is not feasible, as may be the case in future 
catastrophes, and are a worthwhile investment as a fail-safe mechanism should  
patient evacuations be delayed or become infeasible for any number of reasons when 
disaster strikes.  
4. Medical Supply Chain 
Impacts to Puerto Rico’s power supply, physical transportation infrastructure, 
communications, and general disruption to the routine flow of goods created significant 
disruptions in the island’s medical supply chain that proved difficult to overcome. The 
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impacts were also bi-directional, and impacted goods flowing out of Puerto Rico, and 
those flowing into San Juan. Puerto Rico produces $40 billion a year in pharmaceutical 
and medical supplies that are shipped to the U.S. mainland, to JAXPORT in Jacksonville, 
Florida.311 The island manufactures 30 pharmaceutical medications without therapeutic 
alternatives, and 14 of them are only produced in Puerto Rico.312 These medications 
represent 10% of all pharmaceuticals and 43% of all saline consumed in the United 
States, and the market comprises 30% of Puerto Rico’s annual gross domestic product 
(GDP).313 The island is also recognized as a national hub for intravenous fluid bag 
manufacturing accounting for 43% of the national supply, which resulted in national 
shortages following Hurricane Maria.314 
Meanwhile, on Puerto Rico, Oscar Ruiz of the Sociedad Puertorriqueña de 
Endocrinología y Diabetología traveled the island in the early aftermath of the storm and 
established makeshift medical clinics and noted severe shortages of critical medical 
supplies in communities in need and home to many with chronic health conditions reliant 
upon regular use of prescription medications.315 In another instance, Eunice Vargas 
trudged through sludge and flooded streets seeking oxygen tanks for her 76-year-old 
mother when standard deliveries stopped arriving, but was unable to locate additional 
supplies; she next went to the oxygen manufacturer and found the location to be 
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closed.316 Oxygen shortages were prevalent across the island because both oxygen 
manufacturers on the island were destroyed by the hurricane that thus resulted in  
Puerto Rico’s reliance on imported medical grade oxygen.317 Even in clinical settings, 
hospitals were critically low on oxygen, which forced them to curtail services and ration 
remaining supplies.318 
Widespread medical supply shortages prompted the ASPR to establish a “hub and 
spoke” distribution model in Puerto Rico whereby large metropolitan hospitals served as 
supply and treatment “hubs” and small rural or community hospitals operated as the 
“spokes” that relayed their status and resource needs to their assigned “hub.”319 For 
example, the ASPR identified San Juan’s Centro Medico as a hub managing six spokes 
and afforded each location, including the hub, with an FMS in front of each hospital.320 
The ASPR used this model for the first time in an attempt to disperse supplies and 
treatment across a wider range of medical facilities and performed this strategy with the 
aid of the Department of Veteran Affairs and the DOD.321 
a. Discussion 
Supply disruptions are largely unavoidable, which compels medical providers to 
build disruptions into emergency plans in the form of alternative sourcing and sensible 
stockpiling of supplies. Systemic supply chain resilience requires long-term sustained 
investments to highways, bridges, ports, airports, communications infrastructure, the 
power grid, and backup power generation, etc., which may not be in Puerto Rico’s and 
many other community’s immediate future. Prudent network-level preparedness 
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measures thus become the more attainable goal over the short-term, and represent an area 
over which medical providers can exert control.  
b. Review 
Hurricane Maria also offered a lesson to small community hospitals and clinics 
that these entities can expect to be at the end of a long supply line as metropolitan 
medical facilities are prioritized for resupply. This consideration is critical for smaller 
providers that serve closer to impacted, and potentially vulnerable, communities. While 
these same smaller-scale networks may not have the same resources available as larger 
metropolitan networks, preparedness can be prioritized by leadership, grant funding can 
offset costs, and other low-cost measures can be taken, such as simply obtaining simple 
communications equipment, planning how to transport staff to and from clinics, and 
slowly stockpiling the necessary supplies. The SW-RAMC network offers a strong 
example of how this lesson can be accomplished. 
5. Fatality Management 
The death toll in Puerto Rico is a controversial topic under the Trump 
administration. The initial official death toll was calculated to be 64 by the Puerto Rican 
government.322 Harvard and the Milken Institute School of Public Health at George 
Washington University conducted subsequent studies that resulted in significantly higher 
estimations. Harvard indicated an adjusted fatality estimation of 14.3 deaths per 1,000, a 
62% increase over the same period in 2016, and more than 70 times the official 
government estimation for a total of 4,645 fatalities.323 The Milken Institute School of 
Public Health, commissioned by the Puerto Rican government, offered a substantially 
lower estimation after accounting for an 8% migration rate out of Puerto Rico in the 
recent period following Hurricane Maria that placed their estimation at 2,975 deaths, a 
number the Puerto Rican government officially recognized as the new official death toll 
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in August 2018.324 Since Hurricane Maria, the Puerto Rican government has created a 
plan to revise the death certification protocol that resulted in many deaths not being 
identified as disaster-related.325 
In addition to DMATs, the HHS maintains Disaster Mortuary Operations 
Response Teams (DMORTs), which proved pivotal in the response to Hurricane 
Maria.326 These teams provided support to the island struggling with several major issues 
as it pertained to fatality management as identified by the GAO: limited staffing capacity, 
infrastructure damage, and limited local equipment capacity.327  
Puerto Rican mortuary affairs personnel reported to the GAO that a disaster plan 
was in place for fatality management, but it was simply overwhelmed by the impact of 
Hurricane Maria. Part of this plan required unattended deaths to undergo autopsy to 
determine the cause of death. This requirement prompted a backlog in autopsies and 
forced staff to request outside resources from the federal government. The Bureau of 
Forensic Sciences (BFS) in San Juan manages fatalities on the island, and is staffed with 
just five pathologists.328 Prior to Hurricane Maria, the office was averaging 73 fatalities 
per week. Post-Maria, medical examiners advised they were processing upwards of 145 
decedents over the same timeframe.329 This rapid influx exacerbated existing case 
backlogs, and prompted the BFS to request outside assistance. In addition to other 
resources, the BFS ultimately needed at least 11 refrigerated trailers to house decedents 
awaiting final disposition.330 
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Infrastructure damages also led to difficulties processing death certificates and 
transporting the deceased to the BFS office in San Juan. Damaged roadways made 
transportation difficult across the island, and impacts to the power supply forced 
pathologists to process death certificates into Puerto Rico’s Central Office of the 
Demographic Registry only on a weekly versus a daily basis.331 This delay has prompted 
Puerto Rico to work in conjunction with the CDC on updating to a more resilient system 
since Hurricane Maria.  
The largest equipment shortage throughout Puerto Rico was cold storage for 
decedents prior to a proper burial. Widespread power outages forced many across the 
island to rely upon the BFS San Juan office for temporary cold storage, which resulted in 
a further backlog in San Juan and prompted the BFS to request federal refrigeration 
resources in the form of trailers with generator capacity.332 Puerto Rico continues to 
struggle with equipment shortages and case backlog prompting the BFS to request 
continued FEMA support via federal fatality management capabilities but is now 
struggling to have those requests granted outside of a current disaster context.333 
a. Discussion 
Part of Puerto Rico’s fatality management problems were related to the process, 
but the larger problem was underinvestment in medical examiner capability, in terms of 
staffing, and physical infrastructure, such as morgue space and medical examiner 
facilities. While Puerto Rico had a plan for disaster fatality management, the process 
varied little from standard practices that did not allow for the rapid processing of 
decedents, and contributed to substantial autopsy backlogs that continue to plague the 
island’s fatality management infrastructure.  
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The island also continues to lack adequate facilities, equipment, and staff to 
manage disaster caseloads, which likely means that Puerto Rico will be heavily 
dependent upon outside resources in subsequent disasters. Long-term investment in 
organic fatality management capability will reduce this reliance, so too will proactive 
planning and coordination. Puerto Rico is in a position to coordinate cold storage 
resources with private sector providers owning refrigeration capability, such as reefer 
trucks, and may establish standing mutual-aid agreements with mainland pathologists, 
and schools of pathology, to swell the ranks of pathologists rapidly when disaster strikes.  
6. Conclusion 
The experience of the Puerto Rican medical infrastructure during Hurricane Maria 
illustrates the fact that amid catastrophe, even a rapid influx of a wide range of medical 
support is likely to prove inadequate to meet the needs of an entire impacted population.  
Major impacts to power, water, transportation, and communications infrastructure 
made understanding the extent of damages and resource needs of medical providers 
impossible for a lengthy period.334 Ergo, despite a large influx of outside medical 
professionals, delivering treatment to those in most need would take a considerable 
amount of time to achieve. In the meantime, medical volunteers, community 
organizations, and NGOs sought to fill the void, particularly in rural hard-to-reach areas 
of the island.335 
This void in medical provision indicates a need to prioritize preparedness and 
decentralization of medical capability amid, and despite, restrained budgets and other 
resource shortfalls. Throughout Hurricane Maria, various informal actors contributed to 
caring for communities in need. Harvesting of these capabilities in a steady-state 
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environment, incorporation into disaster planning, and forging of lasting relationships can 
contribute to higher states of preparedness, and ultimately, disaster resilience. The need 
to build self-reliance and reduce the need for outside resources is pertinent to all disaster-
prone communities as world events, such as COVID-19 and geopolitical tensions, make 
the availability of outside disaster response resources, such as state mutual aid, and the 
DOD more uncertain. 
Many of Puerto Rico’s underlying conditions served as comorbidities to disaster 
impacts at levels expectant of an aging and often unhealthy population.336 The public 
health status of the island beckons that health and emergency management practitioners 
join forces in broadening the scope of “disaster preparedness” to have a larger focus on 
the overall health of communities impacted, or likely to be impacted, by disasters. If 
health can be brought into the emergency preparedness fold, it is reasonable to assume 
that stronger, healthier individuals will lead to healthier families, communities, etc. 
However, the state of public health in Puerto Rico is also linked to other issues of 
economic hardship and environmental factors that will ensure efforts to improve the 
health status of residents remain challenging. Underlying the medical lifeline challenges 
was the total power loss to the island due to a destroyed power grid. 
D. ENERGY LIFELINE 
FEMA defines the energy lifeline as, “Electricity service providers and 
generation, transmission, and distribution infrastructure, as well as gas and liquid fuel 
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processing, and delivery systems.”337 The components of this lifeline include power grid 
and fuel.338 
Hurricane Maria wrought devastation on Puerto Rico resulting in the longest 
power outage in the United States, and the second longest power outage in recorded 
history that lasted nearly one year before a majority of customers had power restored.339 
The energy lifeline is of critical importance as a primary facilitator of all other lifelines. 
For example, whereas it is possible to have total communications outages without 
impacting the power grid, the inverse is not true. The same logic model applies to all 
other lifelines as well. 
1. Power Grid 
The Puerto Rican Electric Power Authority (PREPA) supplies a vast majority of 
the power and serves nearly 1.5 million customers throughout Puerto Rico and its 
outlying islands of Culebra and Vieques.340 The island operates on 98% fossil fuels, 
primarily imported diesel fuel and natural gas delivered to large power generation 
stations along the island’s northern and southern shores. A majority of the island’s power 
is generated in the south and is then pushed across expensive, and vulnerable, high-
voltage transmission lines to the north that results in energy costs per kilowatt hour 
(kWh) that are nearly double that of the mainland.341 PREPA’s power network consists 
of six fossil fuel, and seven hydroelectric generation facilities; the island is also home to 
two cogeneration plants, two windfarms, and five privately owned solar farms.342 In 
total, the grid consists of “2,478 miles of transmission lines, 31,485 miles of distribution 
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lines across the service territory, and 334 substations.”343 PREPA generates power 
primarily via facilities located on the northern and southern shores of the island; the two 
largest and most vital generating facilities, Aguirre and Costa Sur, are located on the 
southern shore, connected to the north by high-voltage transmission lines traversing 
mountainous terrain.344 This form of transmission proved problematic when those lines 
collapsed under hurricane force winds in remote hard-to-reach areas leading to grossly 
extended power restoration timelines and system repair costs.345 
At the time of Hurricane Maria, the Puerto Rican government was estimated to 
have been $74 billion dollars in public debt and had an economy that retracted 15% over 
ten years prior to Hurricane Maria.346 PREPA was no exception. In the years preceding 
Hurricane Maria, Puerto Rico’s electrical grid had deteriorated after losing nearly a 20% 
demand for power between 2007 and 2017 due to the sun-setting of tax haven legislation, 
Section 936, which led to a gradual exodus of major corporations operating in Puerto 
Rico that were large industrial power consumers. When large major corporations pulled 
up stakes, energy demand decreased significantly; revenue and system maintenance 
followed downward. One month before Hurricane Maria, in August 2017, Puerto Rican 
authorities estimated that PREPA required $1.6 billion in systemwide upgrades to avoid 
bankruptcy. One month prior, in July 2017, the Financial Oversight and Management 
Board (PROMESA by the Spanish acronym) had filed a petition requesting bankruptcy 
protection for PREPA.347 Puerto Rico’s broader financial prospects look bleak as well. 
In 2016, public debt accounted for 93% of the island’s GDP, and Puerto Rico’s fiscal 
future hinges largely on the viability and success of a variety of debt restructuring 
maneuvers, the outcomes of which remain to be seen.348 
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It is nearly impossible to consider any disaster impact on Puerto Rico without also 
discussing its link to the collapse of the power grid. Not only was the power grid 
devastated by Hurricane Maria, norther portions of the island were also struck just two 
weeks prior by Hurricane Irma that knocked out power to one million customers. It is 
estimated that 70% of power was restored prior to Hurricane Maria’s impact; however, 
the remaining 30% of customers without power were already anticipated to wait months 
for power restoration.349 On September 21, the day after Hurricane Maria’s landfall, 
FEMA reported 1.5 million customers without power, which represents roughly 100% of 
PREPA’s customers, and noted a waiting period for the deployment of power trucks to 
the island vital for restoration operations.350 Complicating matters, the submarine 
transmission line feeding the island of Vieques was damaged in the storm and cut off the 
island.351 It is estimated that 80% of all utility poles on the main island were 
destroyed.352 Over the following three weeks, no more than 16% of customers’ power 
was restored; for those that did have power once again, it remained unreliable.353  
Post-impact, it became immediately apparent that PREPA lacked the capacity to 
restore the island’s power grid fully.354 The USACE estimated that 80% of the island’s 
grid was destroyed and the power restoration mission would take many months to 
complete.355 The poor prognosis of Puerto Rico’s power grid led to the largest USACE 
power mission ever with an estimated 2,300 generator installations completed by the 
249th Engineer Battalion.356 Particular emphasis was placed on powering critical 
facilities, such as hospitals, water plants, communication towers, police and fire stations, 
and 911 call centers—as allowed under the Stafford Act—that in many cases, either 
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lacked generators or had inoperable generators.357 Many generators across the island 
were aging and not designed for long-term use (i.e., months at a time), which led to 
frequent mechanical failures that contributed to infrastructure fragility for a long period 
of time.358 When the USACE completed its mission in May 2018, the Corps had restored 
roughly 99% of pre-existing customers’ power service.359 The USACE noted that the 
response in Puerto Rico was the “most difficult and complicated task” on the island and 
mentioned that in other disasters on the U.S. mainland, transportation into the disaster 
area remains viable or is minimally impacted.360 As a result, the USACE is now 
reviewing how it provides support in remote island environments, and is prioritizing 
transportation assets and the ability to track personnel and resources deployed to an 
incident in real-time.361 FEMA has also determined a need for improvements to include 
adding 300 more emergency generators to its inventory, and a need to update its existing 
Caribbean transportation contract.362 
Utter collapse of the Puerto Rican power grid plunged Puerto Ricans into the 
second longest power outage in recorded history and profoundly altered their daily lives 
for many months following Hurricane Maria. Puerto Rico’s blackout underpinned the 
failure of multiple other vital community services, such as communications, water 
systems reliant on electrically powered water pumps, grocery stores, banks, hospitals, 
clinics, and threatened residents reliant upon power for medical devices.363 For nearly a 
year, Puerto Ricans who remained without power flocked to the few homes and 
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community facilities that had temporary generator power, and began drawing water from 
natural sources despite potentially high levels of contamination.364  
After initial restoration, rolling outages remain frequent. In March 2018, 970,000 
customers lost power due to the shutdown of two major substations.365 This outage 
followed another by three weeks caused by a fire at a major power station.366 To this 
day, recurring blackouts are common and the grid remains fragile to minor mechanical 
issues, weather impacts, and the island’s seismic threat. For example, In January 2020, 
Puerto Rico suffered a 6.5 earthquake in the south of the island that led to widespread 
power outages.367 The island has suffered multiple other outages of varying durations in 
areas all over the island, and illustrates the ongoing threats posed to Puerto Rico and the 
continued fragility of the power grid. 
In light of Puerto Rico’s energy challenges, several communities stand out as 
models of independence and resilience. Around the island, a variety of self-sufficient 
solar microgrids and energy co-ops are springing up and offering potentially scalable 
models. In Puerto Rico’s mountainous interior, the rural community of Adjuntas was 
served by a community organization known as Casa Pueblo. Founded in 1980 as a 
cultural center, Casa Pueblo remains dedicated to ecological interventions, clean energy, 
education, and environmental activism.368 Immediately following Hurricane Maria, Casa 
Pueblo was the only powered location in Adjuntas and quickly became an organizing hub 
for self-help community relief efforts. Residents converged on the solar-powered facility 
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to compile and exchange information, supplies, and charge necessary electronics.369 In 
some ways, Casa Pueblo also became a vital healthcare clinic as those dependent upon 
electronic medical devices arrived to power their life-sustaining equipment.370 Casa 
Pueblo was also able to continue broadcasting on its self-owned radio station, which 
served as a vital source of information for local residents.371 In telling Casa Pueblo’s 
story, author Naomi Klein said that visiting the organization was “a vertiginous 
experience—a bit like stepping through a portal into another world, a parallel Puerto Rico 
where everything worked and the mood brimmed with optimism.”372  
Since Hurricane Maria, Casa Pueblo has partnered with The Honnold Foundation 
to scale a solar microgrid, currently producing 220 kW on a solar micro grid, returning 
energy profits to the local community, and powering 17 small businesses.373 Casa Pueblo 
has also been able to scale its storage to one-megawatt capacity based upon second-life 
electric car batteries procured in cooperation with The Honnold Foundation.374  
Other energy independent examples exist around the island in Utuado, Ciales, 
Jayuya, Vieques, and others. In Utuado, the Hydroelectric Cooperative of the Mountain 
energy co-op seeks to create a more cost-effective energy model that is also 
environmentally sustainable.375 Near to Utuado, solar community hubs are springing up 
in Jayuya currently centered upon a gas station, health clinic, and a blended coffee 
roasting and ice-making facility.376 The gas station serves as a quasi-community hub, 
similar to Casa Pueblo that bridges the communities of Utuado and Jayuya. The solar-
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powered health clinic in Jayuya is operated by a community organization known as 
COSSAO aimed at improving access to healthcare regardless of financial or insurance 
status of patients.377 The facility offers a surprisingly wide range of services including 
dental, prenatal care, dentistry, surgery, pharmaceuticals, and urgent care.378 The clinic 
opened in 2018 in response to a void of medical services for local residents.379  
On the island of Vieques, east of the main island, a non-profit organization called 
Footprint based in Vieques focuses upon solar energy systems to power communications, 
refrigeration, and lighting.380 In conjunction with the local emergency management 
office, the Footprint team assesses the needs and designs programs to serve the local 
community.381 In addition, in the community of Toro Negro, in Ciales, the community 
has come together to establish a solar microgrid management by a local cooperative, and 
to secure safe alternate drinking water sources after enduring over eight months without 
power and potable water.382 Other examples of grassroots community resilience 
endeavors exist in Puerto Rico; however, these organizations are offered as examples of 
the ongoing migration toward community-led initiatives responding to shortcomings of 
state and federal government service provisions. 
a. Discussion 
Power outage durations in Puerto Rico were extensive, which made response and 
recovery of communities exceptionally challenging. On average, Puerto Rican residents 
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went 84 days without electricity; many residents sustained outages well over the average, 
closer to one year, which positively correlated with the remoteness of the customer.383 
The initial response priority to Puerto Rico’s destroyed power grid was to repair the 
existing system rapidly, at the expense of neglecting a long-term, energy independent, or 
otherwise resilient model for future energy resilience.384 In 2017, the existing disaster 
legislation, the Robert T. Stafford Act, only allowed FEMA to fund permanent work 
insofar as it restores to pre-disaster conditions, which did not account for the poor 
condition of Puerto Rico’s electrical grid prior to Hurricane Maria.385 This situation led 
former FEMA Administrator, Brock Long, to Capitol Hill to plead the case that Puerto 
Rico was an exception to this long-standing rule.386 In 2018, the Bipartisan Budget Act 
made an exception to this rule to allow FEMA to “restore disaster-damaged facilities or 
systems that provide the specifically identified critical services to an industry standard 
without regard to pre-disaster condition” in both Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands 
for damages incurred by Hurricanes Irma and Maria.387 
b. Review 
Puerto Rico’s power grid was undoubtedly in serious disrepair when Maria struck 
that contributed to high levels of structural damage and prolonged power outages. 
However, beginning in 2015, PREPA had outlined strategic goals in its Integrated 
Resource Plan (IRP) aimed at migrating away from oil as a primary fuel and moving 
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toward renewable energies and natural gas as primary power sources.388 Under this plan, 
Puerto Rico would achieve 20% renewable generation by 2035.389 The IRP was updated 
via the Puerto Rico Energy Public Policy Act in April 2019 and emplaced more 
aggressive goals. Under this act, Puerto Rico is to achieve the elimination of coal as an 
energy source by 2028, utilize 40% renewable energy by 2025, and 100% renewable 
energy generation by the year 2050.390  
Clean energy and microgrids remain key components of Puerto Rico’s future 
energy strategy. Several clean energy and microgrid projects have been developed since 
Hurricane Maria. Microgrids offer a grid structure that allows for the isolation of impacts 
to prevent large-scale and long-term outages, and potentially faster restoration 
timelines.391 In Maria’s wake, much of the investment in such technology has come via 
private sector philanthropy, such as Tesla installing microgrid technology in several small 
communities around the island.392 While these investments are viewed as positive steps 
in the right direction toward energy resiliency, some experts remain skeptical that these 
approaches will solve Puerto Rico’s power problem on grounds of scalability and 
sustainability.393 In addition to ongoing microgrid initiatives, FEMA has increased its 
on-island stock of available generators from 90 to 268 as of August 2020.394  
Amid tectonic aspirations of clean energy, Puerto Rico has legislated annual 
power rate increases from $.22 per/kWh up to $.32 per/kWh, and requires even those 
operating solely on solar panels to pay into funds designed to pay down PREPA’s 
 
388 Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority, “Integrated Resource Plan—Puerto Rico Energy Bureau,” 
Puerto Rico Energy Bureau, 2020, https://energia.pr.gov/en/integrated-resource-plan/; New York Power 
Authority et al., Build Back Better, 5–6. 
389 New York Power Authority et al., 7. 
390 Puerto Rico Energy Public Policy Act, Public Law 17-2019 (2019), https://energia.pr.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2019/05/Act-17-2019.pdf; Umair Irfan, “Puerto Rico Is Targeting 100% Renewable 
Energy. The Trump Administration Has Other Ideas,” Vox, April 17, 2019, https://www.vox.com/2019/
4/17/18306417/puerto-rico-renewable-energy-natural-gas. 
391 American Society of Civil Engineers, 2019 Report Card for Puerto Rico’s Infrastructure, 28. 
392 American Society of Civil Engineers, 32. 
393 American Society of Civil Engineers, 32. 
394 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Hurricane Maria by the Numbers.” 
98 
existing debt.395 Moreover, as the ASCE point out, these fees are to pay down PREPA’s 
old debt, not to invest in the island’s aggressive clean energy goals.396 Energy price 
hikes make market entry difficult, and are a strong disincentive to transition to cleaner, 
more sustainable forms of energy. Such price structuring stifles migration toward 
renewable energy solutions.  
Unfortunately, based upon historical storm track data, similar storm paths leading 
to high levels of damage to infrastructure are likely to reoccur in the future.397 This data, 
along with the other challenges outlined, places Puerto Rican communities at a high 
likelihood of repeated long-term power loss and isolation. However, the perennial threat 
of catastrophic disasters offers an opportunity for government agencies, NGOs, and 
community organizations to maintain community engagement and fundamentally prepare 
Puerto Ricans in ways that increase resiliency. The Puerto Rican experience also affords 
other communities the ability to study impacts and challenges of power loss in resource-
constrained environments for a comparative analysis of applicable circumstances to 
communities everywhere. Communities, such as Adjuntas, Utuado, and Jayuya, and 
organizations, such as Casa Pueblo and the Hydroelectric Cooperative of the Mountain, 
and COSSAO offer models for energy independence, accessible and affordable 
healthcare, and community resilience that other jurisdictions may seek to replicate in the 
interest of reducing long-term vulnerability against catastrophes. 
The uprising and solidification of decentralized and community-based 
organizations, and their growing role in community resilience, align with the ODNI’s 
Global Trends assessment of a future in which “advocacy groups, charities, and local 
governments prove nimbler than national governments” as the government and the public 
renegotiate roles and responsibilities in providing public services, also noting that 
“tomorrow’s successful states will probably be those that invest in infrastructure, 
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knowledge, and relationships resilient to shock.”398 Furthermore, resilient community 
hubs are likely to play an increasing role in communities’ response and recovery efforts. 
In 1960, Nobel Prize winner, Thomas Schelling, discovered that in the absence of 
information, people will “people will coordinate by selecting a focal point that seems 
natural, special or relevant to them,” and this scenario appears to hold true in Puerto Rico 
following Hurricane Maria.399 
2. Fuel 
Fuel supply to Puerto Rico presents a vulnerability given the power grid’s reliance 
on imported fuel for electricity generation. Roughly, 75% of Puerto Rico’s energy 
production is derived from petroleum products obtained via fuel imports through the 
ports of San Juan, Guayanilla, and Ponce, and arrive mostly on foreign-flagged vessels 
from non-U.S. ports of origin.400 In fiscal year 2017, Puerto Rico received 212 fueling 
ships to supply its power production.401 By one estimation, Hurricane Maria may have 
driven diesel demand by as much as 500% by a large-scale transition to generator power 
across the three inhabited islands.402 Fuel shipments bound for Puerto Rico were met 
with significant delays as a result of Hurricanes Irma, Jose, and Maria as they sought safe 
passage around each system.403 Once shipments arrived, off-loading fuel products 
remained problematic. While fuel supply sources remained unaffected by the storm, the 
ability to distribute fuel was crippled for a significant period of time. For example, the 
FEMA Daily Brief for September 27, one week post-landfall, noted, “bulk fuel is on the 
island, but there is limited capability to distribute.”404 The same briefing on September 
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28 estimated 18 days of fuel were available on the island and noted distribution remained 
challenging due to debris issues. With fuel in port, truck drivers who deliver the product 
to final destinations were unable to get to the port either due to blocked transportation 
routes or a need to ensure their own families were safe before reporting to work.405 
FEMA’s AAR noted that competing demands for fuel transfer from vessels to trucks 
created a need to develop a fuel truck shipment route priority and necessitated the 
contracting of additional trucks and drivers.406 Retrospectively, the fuel shortages 
experienced on Puerto Rico following Hurricane Maria appear to be an issue of demand 
and delivery, not of supply.407 In the moment, the issue appeared to be resource scarcity, 
which led to very high levels of resource ordering, further crowding the overwhelmed 
distribution system.408  
Regardless of cause, endpoint fuel scarcity sent Puerto Ricans everywhere 
scrambling with vehicles and gas cans to wait in hours-long lines to get what little fuel 
they could from the island’s 1,100 gas stations.409 For residents of the interior 
municipalities, sourcing fuel became a day-long venture.410 For residents fortunate 
enough to have access to both generators and fuel, the costs of fuel exacerbated financial 
woes as they quickly became unaffordable to operate for long periods, driving some 
resident to eat very basic foods and pool funds to source precious gasoline.411 For 
residents with generators that could afford fuel, rationing was common and was typically 
capped at five gallons of fuel per individual.412 Residents throughout the island would 
often flock to locations with generators to charge their telephones and other electronics 
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then go in search of what limited cell phone connectivity could be found to coordinate 
helping their family, friends, and putting their lives back together. 
a. Discussion 
Puerto Rico’s reliance on imported fuels creates the need for particularly resilient 
airport, seaports, and ground transportation infrastructure.413 Should a single port of 
entry fail, securing a resupply of fuel in support of temporary power generation and daily 
use will be in peril.  
b. Review 
However, the experience of Hurricane Maria also indicates that post-disaster, fuel 
supply shortages are more likely to be related to issues of distribution, not limited 
supply.414 Distribution issues consisted of physical impact to, and blockage of, vital 
transportation routes, and the unplanned need for the USACE and FEMA to support such 
a massive temporary power generation mission.415 In the interest of long-term 
vulnerability reduction and disaster resilience, the community organizations discussed 
under the energy component that are based upon sustainable micro grid energy models 
reduce the need for high-volume fuel shipments in the days and weeks following a major 
disaster and afford a resilient model that extends a lifeline to communities, particularly in 
rural areas. Scaling this model to other communities throughout Puerto Rico may relieve 
the stress on the logistics supply chain amid future disasters.  
3. Conclusion 
The widespread destruction Puerto Rico’s power grid made the stabilization of all 
other critical infrastructure extremely challenging, and nearly impossible, for a significant 
period of time. In much the same way that the island’s underlying health conditions 
exacerbated issues found in the health and medical lifeline, the island’s pre-existing 
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decrepit power grid also served as an amplifier to Hurricane Maria’s destructive power. 
With a collapsed grid, the island quickly became many times more dependent on the 
import of fuel that also proved problematic due to the widespread collapse of the resource 
distribution networks discussed in the transportation lifeline. Without a power supply 
across the island, it also proved essentially impossible for communities and responders to 
communicate effectively as well.  
E. COMMUNICATIONS LIFELINE 
FEMA defines the communications lifeline as:  
Infrastructure owners and operators of broadband internet, cellular and 
landline telephone networks, cable services, satellite communications 
services, and broadcast networks (radio/television). These systems 
encompass diverse modes of delivery, often intertwined but largely 
operating independently. Services include alerts, warnings, and messages, 
911 and dispatch, and access to financial services.416 
The components of this lifeline include infrastructure, responder communications, alerts, 
warnings, and messages, finance, and 911 dispatch.417  
The most evident gap in Puerto Rico’s communications capabilities was the lack 
of survivable communications primarily due to a lack of a resilient infrastructure, scarce 
equipment redundancy, lack of temporary power generation, and a general void of 
catastrophic preparedness initiatives both in the private and public sphere. A full two 
days after landfall of Hurricane Maria, the Puerto Rico government still had negative 
contact with 40 of its 78 municipalities.418 FEMA’s AAR indicated that local, state, and 
federal governments suffered from an inability to communicate, which resulted in poor 
resource coordination, and identified that ensuring the future continuity of 
communications as an agency high priority.419 Without functioning communications, 
jurisdictions found it impossible to request outside resources or receive offers of 
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assistance from other jurisdictions. Puerto Rico authorities could not communicate with 
the outside world for a significant period of time, particularly in regard to off-island 
EMAC resources from different states.420 Many Puerto Rican responders at both the 
local and Commonwealth levels reported that the inability to communicate was the 
biggest challenge to mounting an effective response.  
1. Infrastructure  
Puerto Rico’s communications network is comprised of fiber internet, microwave 
towers, cable television, broadcast radio, and cellular sites. In total, the island has a 
network of 1,600 cell sites supporting the primary means of individual communication 
via voice and text.421 In 2018, the island had an estimated 703,266 fixed line customers, 
and 3,330,286 wireless customers, which represented a 21% and 101% saturation rate, 
respectively.422 AT&T, T-Mobile, Claro, Sprint, and Open Mobile serve as the primary 
providers, and cellular service is the majority source of internet for many on the 
island.423 A vast majority of communications on the island is achieved via wireless, 
cellular technology, whereby 80% of residents exclusively use cell phones for routine 
communications.424 Much like other sectors, the communications infrastructure was in 
ill-repair and vulnerable before Hurricane Maria made landfall. Many cell towers were 
overloaded with equipment, which made them top-heavy and susceptible to high winds, 
and many cell sites were poorly maintained and difficult to access for routine upkeep.425 
Hurricane Maria decimated the island’s communication infrastructure and 
rendered 95.6% of all cell sites non-operational. All municipalities experienced at least 
75% outages, and peak communications outages left 48 of the island’s 78 municipalities 
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with 100% cellular outages for extended periods.426 Maria also rendered an estimated 
85% of both above and below ground cable and fiber-optic networks inoperable.427 
Services were incrementally restored over the following six months at which point 4% of 
cell sites remained completely inoperable.428 The Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) noted these impacts were “considerably longer than for any other storm” and the 
networks in both Puerto Rico and neighboring U.S. Virgin Islands were “almost 
completely destroyed” in its 2018 report.429 It is important to note that the damage 
wrought by Hurricane Maria overlaps that inflicted by Hurricane Irma just two weeks 
prior. Although the U.S. Virgin Islands bore the brunt of Hurricane Irma, Puerto Rico 
was substantially impacted as well.430 For example, the day after Irma’s impact, Puerto 
Rico recorded 39% cell site outages; nearly a week later on September 14, 2017, Puerto 
Rico was still experiencing 6% cell site outages.431 According to the FCC’s Disaster 
Information Reporting System (DIRS), cellular outages were concentrated east-to-west 
along the northern two-thirds of the island.432 Hurricane Maria would strike five days 
later and knocked out nearly all communications islandwide. 
In an attempt to stem widespread outages, Google’s X lab, operated by its parent 
company, Alphabet, devised a plan to launch telecommunication balloon platforms 
designed to provide communications capability to remote areas in October 2017. Prior to 
Hurricane Maria, the solar-powered balloon platforms had undergone testing in New 
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Zealand, Peru, and Brazil.433 Performing this mission required that the FCC grant 
Alphabet an experimental license.434  
By November, Alphabet reported that it was providing communications services 
to as many as 100,000 residents of the island via its stratospheric balloons that delivered 
internet service to areas that remained without functioning cellular towers.435 Each 
balloon operated via AT&T and T-Mobile networks and covered 5,000 square 
kilometers, supplying as much as a 10 megabyte per second connection that allowed 
residents to send texts and emails.436 While this technology provided some 
communications relief, they offered daytime services only as the balloons are solar-
powered, and Project Loon remains experimental technology.437 
a. Discussion 
According to one study, on average, Puerto Rican residents went without cellular 
phone service for 41 days; those who resided in more remote areas strongly correlated 
with longer service outages.438 This number is significant given the central role 
communication plays in the coordination of all other disaster response and recovery 
functions. J. Brian Houston et al. describe communication systems and resources as 
“reservoirs in which community meaning-making, information exchange, interactions, 
and connections can occur.”439 
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b. Review 
Alphabet’s balloon technology represents what is possible for public and private 
partnerships in challenging environments. Deployments of Alphabet’s balloons was not a 
pre-planned action but perhaps should be, particularly in areas known to suffer major 
communications impacts, and long restoration timelines. Pre-planning such capability 
may afford technology providers the ability to scale operations further and provide higher 
levels of services in the future.  
The role of the ARRL in supporting first response operations and the ARC’s Safe 
and Well program also portray what is possible when non-governmental and informal 
actors are brought into alignment with government response frameworks and their 
resources are applied to common problems facing disaster-impacted areas. Greater pre-
planning for non-governmental actors may have also expanded each organization’s 
ability to provide disaster relief services. 
2. Responder Communications 
Responder communications largely rely on the same physical infrastructure as the 
public and therefore were as heavily impacted as other forms of communication. FEMA 
defines responder communications as the LMR networks that first responders use to 
communicate with dispatch centers and with each other in the field.440 First response 
repeaters, antennas, and other communications hardware are affixed to commercial 
towers and government facilities exposed to Hurricane Maria’s high winds over an 
extended period of time. When well over 90% of cellular communications went offline, a 
vast majority of responder communications capability did so as well. 
Many regional authorities reported an inability to communicate with the central 
government, and lacked the clear authority under those circumstances to respond to the 
disaster’s impacts.441 Therefore, during the initial days and weeks following Hurricane 
Maria, communications resorted to old ways via the use of runners between 
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municipalities and the San Juan, Puerto Rico’s capital city. For instance, Caguas Mayor, 
William Miranda Torres, reported driving to San Juan with hand-written supply requests 
often times staying for four to five hours each day to plead for disaster relief supplies for 
his town.442 This practice was common with the mayors of nearly all 78 municipalities in 
Puerto Rico. According to Puerto Rico’s Chief Information Security Officer, Luis 
Arocho, “no one prepares for the complete loss of the communication network…what 
happened in Puerto Rico has never happened with a major disaster in the United 
States.”443 Most disasters have an edge where the destruction stops and disaster aid 
resources can amass and be used as operational hubs. As an island, Puerto Rico posed 
unique challenges because the entire island was heavily impacted with nowhere left to 
stage resources. 
When standard cellular and internet connectivity was lost, Puerto Rico sought 
support from a variety of actors with the primary sources being FEMA, the DOD private 
sector providers, and volunteer organizations, such as the ARRL. Immediately following 
Hurricane Maria, FEMA deployed its Mobile Emergency Response Support (MERS) 
units. By September 23, the agency had deployed 34 MERS teams, which left only 5.5% 
of MERS capacity remaining in reserve.444 MERS provided “mobile satellite, mobile 
radio, and logistics support services to provide command and control communications, 
situational awareness, and program delivery.”445 For the capability that FEMA was not 
able to offer organically, the agency contracted services via the private sector and 
coordinated delivery of DOD and Secret Service assets.446 FEMA also eventually issued 
satellite phones to both municipal mayors and hospitals; however, they proved to be 
largely ineffective in facilitating communications. FEMA reported that poor weather 
conditions, user inexperience, and phone activation issues were the culprits hindering the 
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use of satellite phones.447 The agency also noted that some satellite phones “could not 
correctly operate” in the Caribbean.448 Anecdotally, in other words, the overhead 
satellite infrastructure was either not positioned properly over the area, or held 
insufficient bandwidth to process a sudden surge in satellite communications traffic.449 
Unfortunately, for Mayor Torres, and many other mayors in his position, communicating 
needs to San Juan would not substantially improve until cellular networks were restored. 
Military units also aided substantially in emergency communications coming 
from both Title 32 (National Guard) and Title 10 (Federal) forces from around the 
country. By September 30, the DOD had received requests for two theater 
communications packages, and three others for communications support packages 
inclusive of Broadband Global Area Networks (BGAN) with operators.450 The DOD’s 
primary focus was to support “government and FEMA Joint Field Office efforts to 
engage the mayors of the 78 municipalities and ascertain needs” with the intent to bolster 
governmental communications capability to facilitate command and control over 
response efforts.451 The DOD also deployed a number of Civil Affairs Information 
Support Element (CAISE) teams.452 These teams performed a variety of functions but 
one of the most vital was aiding in the restoration of radio broadcast stations, which 
allowed the government to communicate more effectively with the communities it served. 
Given the extensive damage to the infrastructure, satellite-based solutions played 
a vital role in establishing reliable responder communications. One major provider, 
Hughes Network Solution LLC, carried a majority of the satellite internet and Voice over 
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Internet Protocol (VOIP) communications.453 Hughes offers a variety of satellite-based 
communications platforms. The company reported supporting FEMA, the NWS, the 
DOD, and Customs and Border Protection (CBP), as well as many private sector clients 
totaling 1,500 individual terminal connections between Puerto Rico and the Virgin 
Islands in the first three months post-disaster.454 One of the most commonly used 
devices are known as very small aperture terminals (VSATs) that allow for the sending 
and receiving of information in areas with no existing networks.455 Other assistance 
came from random sources able to provide assistance, such as when Massachusetts and 
Rhode Island provided Puerto Rico with satellite communications and radios as part of a 
much broader joint effort to prop up the island’s communications infrastructure.456 These 
sources primarily originated via the EMAC network managed by NEMA. 
As primary means of communications were degraded or destroyed, and local and 
state responders began using alternative means of communications, one such resource 
was amateur radio networks.457 Unsurprisingly, grassroots communications platforms, 
such as HAM radios, displayed the high levels of resiliency in this disaster and were able 
to fill vital communications capability gaps. While a HAM network existed on Puerto 
Rico (and mutual-aid operators on the mainland), scant evidence is available that shows 
that the networks were well integrated in Commonwealth emergency response plans as an 
asset to the island. The ARRL, however, comprised of volunteer radio operators capable 
of operating a wide range of communications technology, was able to be of great 
assistance nevertheless.458 Private HAM radio operators and members of ARRL’s 
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subsidiary component, ARES, teamed with first responders to provide communications 
via handheld HAM radios, and other operators (approximately 12) PREPA manned 
trucks.459 Early in the response, the ARC partnered with the ARRL and mobilized 
approximately 50 radio operators to Puerto Rico where they aided ARC’s Safe and Well 
Program that reunites separated family members following disasters.460 The ARRL radio 
operators also supported 51 community hospitals by issuing and installing very high 
frequency (VHF) communications that allowed them direct radio communications to the 
Puerto Rico Emergency Operations Center, which aided greatly in coordinating 
resources.461 The ARRL, as a grassroots organization, filled vital communications gaps 
in many other ways at a time when government and private sector frameworks could not. 
Unfortunately, the ARRL was only able to be of such assistance in spite of, not because 
of, pre-disaster planning and strong local and state government coordination.462 
a. Discussion 
Restoring functioning responder communications required that numerous ad hoc 
measures be performed and supported by a massive amount of resources. While FEMA 
and the DOD maintains standard capabilities, their employment in Puerto Rico was not 
pre-planned which posed a challenge and caused FEMA to nearly exhaust all its MERS 
capability.463 
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b. Review 
Hurricane Maria also highlighted both the lack of survivable communications and 
the importance of having such contingencies in place pre-disaster impact. Government 
entities often struggled to distribute satellite phones and VSAT technologies in a manner 
that comparably supported response operations as primary communications systems. 
Securing such contingency technology is often cost-prohibitive, which may suggest 
Puerto Rico build out more economical capabilities by further incorporating volunteer 
actors, such as ARRL’s HAM radio operations into future response and recovery plans.  
3. Alerts, Warnings, and Messages 
Extensive damage to physical infrastructure, such as wind damage to radio and 
microwave towers, downed utility poles, and other similar impacts brought cable and 
radio broadcast capability to a standstill for a matter of months as well. As late as 
December 2017, only 5% of Puerto Rico’s 100 television stations were reporting 
themselves as operational and nearly 33% of both amplitude modulation (AM) and 
frequency modulation (FM) radio stations remained inoperable.464 Additionally, the FCC 
reports that cable system and traditional landline services were “generally non-existent” 
primarily due to the widespread and long-term lack of power.465 These impacts made 
communicating information to the public difficult in all cases and impossible in many 
others. Radio broadcasting stations proved to be rather resilient considering the 
circumstances; however, this communication medium only afforded responders a one-
way method of communication that did little to alleviate the inability to communicate 
resource needs, and apply available resources in a timely manner.466 On September 22, 
2020, Puerto Rico’s Guajataca Dam was in eminent danger of collapsing, which resulted 
in the need to evacuate 70,000 residents. This evacuation prompted the NWS alerting 
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procedures. However, due to widespread communications outages, authorities had little 
means actually to reach the intended audience, which prompted first responders to alert 
area residents physically via PA systems on emergency vehicles to urge people to 
evacuate immediately.467 Despite shortcomings, in the following days and weeks, FEMA 
continued to try to implement novel solutions to maintain alert and warning capability. 
The agency’s Integrated Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS) Office, responsible 
for such things as emergency alerts, amber and silver alerts, partnered with SirusXM to 
emplace satellite radios to keep what are known as “primary entry point” (PEP) stations 
broadcasting.468 
Void of widespread service restoration, residents were often traveling long 
distances seeking locations and buildings that could offer cell phone signals and Wi-Fi 
connectivity to allow them to connect to family and resources on the island, as well as the 
mainland.469 One other notable connection to the outside world was radio station WAPA 
680 of San Juan that continued to employ analog equipment requiring less energy to 
operate than other stations that had migrated solely to modern digital equipment requiring 
greater generator power; thus, WAPA 680 provided continuity of services when others 
ceased to function.470 Not only did WAPA 680 operate as a radio station, it also took the 
initiative to field initial calls for emergency assistance for those becoming isolated by 
rising floodwaters before the communication network collapsed.471 Following the storm, 
the radio station also hosted medical professionals who offered residents medical and 
psychological advice over the airwaves.472 The station’s continuity served as a lifeline of 
information for residents otherwise in the dark. Other stations that were able to remain on 
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the air often operated in a limited capacity, such as only being able to operate on the FM 
band, and for those who had generators, fuel began to become scarce, which forced many 
stations to cease broadcasts at 5 p.m. daily.473 These stations also served vital roles, such 
as helping reunite families and perform welfare checks on loved ones.474 These examples 
illustrate the value of several truths: citizens maintained radios capable of connecting 
them to local broadcast stations, analog communications equipment is often more reliable 
amid catastrophes than more sophisticated hardware, WAPA 680 was able to operate on 
generator power, which allowed it to continue to broadcast in austere conditions in the 
immediate aftermath when residents needed it most, and local broadcasting stations 
should be viewed as a vital response resource when preparing for disasters. 
On a community level, the environmental activist organization, Casa Pueblo, was 
also able to maintain operations of its radio station broadcasting in Adjuntas due to its 
focus on pre-disaster preparedness and abundant solar power generation. By remaining 
on the air, Casa Pueblo was able to serve the vital function of keeping the local 
community abreast of important updates and information pertaining to disaster response 
and recovery.475 
a. Discussion 
Once again, the capabilities of non-governmental actors proved most resilient 
amid catastrophic disaster as evidenced by entities, such as Casa Pueblo and WAPA 
680’s ability to maintain communications capabilities. It remains important for 
government entities to identify, support these community resources, and join as partners 
in disaster response. Doing so would serve as a force-multiplier to strengthening the 
island’s resilience against future catastrophic disasters. 
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b. Review 
Hurricane Maria’s threat to the Guajataca Dam also highlighted the need for 
functioning secondary and tertiary means of communicating risk to communities. If the 
NWS’ warnings are the primary means, and audible stationary alert systems are a 
secondary, this need will remain problematic in hurricane scenarios that extensively 
affect the operability of both of these systems and methods of communication. Perhaps a 
tertiary means of notification is necessary, such as a PA system affixed to rotary wing 
aircraft or a ground strategy whereby first responders go door-to-door or utilize PA 
systems to warn residents to evacuate. Such capability would likely negate predictable 
hurricane impacts.  
4. Finance 
Loss of power, internet connectivity, and physical infrastructure rendered Puerto 
Rico a cash economy for a significant period of time. While many residents withdrew 
cash prior to Hurricane Maria’s impact, the protracted nature of the response resulted in 
many quickly running low on cash to buy what critical supplies were available, such as 
food, water, and petroleum products.476 According to Zoime Alvarez, Vice President of 
the Association of Banks of Puerto Rico, by October 3, roughly 40% of bank branches 
were at least partially operational.477 This reduction in operations resulted in many 
residents spending much of their time using precious fuel, or walking long distances, in 
an attempt to find working ATMs so they could buy the necessary provisions for 
continued survival. The issues surrounding the functioning of banks was also multi-
faceted; many branches did not have available drivers to deliver cash, each relied on 
generator power to operate, and their employees were subjected to the same disaster 
impacts as everyone else on the island.478 
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a. Discussion 
Finance is not often a frontline disaster response topic, however, a lack of access 
to cash or credit card services can be devastating to impacted communities.  
b. Review 
Luckily, Puerto Rico saw a plurality, if not a majority, of banking services back 
online within a reasonably short period of time; however, many throughout the island 
struggled to access their financial resources to provide for the essentials. Emergency 
financing and cash access must be a governmental disaster planning consideration, while 
storing cash reserves, when possible, remains the responsibility of all citizens.  
5. 911 Communications 
High winds and resulting damage to physical infrastructure also impacted other 
forms of communications, such as public safety answering points (PSAPs), or more 
commonly referred to as 911 call centers, cable providers, and radio broadcast stations. 
The morning after Hurricane Irma’s impact, the two PSAPs in Puerto Rico were degraded 
in capability; the centers were able to receive 911 calls for service but without automatic 
location identifiers (ALIs), it was difficult to map calls and direct resources.479 By the 
time Hurricane Maria impacted Puerto Rico, the island’s PSAPs were once again fully 
operational.480 Remarkably, the PSAPs continued to operate throughout Hurricane 
Maria’s impact although ALI issues re-emerged along with others, which prompted 
dispatchers to resort to old analog methods of information gathering and 
recordkeeping.481  
As of 2019, it was reported that the PSAPs still lack ALIs and that 911 computer-
aided dispatch systems still contained old mapping software that had not been updated 
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with new roads, businesses, and housing developments. 911 Commissioner, Yazmín 
González Morales, disagreed on the accuracy of this report.482 
In addition to aforementioned outside responders and resources, the island also 
was afforded a great deal of regulatory relief via the FCC. For instance, the FCC offered 
support to the ARRL to alter broadcast intensity to facilitate better communications with 
the mainland. The FCC also afforded temporary provisions to reduce record-keeping 
requirements, permitted atypical bandwidth use, and waived interoperability requirements 
all in the interest of facilitating a rapid communications recovery.483 
However, as power outages initially spread and communications capability 
degraded, citizens had little means of soliciting help from first responders. This 
unavailability forced many to resort to signaling “help” and messages, such as “send 
food” in large letters either on the ground or rooftops in hopes they would be spotted 
from the air.484 Residents also began using relays and word-of-mouth, a method even 
local governments were resorting to at the time.485 As late as October 30, 2017, just “12 
of 78 police stations, 14 of 56 emergency medical service stations, and none of the 93 fire 
stations was able to relay 911 calls.”486 In practical terms, this inability meant that 
residents fortunate enough to be able to place a call to 911 may still not receive 
emergency services due to the lack of connectivity at responding stations.487 
Amid the response, FEMA procured or issued satellite phones for many first 
responders, such as police, fire, and ambulance services, but 911 operators reported not 
having the numbers to the devices. Communications and coordination therefore remained 
a challenge.488 Satellite phones are typically expensive to procure and keep active 
service on, and are generally more complicated to use than a standard cellular phone that 
 
482 Robles, “New Emergency Sirens Sat in Storage.” 
483 Federal Communications Commission, 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season Impact, 21. 
484 Respaut and Graham, “With Cell Service Crippled.” 
485 Respaut and Graham. 
486 Fischbach et al., “After Hurricane Maria,” xxvii. 
487 Fischbach et al., xxvii. 
488 Robles, “New Emergency Sirens Sat in Storage.” 
117 
nearly everyone is now accustomed to using. This difficulty may lead to situations, such 
as Puerto Rico not having pre-planned satellite communications capabilities. 
a. Discussion 
In summary, 911 emergency communications capabilities in Puerto Rico proved 
able to work with FCC regulators to establish workarounds under exigent circumstances 
that ensured some baseline capability remained in place throughout the initial response.  
b. Review 
Hurricane Maria illustrated that a total loss of communication remains possible in 
the modern age, and local communities can take continuity of communications into their 
own hands. If each community had maintained HAM radios and operators, they each 
would have had a reliable means of communicating needs to the outside world. Not being 
able to communicate directly contributed to an inability to coordinate response and 
recovery personnel and resources. Gaining and maintaining situational awareness was a 
monumental task void of standard communications technology, and void of awareness, 
responders could not effectively apply disaster aid resources.  
The scope and scale of damage to Puerto Rico’s communications infrastructure is 
difficult to capture in its entirety; however, the issues discussed in this section offer 
insight into the major challenges that disaster responders, local community leaders, and 
residents contended with in the days, weeks, and months that followed Hurricane Maria. 
Writ large, communities throughout the island struggled to communicate needs and 
coordinate resources until cellular networks were reliably restored, which took a record-
setting period of time. The ways in which Puerto Rico was able to cope with the 
consequences of Hurricane Maria can be instructive to other communities that may also 
find themselves isolated due to severe disaster impacts. Puerto Rico illustrates that 
solutions can be found and brought to bear even in extreme circumstances, and that many 
of those solutions can be found at the community-level. 
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6. Conclusion 
Puerto Rico’s pre-disaster communications infrastructure was beset with delayed 
maintenance issues, much like the power grid. Vulnerable communications infrastructure 
suffered severe damages amid Hurricane Maria that severely limited responders of all 
types from understanding the situation in communities across the island, and from 
coordinating and de-conflicting their actions. These issues naturally led to delayed 
responses, duplicative efforts, and a myriad of inefficiencies until temporary field 
communications could be erected, or hasty infrastructure repairs could be effected. 
However, the long-term power outage necessitated that most communications 
infrastructure operate on regular fuel resupply, which proved difficult to manage 
effectively.  
As seen in other lifelines, non-governmental actors proved able to fill critical 
voids in government capability. The ARRL volunteers were able to establish themselves 
with key government actors and afford urgent communications bridges that may have not 
otherwise been possible under the same timelines.489 Likewise, the private sector proved 
able and interested in piloting new technologies, such as balloon platforms capable of 
providing cell and basic internet service, with mixed success, as an unconventional means 
of rapidly restoring communications.490 Adding another layer of complexity to the 
situation, essentially all transportation routes throughout the island were negatively 
impeded or impacted in some way by Hurricane Maria, which also contributed to the 
initial inabilities to distribute vital supplies to impacted communities.491 
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F. TRANSPORTATION LIFELINE 
FEMA defines the transportation lifeline as “Multiple modes of transportation that 
often serve complementary functions and create redundancy, adding to the resilience in 
overall transportation networks. This includes roadway, mass transit, railway, aviation, 
maritime, and intermodal systems.”492 The components of this lifeline include highway/
roadway/motor vehicle, mass transit, railway, aviation, and maritime. 
This lifeline narrative offers little in terms of community preparations for 
disasters other than to highlight transportation impact challenges that communities are 
likely to face in catastrophic disasters. Communities appeared to play a less active role in 
managing and resolving transportation lifeline impacts during and after Hurricane Maria. 
This information however may be informative as communities develop their own 
catastrophic disaster plans and strategies. For this reason, this lifeline is addressed despite 
the paucity of data suggesting direct community involvement.  
1. Highway/Roadway/Motor Vehicle 
Puerto Rico has 18,358 miles of roadway spanning three categories: the National 
Highway System (NHS), state highways, and municipal roadways. The roadways are 
classified as follows: 284 miles are NHS-interstate highways, 496 miles are NHS non-
interstate roadways, 4,296 miles are non-NHS roadways, and 13,280 miles are municipal 
road systems.493 Not all roadways are uniformly cataloged at the Commonwealth level; 
therefore, other sources indicate fewer miles of roadway, such as RAND’s estimation of 
16,500 miles of roadway networks, and 2,222 bridges across the island.494 Regardless of 
the exact miles of roadways, Puerto Rico maintains a ring-route of highways that 
circumnavigate the island and serve as the primary over-the-road access points.495 In the 
aftermath of Hurricane Maria, some 6,000 incidents were reported to the island 
Department of Transportation (DTOP) including “landslides and collapsed and seriously 
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weakened bridges.”496 Hurricane Maria is estimated to have generated an astounding six 
million cubic yards of debris that resulted in just 400 miles of the island’s total roadways 
remaining passable.497 
Importantly, in the context of Hurricane Maria, the municipality manages the 
municipal roadways. They exist, but are not under the central government, and therefore, 
are not required to meet federal or Puerto Rico Highway and Transit Authority (PRHTA) 
standards unless the project utilizes federal funding.498 Similar to other critical 
infrastructure sectors, the island’s roadways are plagued by a variety of issues including a 
lack of dedicated funding, poor construction standards, and laws allowing heavy freight 
leading to early roadway damage.499 Heavy structural impacts to Puerto Rico’s network 
of roadways, coupled with a near total loss of communications, degraded the island’s 
ability to coordinate response operations and deliver vital commodities via multi-modal 
transportation.500 For reference, Hurricane Maria triggered an estimated 40,000 
landslides in three-fourths of the island’s 78 municipalities, which were two orders of 
magnitude greater than any previous experiences.501 Blocked and collapsed roadways 
and bridges crippled the island’s ability to distribute commodities. Massive transportation 
impacts spurred FEMA to assume a leading role in not just supplying resources to the 
island’s ports and RSAs, but also ensuring the onward movement of supplies to final 
destinations, such as local points of distribution (PODs). Operating as the sole distributor 
was not a pre-planned role for FEMA, which led to supply chain breakdowns, staffing 
shortages, and an inability to source enough truck drivers.502 Severe roadway and bridge 
damage across the island led FEMA, in partnership with the DOD, to begin an air 
reconnaissance of damages, and delivery of commodities to isolated areas as early as 
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three days post-hurricane impact.503 However, FEMA noted that information gleaned 
from damage assessment flights was difficult to communicate to those on the ground and 
therefore had limited impacts on improving the common operating picture of the 
response.504 Additionally, it remains unclear how effective supply airdrops were in terms 
of what percentage of needs was met, or if areas of highest priority received deliveries 
first. 
The island also suffered from insufficient debris management contracting 
capability, which prolonged the inability to transport resources and commodities over-
the-road. In 2018, the GAO found that the response to the 2017 hurricanes, particularly in 
the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico, highlighted “longstanding issues,” including 
shortages in available debris removal contractors that delayed crucial recovery steps and 
“a lack of trained personnel with program expertise.”505 This deficiency led to long 
delays and an inability to reach the most impacted areas of the island, which in turn, led 
some municipalities to organize ad hoc debris removal crews comprised of local 
residents. For instance, in the town of Aibonito, crews would work during the daylight 
hours and convene on the town center by evening, the only area with power restored.506 
This scenario serves as one example of a community coming together to fill a void by 
performing a public service at a time when their government and private contractors fell 
short of fulfilling disaster response and recovery obligations. 
a. Discussion 
Much like the health and medical lifeline, access and situational awareness were 
major challenges in the early response phase as it related to transportation. Amid 
significant roadway and bridge impacts, ARRL HAM radio operators were once again 
the “eyes and ears” as they had VHF radio operators spread throughout the island that 
allowed them to construct an incident map of open and closed routes, and other damages 
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impacting the response operation.507 In total, 131 local radio operators and 22 mutual-aid 
operators supported the island’s communication and situational awareness needs.508 This 
capability proved pivotal at a time when governmental elements struggled to gain and 
maintain island-wide situational awareness.  
b. Review 
Crowdsourcing information from individuals regarding transportation impacts 
also proved vital in Puerto Rico. FEMA alone noted that 5,400 “digital volunteers” 
provided information on roadway and bridge closures, hospital status, and food and fuel 
availability.509 This latent community capability, combined with the role of ARRL HAM 
radio operators, illustrates the critical role non-governmental actors play in disaster 
response, and secondarily, indicates a need to plan for leveraging these capabilities, 
particularly in catastrophic disasters.  
Additionally, NGOs proved able to access hard-to-reach areas of the island and 
render aid. For example, an organization called Visit Rico was able to gain access to rural 
farms and support their owners with funding and by organizing debris removal 
volunteers.510 In the days, weeks, and months following Hurricane Maria, Farm Aid was 
able to work through Visit Rico to get cash in farmers’ hands and organize a “Farm to 
Farm” fundraiser in which mainland farms supported those impacted by the hurricane in 
Puerto Rico.511 Additionally, the COSSAO organization focused on clearing debris, 
opening roadways, and conducting emergency bridge repairs in concert with other 
organizations.512 
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The experience of Puerto Rico calls for a recognition of the limitations of 
contractual and governmental ability to provide for all services, particularly concerning 
debris clearance and the rapid re-opening of critical pathways in communities. An 
inability to open roadways rapidly inhibits the ability to provide medical aid, to deliver 
food and water provisions, to conduct fuel deliveries, as well as other critical response 
functions. Delays in services and physical isolation indicate a need to re-evaluate latent 
community capability and reimagine the role of residents in extreme times of needs amid 
catastrophic disaster impacts. In some instances, municipalities may be required to 
mobilize able-bodied citizens rapidly to perform emergency route clearance for the 
greater good of the community, which may be a difficult subject that raises questions as 
to the role and capacity of the government to be the public service provider.513 
2. Mass Transit 
Puerto Rico has limited mass transit capability that suffers from financial deficits. 
The systems the island does maintain are primarily centered on San Juan, managed by the 
Integrated Transit Authority (ATI, by its Spanish acronym) under the PRHTA.514 Tren 
Urbano is a fully automated rapid transit system consisting of 74 Siemens heavy rail 
transit vehicles that service the municipalities of San Juan, Guaynabo, and Bayamon, via 
a 10.7-mile track with 16 stops.515 The system is operated by Alternate Concepts 
Incorporated and is capable of a max speed of 62 miles-per-hour with a capacity of 144 
seated and 216 standing passengers per each two-car unit.516 ATI indicates that it 
provides 166-weekday trips, 138-weekend trips, services 26,500 trips per day on a 
schedule spanning from 5:30 AM to 11:30 PM.517 A variety of proposals have been 
made over the years to expand this system, but none have come to fruition. Following 
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Hurricane Maria, Tren Urbano services were suspended until December 19, 2017 due to 
substations not having power.518 
San Juan also maintains the Metropolitan Bus Authority and the Cataño, Culebra, 
and Vieques Ferries. The public bus service provides connections via 31 routes between 
the areas of San Juan, Carolina, Cataño, Guaynabo, Trujillo Alto, and Bayamón that 
services approximately 80,000 riders on workdays.519 The fleet reportedly contains only 
26 metrobuses. Approximately 28 other municipalities report providing some type of 
public transportation service on either fixed or demand-based schedules.520 Additionally, 
prior to Hurricane Maria, an estimated 1,884 privately owned public transport vehicles 
throughout the entire Commonwealth provided some imprecise level of community 
service.521 By September 29, 21 of the 23 metropolitan bus routes were back in 
service.522 
The Cataño Ferry consists of one line connecting Cataño on the western shore of 
the Bay of San Juan to the city of Old San Juan and is operated by AcuaExpreso.523 The 
Culebra and Vieques ferries are operated out of the Ceiba Ferries Terminal Building on 
the island’s eastern shore and provide services to residents and tourists living on or 
visiting each island. The government of Puerto Rico allocated just over $1 million in 
routine maintenance funds for the ferry terminal in its FY 2019–2022 plan under the 
Statewide Transit Improvement Program (STIP), $3 million for ferry maintenance, 
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$90,000 for waterway dredging, and $25 million for the development of a cargo ferry 
system connecting out of the military base, Roosevelt Roads.524 
a. Discussion 
A 2016 DTOP fiscal year report indicated a transportation infrastructure operating 
at a fiscal deficit.525 Issues pertaining to the solvency of the public transportation 
infrastructure partially stem from declining credit ratings—linked to long-term, island-
wide divestment—and has been addressed via proposing fuel tax increases on the 
island.526 The struggles of public transportation in Puerto Rico are a pertinent reminder 
that disasters do not occur in socioeconomic vacuums, but instead, overlay and often 
exacerbate existing local dynamics. Collectively, financial strain and insolvency 
combined with disaster result in lower resiliency of such public services.  
b. Review 
Massive transportation infrastructure impacts led many Puerto Ricans to travel 
long distances on minimal fuel supplies in search of bare life essentials in the days and 
weeks following the storm.527 This situation highlights a need for substantial 
community-level lifeline resources that build resiliency into the infrastructure network. In 
areas of extreme isolation, heavy impacts, and long delays, surrounding the influx of key 
resources, becomes a central consideration when preparing for and mitigating against 
future catastrophic disasters.  
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Puerto Rico no longer maintains a cargo rail system since the decline of the 
agricultural sector and the widespread use of the automobile and over-the-road freight 
hauling. Instead, personal vehicles and semi-trucks are utilized for the daily transport of 
persons and materials. 
4. Aviation 
Puerto Rico has 29 airports or airstrips, 17 of which are paved, and just two are 
longer than 3,000 meters.528 The Puerto Rico Ports Authority (PRPA) oversees the 
island’s air and seaports.529 Rapid airport assessments became a critical factor in re-
establishing passenger and cargo air transports into the island following Hurricane Maria. 
Once the re-opening of airports occurred, most operated at limited capacity for at least 
one week post-landfall, increasing supply transit times, and limiting the ability to receive 
disaster aid.530 Despite heavy transportation impacts and the limited capacity of airports, 
FEMA reports that the first aircraft carrying relief supplies landed in San Juan on 
September 23, one day after landfall. The agency coordinated daily flights until October 
19.531 
a. Discussion 
The ASCE noted in 2019 that because of Puerto Rico’s isolated position, it is vital 
that its infrastructure become more resilient than the mainland infrastructure.532 
However, communities have a limited role in aviation operations in Puerto Rico other 
than being politically active and partaking in community mitigation decision-making and 
prioritization practices that may impact the resiliency of such infrastructure.  
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b. Review 
The larger responsibility for resilient air transport infrastructure falls to local, 
state, and federal governments. Notwithstanding, residents of heavily impacted areas will 
bear the brunt of a degraded supply chain, whether issues of supply or distribution plague 
it, or both when infrastructure disruptions do occur. However, these disruptions are both 
predictable and amenable by risk mitigation in the form of pre-planning and building of 
self-reliance that allows slack—in the form of time and resources—in critical supply 
chains until services can be restored to reasonable pre-disaster levels. Citizens can be 
active participants in how their local and state governments approach mitigation 
planning, and can use the impacts of Hurricane Maria to inform future planning 
assumptions for catastrophic disasters. 
5. Maritime 
Puerto Rico imports at least 80–85% of its food, and 98% of its electricity is 
derived from imported petroleum, natural gas, and coal products.533 Although the island 
maintains port facilities in Isla Grande, Ponce, Mayaguez, Puerto Nuevo Army Terminal, 
Arecibo, Yabucoa, Guyanilla, and Guánica, the Port of San Juan receives the bulk to 
maritime shipments and nearly all cargo.534 In 2017, the island received 212 maritime 
fuel shipments, and the Port of San Juan received 164 cargo shipments holding over 1.3 
million containers.535 As of 2017, and since 2015, most port calls to San Juan were 
performed by just 16 vessels.536 Prior to this period, roughly 22 U.S. vessels regularly 
resupplied the island, which was a decline from years prior.537 This surviving fleet 
comes following years of corruption and bankruptcy of major shipping providers.538 As 
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noted under the food, water, and shelter lifeline, most cargo containers arriving in the 
Port of San Juan following Hurricane Maria were generically labeled from their 
JAXPORT, Florida point of embarkation as “FEMA Freight,” on the bill of lading, and 
“Disaster Relief” on the containers.539 
Nine additional vessels were allocated to routes from the mainland to San Juan, 
which increased shipment capacity by 40% to support the surge of supplies to Puerto 
Rico.540 While successfully getting additional needed resources and commodities to the 
island, it did little to solve the distribution bottleneck plaguing the response mission. In 
many ways, supply shortages during Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico, initially 
misdiagnosed as supply issues, were later discovered to be more related to problems of 
distribution. The result for Puerto Rican communities was the same, causing widespread 
resource shortages, such as food, water, fuel, power, telecommunications, and medical 
treatment.  
a. Discussion 
Puerto Rico is heavily reliant on maritime-imported products of all types to 
support daily life on the island, which presents a vulnerability, as well as also creates a 
need to “buy time” by stockpiling critical resources ahead of time for periods of massive 
disaster impacts.  
b. Review 
Foreknowledge of the island’s dependency on regular supply shipments can also 
inform the actions of the community and volunteer organizations active in disaster relief 
by setting realistic expectations of time delays in the restoration of routine community 
lifeline services compared to other less geographically challenging locales.  
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6. Conclusion 
Puerto Rico’s geographically isolated position ensures that the timely and 
effective flow of all commodities and resources is particularly vulnerable to disruption. 
Without substantial on-island stockpiles, Puerto Rico is wholly reliant on an 
uninterrupted flow of goods to communities. However, the island’s highways, mass 
transit, aviation, and maritime infrastructure were often in disrepair and structurally 
vulnerable prior to Hurricane Maria’s impacts.541 
Supply shortages in Puerto Rican communities resulted primarily from issues of 
distribution.542 As Hurricane Maria approached, standard maritime supply shipments 
were halted, to be replaced temporarily with disaster relief shipments. Ports became 
quickly overloaded with containers, particularly when road networks proved incapable of 
supporting over-the-ground shipments due to roadway and bridge damage, and a record-
setting number of landslides.543 Complicating impacts to road network impacts, debris 
contractors proved incapable to executing contracts, which spurred some communities to 
pool resources to tackle common problems, such as determining the locations of isolated 
homes, forming cooperative teams to perform debris and route clearance, and pooling 
available tools and heavy equipment from machetes to bulldozers.544 
Short of supplies, communities were left to pool their own resources within 
families and communities, and go in search of scant available commodities.545 This 
search often entailed transiting dangerous roadways, and developing creative solutions to 
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navigate damaged bridges connecting communities to the outside world.546 In addition, 
as residents ventured outside, the risk of exposure to a wide range of HAZMAT was 
ever-present.  
G. HAZARDOUS MATERIALS LIFELINE 
FEMA defines the hazardous material lifeline as “systems that mitigate threats to 
public health or the environment. This includes facilities that generate or store hazardous 
substances, as well as all specialized conveyance assets and capabilities to identify, 
contain, and remove pollution, contaminants, oil, or other hazardous materials and 
substances.”547 The components of this lifeline include facilities, and HAZMAT, 
pollutants, and contaminants.548 
Due to a paucity of data pertaining to this community lifeline, this chapter only 
briefly outlines the HAZMAT impacts created by Hurricane Maria. While communities 
play a vital role in all community lifelines, information pertaining to the specific impacts 
and adaptations to HAZMAT in relation to community actions are scarce and is reflected 
in the level of detail provided as follows.  
1. Facilities 
Gaining and maintaining situational awareness of the HAZMAT facility status 
proved challenging for FEMA. One week into the response, on September 27, the agency 
still only had awareness of the status of 24 of the 52 wastewater treatment facilities 
serving communities across the island.549 By January 2018, the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) reported 284 personnel on the ground in Puerto Rico.550 
According to an EPA news release, the agency was focused upon debris management, 
 
546 Porta, “Lessons in Community Resilience”; Dickerson, “Stranded by Maria.” 
547 Federal Emergency Management Agency, FEMA Incident Stabilization Guide, 7. 
548 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 6. 
549 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2017 Hurricane Season, 33. 
550 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, News Release: EPA Hurricane Maria Update (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2018), 1, https://response.epa.gov/sites/12403/files/
Maria%20Update%20January%204%20FINAL%20ENGLISH.pdf. 
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hazardous household materials, marine operations, drinking and wastewater management, 
and water safety.551  
The EPA’s primary role consisted of coordinating with local governments, 
assessing the status of drinking water, providing analysis and test lab support, and 
identifying strategies to return wastewater facilities to functional statuses.552 This type of 
coordination was a challenging endeavor due to the widespread and long-term loss of the 
power grid, which in turn, impacted the ability to source and supply fresh, safe drinking 
water for communities across the island.553 
Particular EPA attention was paid to serving some 76,000 residents in 
approximately 200 communities served by non-PRASA, independent water systems.554 
In September 2018, the EPA further strengthened ties with seven organizations including 
NGOs and universities under a memorandum of understanding to bolster the safety and 
performance of independent, non-PRASA water systems serving communities in Puerto 
Rico.555 Many of these systems exist in remote areas of the island. By focusing on 
building the capacity of non-PRASA water systems, residents served by these systems 
can become more water resilient over the long-term. It also remains important for Puerto 
Rico to apply resources to building the safety, reliability, and resiliency of PRASA 
systems that serve millions of Puerto Rico before, during, and after disasters.  
a. Discussion 
Puerto Rico’s substandard water and wastewater facilities are partly due to long-
term infrastructure neglect due to divestment and subsequent financial strains throughout 
 
551 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 
552 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Year in Review: 2017–2018 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
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553 Oxfam America, Far from Recovery, 6. 
554 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, News Release: EPA Hurricane Maria Update, 3. 
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the island since the early 2000s.556 Void of long-term reinvestment in water 
infrastructure, Puerto Ricans are very likely to remain vulnerable to similar infrastructure 
vulnerabilities and contaminant exposures in future disasters.  
b. Review 
The underlying vulnerable status of Puerto Rican critical infrastructure serves as a 
vital planning consideration as communities consider their role in future catastrophic 
disasters, community risks, and strategies to increase resiliency. Nationwide, residents of 
all communities benefit from legislation known as Superfund Amendments and 
Reauthorization Act (SARA) Title III, Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-
Know Act (EPCRA). Under this legislation, entities storing and using chemicals 
identified as extremely hazardous substances (EHS) must abide by regular public 
reporting requirements, such as submitting material safety data sheets (MSDSs) to local 
governments, are encouraged to participate in emergency planning with concerned local 
governments, must report chemical releases, and requires that states form emergency 
response commissions (SERCs), emergency planning districts, and local emergency 
planning committees (LEPCs) for each district.557  
In Puerto Rico, the state Environmental Quality Board manages reporting 
requirements and industry is required to submit information regularly to the SERCs, 
LEPCs, and local fire departments.558 This submission offers citizens an opportunity to 
become aware of what sthreats exist within their own communities, have a dialogue with 
local governments, and craft community plans to increase safety post-disaster. No data 
were located that would suggest the impact that either the SERC or LEPCs had on the 
HAZMAT response to Hurricane Maria, but SARA Title III, and the EPCRA serve as 
 
556 American Society of Civil Engineers, 2019 Report Card for Puerto Rico’s Infrastructure, 23–6. 
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inroads to community involvement in understanding, planning for, and mitigating against 
hazards contained in their own communities.  
2. HAZMAT, Pollutants, Contaminants 
Throughout Puerto Rico, drinking and wastewater facilities present poor safety 
track records, and HAZMAT from a number of industries, such as farming, 
pharmaceutical production, petroleum facilities, coal plants, and others, and serve as 
major sources of pollution posing public risk. Over the years, Puerto Rico has struggled 
within HAZMAT facility federal safety compliance. In 2016, PRASA was issued a 
consent decree by the EPA due to violations of sections 301 and 402 of the Clean Water 
Act in connection with the island’s wastewater treatment plants (WWTPs) and drinking 
water treatment plants (DWTPs).559 On December 19, 2016, PRASA entered a guilty 
plea on 15 felony counts of violating the Clean Water Act specific to nine WWTPs, and 
five DWTPs.560 These violations indicate a baseline, pre-disaster struggle with ensuring 
clean and safe drinking water to island residents as an underlying context that was then 
heavily impacted by Hurricane Maria.  
Puerto Rico’s groundwater is potentially affected by a multitude of contaminants, 
but many stem from the coal industry, poultry farms, pesticides, and septic systems. The 
Aguirre power plant alone burns tons of coal that results in massive amounts of coal ash, 
which is difficult to dispose of safely from an island environment. As a result, huge 
mounds of coal ash remain on-site and are subject to rain and runoff. These sites are 
concentrated in the southeast of the island near communities with high rates of poverty 
and unemployment that potentially exposes some of the island’s most vulnerable to 
toxins.561 
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A recent groundwater analysis indicated that selenium, lithium, and molybdenum 
exceeded EPA maximum limits by a factor of four to 14 times.562 A follow-up study 
claims that despite the pollution, drinking water reserves have not been penetrated, and 
therefore present no drinking water health impact to island residents.563 While this 
assertion may or may not be factual, it is well known that floodwaters greatly increase the 
potential to spread dangerous chemicals over large areas, which makes community 
exposure more likely. Additionally, nitrogen runoff from poultry farms, pesticides, and 
septic systems pose water safety challenges to the island.564  
On a community level, contaminated water posed a public health risk that was 
difficult to avoid in light of widespread power and subsequent water outages that led 
residents to seek alternative sources, such as rivers, rainwater runoff, and spring water 
from nearby sources.565 Despite FEMA and the DOD undertaking the largest food and 
water mission in U.S. disaster aid history, many residents were without fresh water for 
considerable periods of time, most for a matter of weeks.566 In the interim, contact with 
and consumption of contaminated water is credited with a witnessed rise in diseases, such 
as leptospirosis, across the island in the weeks and months following the storm.567 These 
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cases provide one example of the elevated health risks communities face in the wake of 
disasters. Although a major spike in the spread of diseases does not appear to have 
occurred in Puerto Rico following Hurricane Maria, the potential is always an important 
consideration for resident safety and wellbeing as floodwaters often contain dangerously 
high levels of toxic chemicals, operate as vectors for diseases, and standing water also 
aids in proliferating mosquito populations that carry a variety of diseases, such as 
malaria, chikungunya, dengue, and zika.568 Recognizing that floodwaters serve as a 
primary threat that hurricanes pose to communities, the CDC publicly warns that contact 
with floodwaters risks exposure to chemicals, household waste, sewage, wild or stray 
animals, and may result in a wide variety of medical conditions from leptospirosis, skin 
rashes, wound infections, tetanus, and others.569 
a. Discussion 
Risks posed by these hazards are important for residents to understand before 
disasters so they can take sensible protective measures in the wake of the next 
catastrophic disaster. 
b. Review 
Puerto Rico presents an urgent need to build “slack” into the water supply chain 
to minimize contact with, and consumption of, potentially contaminated water sources 
following disasters, such as hurricanes. When communities lack access to fresh, safe 
water supplies post-disaster, residents are forced to source water from nearby rivers, 
streams, and lakes that have a great potential of being contaminated by natural pathogens, 
dangerous industrial chemicals, or both. Areas known to be difficult to access, and slow 
to receive disaster aid, are likely at an elevated risk of contaminant exposure as they 
await emergency fresh water distribution networks to mature either in the form of water 
bottle distribution, water trailers, or other methods. Building “slack” into the water 
supply chain would necessarily entail building pre-disaster water stockpiles, and 
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developing alternative means of safe water storage, such as cisterns resistant to wind or 
seismic damage. 
3. Conclusion 
Puerto Rico is home to a large number of HAZMAT facilities from wastewater 
treatment plants to coal and gas-fired power plants that present a risk of contamination to 
surrounding communities. Disasters, such as Hurricane Maria, have an expanding effect 
on existing HAZMAT and present other threats, such as contaminated floodwaters, and 
compromising drinking water supplies.570 Additionally, Puerto Rico has a long-standing 
track record of questionable water quality under normal circumstances.571 
Regardless of the typical water safety standards, the lack of primary water 
systems and basic supplies forced many Puerto Ricans to drink from, and bath with, 
clearly unsafe water sources, such as streams, rivers, and mountain runoff for long 
periods of time, and necessitated repetitive contact with contaminated floodwaters as 
residents aided each other and went in search of supplies.572 Research did not indicate 
that largescale water stockpiles or alternative water sources were an element of disaster 
preparedness efforts prior to Hurricane Maria. This situation was particularly 
problematic, as the distribution of water bottles and generators to support drinking water 
facilities were plagued by slow and complex distribution.573  
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H. SUMMARY 
In sum, major preparedness gaps were both evident and substantial across all 
community lifelines. In a majority of cases, outside resources met disaster relief needs, as 
per the NRF, either by state mutual-aid resources, NGOs, the DOD, or other federal 
agencies. However, in many instances, disaster relief was delayed or inadequate in the 
early stages of the disaster. Many communities thus experienced critical resource deficits 
for weeks post-impact with the most concerning shortfalls pertaining to food, water, and 
medical services. Communities in rural and mountainous areas were often cutoff from 
resupply and aid by collapsed roadways and bridges after the island experienced a record-
setting number of landslides. Overall, Puerto Rico’s experience illustrated a situation in 
which the outer boundaries of the NRF were reached, and how, in such circumstances, 
when the framework began to fray, communities were compelled to fill the void. It is 
possible to consider future scenarios in which the NRF may be degraded further and 
suffer collapse, and as a result, isolate communities for longer periods of time, which is a 
potentiality that should drive future preparedness initiatives. 
Despite devastating impacts and substantial resource shortfalls across the 
community lifelines and throughout the island, the study of Puerto Rico also indicated the 
presence of close-knit communities coming together to provide each other impromptu 
mutual-aid, emergent ingenuity, as well as a vibrant community-based organization 
network. Hurricane Maria also appears to have served as a catalyst to revive grassroots 
partnerships and preparedness initiatives from community healthcare to agrotherapy.  
Puerto Rico’s experience with Hurricane Maria displayed many formal and 
informal actors coming together, rising to the occasion, but also exposes a lack of pre-
planning and integration of unconventional disaster actors. Documenting these instances 
affords a blueprint and ample future opportunity to reconsider how the island plans and 
prepares for disasters, and may inform future disaster resiliency benchmarks.  
All disasters begin and end locally. If disaster programs can serve as gardener of 
the grassroots from the bottom-up, while also aligning top-down disaster plans and 
resources, then federal, state, local, and community actors can meet in the middle within 
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a more resilient Puerto Rico. The following chapter synthesizes themes present within all 
community lifelines, and provides lifeline-specific conclusions that can inform a path 
forward for Puerto Rico, and other communities seeking to achieve similar disaster 










IV. THEMES AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. THEMES 
Throughout the course of this study, several themes became apparent across all 
community lifelines. Each theme is presented as an element for consideration for a future 
in which Puerto Rico is resilient and prepared for catastrophic disasters, and may serve as 
key considerations for other communities seeking to achieve the same goal. These themes 
also serve as the lens for conclusions provided in the next section.  
1. Holistic Disaster Preparedness 
Disaster preparedness is about far more than food and water stockpiles, having a 
response plan, emergency sheltering, and power crews. Puerto Rico’s precarious 
infrastructure, financial burdens, and public health crises appear to have compounded the 
impacts of Hurricane Maria.574 Puerto Rico also suffered from substandard water quality, 
failing roads and bridges, and a frail power grid, which all served as disaster 
amplifiers.575 When disasters overlay struggling populations, many pre-existing 
conditions are exacerbated and recovery can take much longer than in areas operating 
with more health and balance pre-disaster. Balanced budgets, sound infrastructure, and 
healthy, well-connected, and cooperative communities are also considered disaster 
preparedness. How communities conceptualize and actualize preparedness will serve as 
influential factors in disaster outcomes. A myopic view of what it means to be prepared 
will not prove as beneficial as a more holistic approach to preparedness.  
A 2020 RAND study indicated that “in the longer term (the next decade or so), 
Puerto Rico will need to focus on key resilience challenges,” such as “economic 
conditions that precipitated population loss, worsened storm damage, and currently 
 
574 See sections relating to pre-hurricane conditions in Fischbach et al., “After Hurricane Maria.” 
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inhibit recovery.”576 After RAND researchers conducted roundtable discussions with 
municipal leadership in all 12 emergency management zones, the data indicated a lack of 
preparedness for Hurricane Maria despite years of planning. Mayors indicated that pre-
disaster actions did not account for the devastation wrought by Hurricane Maria that 
resulted in a complete system collapse.577 Municipal leadership uniformly reported 
completely overwhelming circumstances, which indicates a need for focusing on building 
resilience by increasing the density of networks, and catastrophic disaster preparedness 
from the community-level up to the state-level, and from the federal government down to 
the state-level. 
No matter how robust a federal disaster response is, deferred maintenance of 
infrastructure, and a near total reliance on FEMA and its partners, will result in unmet 
public needs. Successful disaster response requires a “whole of community” response.578 
According to former FEMA Administrator, Brock Long, “the 2017 hurricane season 
showed that all levels of government—and individual families—need to be much better 
prepared with their own supplies, particularly in remote or insular areas where 
commodities take longer to deliver.”579 While this advice may not account for high 
levels of poverty across Puerto Rico and other American communities, it seemed 
apparent amid Hurricane Maria that even those with few resources fared better when they 
banded together as one community to share information and what resources were 
available.580 This outcome is particularly true in isolated areas, such as Morovis, that did 
not see first responders for weeks, in areas that became cutoff because of collapsed 
roadways and bridges, but is also true in more urban areas, such as Las Carolinas, where 
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disaster survivor needs outstripped available supplies.581 However, individual and 
familial preparation also needs to remain a function that residents are cognizant of, and 
build over long periods of time in ways that are both affordable and sustainable. A focus 
on building strong communities can reduce the burdens amid future disasters.  
Since Hurricane Maria, a strong move toward community-centric solutions with a 
more holistic view of disaster preparedness appears to have resulted. Such efforts include 
COSSAO’s free community health clinics, Tetuan Reborn’s agrotherapy and disaster 
preparedness projects, Casa Pueblo’s continued commitment to solar energy, other 
communities, such as Toro Negro, migrating to solar energy independence, the 
establishment of community kitchens, and ARRL’s continued efforts to support first 
responder communications needs.582 Some of these efforts have benefited from external 
NGO support, such as Mercy Corps’ network of resilience hubs across the island.583 
With continued momentum, the disaster preparedness aperture can be broadened in 
Puerto Rico to be more encompassing of other preparedness factors, and can expand the 
focus on communities. 
2. Integration of Non-governmental Actors 
Non-governmental actors capable of affording disaster response and recovery 
resources and services were not well-integrated into the response to Hurricane Maria. 
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Organizations, such as the ARC and other community groups appeared not to have 
functional pre-disaster relationships with government actors, or effective plans for 
integration in a major disaster response.584 In contrast, while the ARRL appeared to have 
better integration, establishing formal volunteers and integration at the JFO levels was 
still identified as an area of improvement in the organization’s Hurricane Maria AAR.585 
The successful integration of non-governmental actors is not an issue unique to Puerto 
Rico, but has been broadly recognized over time and across the nation.586  
Amid Hurricane Maria, formal local and state government response networks 
experienced overload and relied heavily upon state mutual-aid and federal resources to 
perform their roles as disaster responders.587 Outside formal networks, such as state-to-
state mutual aid via the EMAC system, and employment of federal resources under major 
disaster declaration mission assignments, infused Puerto Rico with much needed 
additional capability. Notwithstanding, many disaster survivor needs went unmet for 
considerable periods of time, which prompted informal networks to fill the void. Whether 
it was neighbor helping neighbor, residents affording crowd-sourcing capability, HAM 
radio operators assisting first responders with communications and situational awareness, 
a local church opening a feeding or medical mission, or a local organization, such as Casa 
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Pueblo, serving as a community hub, informal networks rose to the occasion. Many 
informal networks appeared capable of filling, at least in part, large gaps in resource 
provision although precise measurements of their individual contributions were not 
tracked. This disparity is due, in part, to the lack of pre-disaster integration of informal 
networks that makes post-disaster response activities difficult to account for accurately. 
When facing catastrophic threats and hazards, the role of informal networks becomes key 
before, during, and after catastrophic disasters, least of all, because pre-existing 
community organizations often occupy positions of trust, and are well positioned to 
understand community needs best, and to aid in provisioning commodities and key 
resources.588  
A Heritage Foundation AAR of Hurricane Maria made several recommendations. 
One recommendation noted a need for deeper connections between disaster response 
organizations via routine training and coordination.589 Another key recommendation 
offered that governmental organizations active in disaster should pre-plan how to 
cooperate with, and mobilize, informal or “ad hoc” civilian responders, and suggested 
incorporating faith-based entities into local and state disaster response plans.590 The 
GAO specifically echoed this observation pertaining to a greater inclusion of non-
governmental actors that provide disaster-sheltering assistance. The GAO offered six 
recommendations, all centering around better understanding the capabilities of 
community groups, incorporating them into disaster plans, and developing mechanisms 
for their inclusion in future disaster responses.591 This study has revealed that 
communities performed far more functions than providing shelter, and therefore, should 
be considered for integration and inclusion spanning all disaster operations. Although 
unrelated to Hurricane Maria, the ODNI has noted in Global Trends: Paradox of 
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Progress that “the most resilient societies will also be those that unleash the full potential 
of individuals—including women and minorities—to create and cooperate.”592 
Similarly, RAND offered recommendations based on research aimed at two areas, 
community resilience, and statewide plans. RAND indicated, “at the community level, 
stronger social ties are associated with better mental health, immediate survival, and 
community-level outcomes—in a word, resilience.”593 Researchers further recommended 
that FEMA and its partners “build partnerships across organizations before disaster 
strikes, empower community groups to mitigate risks, and identify and address the needs 
of vulnerable populations.”594 Broader incorporation of non-governmental actors in 
disaster preparedness, response, and recovery can greatly promote resiliency. 
3. Decentralization 
By integrating community-level capability into local government and state 
response plans in the preparedness phase, collective disaster response and recovery 
capabilities are decentralized into more resilient forms. Puerto Rico has long held a 
decentralized governmental emergency management structure by maintaining 12 state 
emergency management zones, and 78 municipal EOCs. However, as noted under the 
safety and security lifeline, much of this structure collapsed. It proved difficult from 
publicly available data to determine what level of functionality remained at the municipal 
or emergency management zone levels.595 What is apparent is that FEMA, other federal 
agencies, and state EMAC resources played an outsized role of first responder for an 
overwhelmed Puerto Rican response system.596 
Due to the lack of functional decentralization pre-disaster, many entities morphed 
into decentralized postures amid the response to Hurricane Maria. For instance, the HHS 
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DMATs reconfigured the typical team composition into smaller “health medical taskforce 
teams” to reach remote areas; US&R teams also divided into smaller, more agile 
configurations to cover larger areas as they faced an unconventional search and rescue 
mission.597 Much of this decentralization was spurred by a lack of communications, a 
destroyed transportation infrastructure, a lack of power, and an overpowering need for 
services among communities. Large, centralized structures were not capable of operating 
quickly or dynamically in response to Hurricane Maria.  
Hurricane Maria also necessitated the decentralization of critical infrastructure 
and equipment as well, such as communications gear, generators, and stockpile 
warehouses. For instance, FEMA and the USACE set forth the largest temporary power 
generation mission in the agencies’ histories that involved the installation of some 2,300 
generator across the island to supply critical power requirements.598 Similarly, FEMA 
facilitated the distribution of satellite communications technology to key personnel and 
facilities throughout the island post-impact.599 Post-Maria, FEMA also set forth to 
grossly expand its disaster warehousing capabilities by a factor of seven across the island 
in a greater number of geographically dispersed facilities.600 
Decentralization, in this context, also means ensuring disaster preparedness and 
resilience at the lowest levels possible. The SW-RAMC’s ability to continue providing 
medical care to patients in a critical moment served as an example of what organizations 
can achieve on their own accord by prioritizing disaster preparedness.601 The SW-
RAMC’s capability to continue operations reduced the burdens on outside resources, 
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such as federal DMATs and field medical units. On the community level, Hurricane 
Maria revealed the existence of what the Urban Sustainability Directors Network 
(USDN) refers to as community “resilience hubs” that are “community-serving facilities” 
that “support residents” and “coordinate resource distribution and services before, during, 
or after a natural hazard event.”602 Casa Pueblo in Puerto Rico is the most 
straightforward example of the role resilience hubs can play in communities.603 Casa 
Pueblo also aligns to what the Electromagnetic Pulse Special Interest Group 
synonymously refers to as “resilient community islands,” which is borrowed from grid 
restoration terminology and transferred to the context of community resiliency.604 
Resilient community islands offer a community meeting place to share information and 
resources, and may transition into “recovery islands” that carry a community forward 
post-disaster.605 
Resilience hubs that serve as community resources before, during, and after 
disasters collectively reduce disaster vulnerability.606 Another such example in Puerto 
Rico resides in the municipality of Cataño. The AsociaciónPro Juventud y Comunidad de 
Barrio Palmas (APJ), has long been a social hub for the area, but now the executive 
director of the association is transforming the organization into a disaster resilience hub 
that “freshly grown food from community gardens, emergency supplies, clean water and 
supplemental power to assist the community.”607 Additionally, under one Mercy Corps 
project alone, roughly 15 resilience hubs are being established around the island with a 
primary focus on providing vulnerable areas with reliable backup power and water 
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systems.608 Resilience hubs are of particular importance in post-disaster environments 
that will challenge the ability of government resources to respond effectively by building 
grassroots resilience. 
Decentralized networks also afford greater access to impact areas and serve the 
vital purpose of reducing the time and distance between resource needs and resource 
delivery. In other words, disaster needs and resources are brought into closer proximity 
for more rapid application, which was most evident in Puerto Rico as it pertained to the 
food, water, and shelter, and the health and medical lifelines. Communities that had more 
robust and resilient food, water, shelter, and medical providers in close proximity to their 
homes appeared, at least anecdotally, abler to meet their own basic needs post-disaster, as 
was also true of provisioning power and telecommunications. Restoration occurred more 
quickly when residents were closer to urban centers.609 
Lastly, decentralization supports what Ramos refers to as “deep-security” in Age 
of the Unthinkable: Why the New World Disorder Constantly Surprises Us whereby 
mindsets pivot away from protecting against all possible threats, and instead focus on 
building the density of networks, and raising their collective ability to absorb the shocks 
of disasters and a rapid return to normalcy.610 This approach may be a sensible path 
forward in Puerto Rico as the island experiences frequent compounding disasters. As 
Patrick Roberts, author of Disaster and the American State says, “FEMA is not the 
cavalry…The roots of vulnerability to disaster are in communities. The neighbors, the 
residents, the city, the state—they are going to be the first to respond and they are going 
to do the bulk of the rebuilding.”611 Disaster resilience must be built in this area. 
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4. Redundant Systems 
FEMA’s 2017 Hurricane Season AAR indicated that, “continuity planning and 
resilient all-hazards communications capabilities must be built into FEMA and its 
partners’ plans and guidance for catastrophic disasters,” and further recommended that 
FEMA more aggressively support continuity of government planning for state and local 
jurisdictions.612 
While the concept of redundancy is certainly applicable to communications 
capabilities, back-up systems must be built into all other lifelines as well, such as 
community-based search and rescue capability, medical care, food and water supplies, 
energy sources, debris removal, and other functions. Each of these areas suffered collapse 
in Puerto Rico after Hurricane Maria. Many communities were isolated for weeks, and 
went without reliable food and water supplies for months that caused residents and 
informal actors to seek emergency interventions to provide for basic needs. Amid future 
catastrophic disasters, each of these primary capabilities are likely to collapse once again, 
which necessitates some type of redundant systems be emplaced before the next 
catastrophe. 
Amid an ongoing budget crisis, Puerto Rico will likely need to rely upon cost-
effective NGOs, community organizations, and volunteer services for such redundancy, 
which links this theme closely with the issue of integrating non-governmental actors into 
disaster response and recovery plans, as well as preparedness functions. Organizations, 
such as the ARRL, for instance, offer cost-effective means of ensuring continuity of 
communications, which in turn, affords the ability to maintain situational awareness and 
coordination operations amid disasters.613 Other groups, such as COSSAO, Tetuan 
Reborn, Casa Pueblo, Center of Mutual Support, and many others, are successful 
examples of communities overcoming resource scarcity to be more resilient together. 
Other communities throughout the nation are also likely to be in similar financial 
positions as budgets shrink and states face massive financial challenges as a result of 
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decades of stressed fiscal policy, and most recently, the impacts of COVID-19. Due to 
these challenges, communities across the nation will likely have to consider how to do 
more with less in the coming years amid financial hardships, and increasing disaster 
frequency. Therefore, Puerto Rico may serve as a prime example of what is possible 
when primary response and recovery systems falter, and many of those examples are 
likely to come from organizations that emerged post-Hurricane Maria. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The conclusion summarizes the study and offers opportunities for future 
discussion and research. Where possible, the recommendations of reputable and 
authoritative sources are provided for consolidated consideration.  
1. Safety and Security Lifeline 
The near total collapse of disaster response capabilities in Puerto Rico suggests 
the island ought to reimagine community safety and security by reaching deeply into 
communities and involving them in disaster preparedness so they can operate as assets at 
times when government resources are overwhelmed. To that end, Robert Bach and David 
Kaufman wrote a 2009 article proposing a “social infrastructure” that brings “the 
American people fully into strengthening their own preparedness.”614 The article 
articulated that top-down approaches have largely excluded citizens and their 
communities from being active participants in their own preparedness. While speaking 
specifically in terms of homeland security, the recommendations provided are also more 
broadly applicable to all-hazards disaster preparedness. The authors suggested sharing 
more risk information with the public, including involving local communities in decision 
making. FEMA regions should be the facilitator and not a hierarchical federal monitor of 
communities, and the United States should establish a “National Institute of 
Preparedness.”615 This concept is particularly applicable to Puerto Rico as the 
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Commonwealth government continues to struggle with fiscal deficits, pension shortfalls, 
and challenges in staffing key departments. 
In a recent FEMA Prep Talk, speaker Aaron Titus shared similar sentiments as 
part of his presentation titled “Let the Community Lead: Rethinking Command and 
Control Systems” in which he described a governmental structure serving as a facilitator 
for community-led disaster response and recovery.616 In many ways, communities did 
lead in Puerto Rico for a period of time; however, non-governmental, and informal 
community actor involvement was not pre-planned and was therefore ad hoc and born out 
of necessity. It is possible that as the island considers its future, it also evaluates how to 
incorporate informal actors better who fill the void when governmental resources are 
overwhelmed.  
In another Caribbean nation with very different political and societal constructs, 
Cuba has proven able to leverage the horsepower of communities to perform such 
functions as evacuating neighbors from coastal and flood prone areas, community debris 
removal functions, community sheltering, and care of community members, particularly 
the disabled and the frail.617 The island has accomplished this process through building a 
preparedness culture, risk mitigation planning, lifelong community education, community 
organizing, and bolstering underlying social capital.618 Given Puerto Rico’s apparent 
high levels of bonding social capital, and recent disaster experience, it remains likely that 
residents can be leveraged to support vital disaster response and recovery capabilities, as 
well, and can be done affordably.619  
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2. Food, Water, and Shelter Lifeline 
Hurricane Maria clearly indicated that government resources at times would prove 
insufficient in disaster response, specifically when amid compounding or close-proximity 
major disasters.620 As FEMA struggled to keep pace with near-simultaneous major 
disasters in Texas, Florida, California, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico, the outer 
limits of the largely government-centric NRF became apparent. Although many states 
were able to provide aid to Puerto Rico, and dozens of federal government entities 
responded, communities still struggled to obtain the basic necessities needed for survival 
and recovery.  
Food and water provision following Hurricane Maria was primarily an issue of 
distribution, but was not linked to supply shortages.621 The 69-day average FEMA 
delivery time was not a matter of not having supplies in the pipeline, but rather of having 
a clogged distribution system.622 Regardless, the end result was communities in need of 
basic food and water provisions for extended periods of time.623 To reduce future 
distribution issues, FEMA reported to the OIG that the agency has undertaken massive 
efforts to correct and bolster its logistics management capabilities to include improving 
contracting capabilities, technical enhancements to its LSCMS platform and over the 
ocean tracking of shipments, and has increased commodity stockpiles “seven-fold” in 
both its Caribbean and Pacific area distribution centers, and has achieved a greater 
geographic dispersion of these stockpiles around the islands.624 Moreover, in rebuttal to 
OIG criticisms, FEMA indicated that it had surplus commodities not capable of being 
accepted by impacted communities due to a lack of need; these items were redirected to 
storage.625 However, it is difficult to know with certainty if these shipments represented 
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a “too little, too late” situation because the private sector had come back online, or if they 
truly surpassed needed disaster supplies.  
What is known is that many communities went without vital supplies for extended 
periods, which is a reality that highlights a need to bolster community-level resiliency. 
Despite FEMA’s drastic logistics capability enhancements, which are commendable, the 
agency will never be resourced or postured to be the sole provider of vital commodities, 
such as food and water to millions of disaster survivors. Programs focusing on social 
capital and food security in both rural and urban areas, but particularly focusing on 
marginalized communities and rural communities known to have physical access 
challenges, can raise a community’s ability to access physical capital post-disaster.626 
Several working examples of what is possible in Puerto Rico can be found in 
organizations, such as Tetuan Reborn, CASSAO, and Casa Pueblo, as grassroots 
organizations with a community-centric focus on providing critical services, such as 
food, water, power, and basic medical care before, during, and after disasters.627 In 
addition, each may serve as an example for expansion across the island.  
Following Hurricane Maria, many community shelters sustained significant 
damage and endured the same loss of power and water services experienced across the 
island.628 Since 2018, the ARC has boosted the resilience of schools doubling as 
hurricane shelters by installing solar panels.629 The panels can reportedly withstand 160 
mph winds and flying debris while providing 50kW of power over a 10-year life span.630 
This ARC project, along with others focused on communities, represents a step in the 
right direction toward building ground-level resilience against future disasters. 
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Agriculture represents another key area in which resiliency should be a priority. 
In Cuba, a country requiring a high level of agricultural self-reliance, citizens often come 
together to harvest crops rapidly preceding hurricanes, and aid farmers in planting short-
yield crops afterward to minimize agricultural losses.631 Organizations in Puerto Rico, 
just as with Tetuan Reborn’s agrotherapy approach, may serve as a catalyst for 
cultivating such community capability aimed at reducing burdensome agricultural losses 
in disasters.632 Minimizing future disaster losses to Puerto Rico’s agricultural sector will 
contribute to food supply chain resilience that is critical to positive disaster outcomes.633 
3. Health and Medical Lifeline 
Hurricane Maria laid bare the underlying population vulnerabilities and other 
public health issues present in Puerto Rico, since 39.5% of those 65 and older live below 
the poverty line, and 84% of children live in census tracts with poverty rates of 30% or 
more since 2012.634 Overall, 43.1% of Puerto Ricans live in poverty, 21.3% are over the 
age of 65, the average household income is just $20,166, 15.1% under the age of 65 have 
a disability, and 7.9% live without health insurance coverage.635 In light of these 
challenges, any workable solution will likely be long-term and multi-pronged, and also 
focused on health promotion against preventable diseases, while also tackling the current 
reality of an impoverished, aging population with high rates of chronic diseases.  
Solutions going forward must be tailored to the realities of the island. Adequately 
planning to support the medically vulnerable in disasters will necessarily be a joint effort 
with different health sector actors. The GAO offered seven recommendations, each 
centered upon the HHS exploring ways to rely more on partners in the interest of medical 
force-multiplication by better understanding partner capabilities, developing 
memorandums of agreement, and incorporating entities that can meet the appropriate 
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standards of care into HHS plans.636 One recommendation in particular addressed 
reducing the agency’s reliance upon DOD assets should they prove unavailable at any 
future point.637  
As a sizeable medical network in Puerto Rico, the SW-RAMC stands as an 
example of what is possible when organizations prioritize and insist on high levels of 
preparedness. The SW-RAMC network held a fully developed and well-considered 
disaster plan that included backup power generation, satellite communications, employee 
safety, fuel provision, and accountability, etc.638 The end result was that the SW-RAMC 
remained functional and able to serve communities amid a catastrophic disaster. If the 
federal or Commonwealth government were to utilize the SW-RAMC as a model for 
other healthcare networks, or if other networks were to emulate SW-RAMC, each would 
require an understanding of how the medical network funded, planned, and staffed its 
preparedness posture. 
Hurricane Maria also highlighted the importance of proximity to care as a key 
factor in successful medical interventions. “Bringing the Hospital Home” is a community 
paramedicine model whereby trained paramedics serve communities’ urgent care needs 
by going to them.639 This model presents another adaptation that makes it possible to 
access underserved or remote communities in times of disasters, and is essentially what 
the HHS’ DMATs aimed to do by dividing into smaller, more mobile “health medical 
taskforce teams” to reach remote communities, cover larger areas, assess community 
health needs, provide medical triage and treatment, and evacuate patients as necessary.640  
As a community-led model, COSSAO stands as an example of community 
medicine meeting the needs of vulnerable communities.641 In addition to focusing on 
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sustainable economic development, community rebuilding projects, agrotherapy, and 
other areas, COSSAO also coordinates a network of medical volunteers to serve 
underserved communities at no cost.642 Organizations, such as COSSAO, appear well-
connected and in tune with the needs of the communities they serve, and operate as a 
force-multiplier in close proximity to impacted communities.  
Effective health and medical provision in Puerto Rico will need to be long-term, 
multi-pronged, and layered from the ground level in organizations, such as COSSAO, to 
island-wide formal medical networks, such as the SW-RAMC, up to the Commonwealth 
public health networks, and with the support of federal agencies, such as the HHS and its 
partners. Lastly, medical NGOs, such as Americares, will continue to serve as vital 
conduits between government actors, medical networks, and communities in need.  
4. Energy Lifeline 
Puerto Rico’s power infrastructure still faces systemic and existential challenges 
that will lead to continued disaster vulnerability. Following earthquakes in January 2020, 
the Costa Sur power plant was knocked out of commission. To this day, the power plant 
remains on backup generators to keep the island powered, which illustrates the continued 
peril to Puerto Rico’s power infrastructure.643 PREPA, the island’s power provider, filed 
for bankruptcy shortly before the dual impacts of Hurricanes Irma and Maria destroyed 
the grid that resulted in one of the nation’s costliest repairs, and more importantly, the 
longest blackout in recorded U.S. history.644 Drastic impacts to the island’s power grid 
made it impossible to consider a myriad challenges to any other community lifeline 
without first recognizing the compounding impact of the total loss of power. Therefore, 
any catastrophic disaster plan devised going forward must plan for, and expect, 
widespread and long-term power outages as part of the equation. 
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In the wake of Hurricane Maria, the energy sector at both the federal and state 
mutual-aid levels have offered substantive recommendations to PREPA to address and 
reduce recovery, long-term sustainability, and vulnerability. The U.S. Department of 
Energy made its recommendations across four areas: transmission and distribution, 
generation, microgrids, and systems operations, management, and planning.645 To 
summarize, the recommendations involve long-term infrastructure investments, 
segmenting the power grid, which contributes to stability and resilience, the installation 
of microgrids for largely the same purpose to provide power to the island, and the faster 
regeneration of a damaged grid while also buying time for large overland transmission 
lines, traversing from the island’s south to the north, to be restored.646  
Similarly, the NY Power Authority (NYPA)—a major supplier of mutual-aid 
assistance—offered recommendations pertaining to the transmission and distribution 
system, the capability to generate power, system operations, as well as an implementation 
roadmap for the island complete with cost-projections.647 In total, the plan costs in 
excess of $17.6 billion, which is an extremely tall order for a bankrupt utility facing 
compounding disasters, even after considering ongoing and massive amounts of federal 
investments.648 Much like the DOE, the NYPA also suggested the development of 
microgrids to allow “energy to become abundant, affordable, and sustainable to improve 
the way of life for the citizens of Puerto Rico.”649 
Notwithstanding, nor specific to Puerto Rico, the Electromagnetic Pulse Special 
Interest Group in Powering Through: From Fragile Infrastructure to Community 
Resilience, highlighted the utility of micro-grids offering stability during restoration  
and may be essential for catastrophic disasters impacting the electrical grid. The authors 
recommend beginning their development locally with a “clear understanding of  
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user requirements, environmental constraints, and reliability standards for 
interconnections.”650 
In regard to beginning locally, many examples already exist in Puerto Rico, from 
the Honnold Foundation’s partnership with Casa Pueblo, to the ARC installing storm-
resistant solar panels on multiple schools that double as shelters, to other organizations 
that also recognize solar as a means of reducing energy dependence and disaster 
vulnerability while also increasing affordability, and access to communities that need it 
the most.651 In line with both federal, state, and non-profit recommendations, the Clean 
Energy Group proposed in September 2018 that the federal government apportion 
recovery funds for a community development block grant that allows communities to 
apply recovery dollars to sustainable solar and energy storage capabilities as a means to 
reduce long-term vulnerability.652 
While solar may not be scalable to solve all of Puerto Rico’s power ailments, the 
sensible promotion and support of the technology may well afford some baseline 
capability to provide communities with enough power supply to meet their basic needs in 
critical post-disaster time periods, or effectively “buying time” for bulk power restoration 
to occur. However, such a transition will require political will and financial support. If 
left to corporate philanthropy, programs aimed at long-term resiliency are subject to the 
waxing and waning interest of corporate sponsors, such as Tesla, which stands accused of 
abandoning a large-scale solar project on Puerto Rico’s eastern island of Vieques.653 
Only with serious, long-term commitment can Puerto Rico reach its energy goals of 
producing 20% of its energy sustainably by 2022, and 40% by 2025, and energy 
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independence by 2050.654 However, unfortunately, the probability of such a commitment 
remains uncertain as Puerto Rico’s leadership appears in favor of natural gas expansion 
as a primary fuel source, and thereby draining political support for a renewable energy 
future.655 
5. Communication Lifeline 
Much like the energy sector, Puerto Rico’s communications sector suffered 
extensive storm damages and near total destruction that rendered commercial 
communications “almost non-existent” post-impact, and it remains fragile to future 
disaster impacts.656 Not only were first responders inhibited from communicating 
resource needs, and coordinating operations, it also inhibited residents as well from 
calling for help, checking on loved ones, and coordinating community collaboration. 
Later, communications outages also made it difficult for residents to apply for disaster 
benefits.657 Additionally, due to largely centralized governmental decision-making 
processes, the inability of regional authorities to reach counterparts in the island’s capital 
reportedly led to uncertainty and delays in the disaster response.658  
RAND, commissioned by the DHS, has made several straightforward, albeit 
expensive, recommendations for improving Puerto Rico’s communications resilience. In 
sum, the recommendations center around making the necessary immediate repairs to 
infrastructure, ensuring adequate backup power generation on each site, replacing 
outdated infrastructure, and ensuring broadband connectivity for all residents.659 While 
these recommendations appear to be rather sensible, it is also unlikely affordable for 
Puerto Rico to implement save for massive federal investments in system upgrades.  
 
654 Puerto Rico Energy Public Policy Act, Public Law 17-2019 (2019), https://energia.pr.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2019/05/Act-17-2019.pdf; Umair Irfan, “Puerto Rico Is Targeting 100% Renewable 
Energy. The Trump Administration Has Other Ideas,” Vox, April 17, 2019, https://www.vox.com/2019/
4/17/18306417/puerto-rico-renewable-energy-natural-gas; and Kaufman; Brown, “Energy Insurrection.” 
655 Brown, “Energy Insurrection.” 
656 Fischbach et al., “After Hurricane Maria,” 163. 
657 Fischbach et al., 155–173. 
658 Fischbach et al., 130. 
659 Fischbach et al., 173. 
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The most resilient communications capabilities evident in Puerto Rico after 
Hurricane Maria were AM radio stations and HAM radio networks. These networks are 
also the most affordable to sustain and expand for future disasters. A post-disaster study 
of the role of radio journalism found that many stations require greater disaster resilience, 
such as continuity plans accounting for damages to the infrastructure, and a need to be 
able to generate power temporarily.660 Researchers indicated that the ability to broadcast 
via radio, particularly to vulnerable communities, provided timely, pertinent information 
on the situation, as well as how to obtain needed resources.661 These observations align 
with another study considering the role of communication in disaster resilience, in 
addition to how it can be leveraged to help communities overcome disasters via 
“communication systems and resources, [fostering] community relationships, 
[establishing] strategic communication processes, and [considering] community 
attributes.”662 Hurricane Maria clearly indicated that the ability to communicate among 
responders and with the public is a critical precursor to effective disaster response and 
recovery.  
Amid the void, the ARRL proved agile and adaptable and provided support to key 
governmental response agencies that served as a bridge during a critical time. The 
ARRL’s AAR supplied multiple post-disaster recommendations with the common themes 
centering on a need to solidify and grow the HAM radio network in Puerto Rico, a need 
to integrate better with communications regulators, as well as other government actors at 
all levels, and with private industry.663 While RAND’s recommendations are most 
holistic, void of cost consideration, ARRL’s recommendations likely more closely align 
with what is possible and most pragmatic in the context of Puerto Rico.  
 
660 Yadira Nieves-Pizarro, Bruno Takahashi, and Manuel Chavez, “When Everything Else Fails: Radio 
Journalism during Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico,” Journalism Practice 13, no. 7 (2019): 799–816, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17512786.2019.1567272. 
661 Nieves-Pizarro, Takahashi, and Chavez, 15. 
662 Houston et al., “The Centrality of Communication and Media in Fostering Community Resilience,” 
279. 
663 American Radio Relay League, 2017 After-Action Report, 49–52. 
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Private sector telecommunications providers also have a role to play in 
catastrophic disaster responses, such as Google X lab’s Project Loon. While Tesla’s 
involvement with solar power in Vieques is a “cautionary tale,” so too are projects, such 
as Loon, which can still be integrated into response and recovery plans without being 
engineered as single points of failure. By layering and decentralizing communications 
capabilities and redundancies, Puerto Rico can continue to drive toward communications 
resilience in sustainable ways.664 
6. Transportation Lifeline 
The transportation lifeline represented less community involvement save for 
communities and community groups banding together to clear debris blocking roadways, 
and examples of constructing workarounds for washed out bridges and roadways, which 
therefore contributes less to answering the research questions.665 Notwithstanding, as 
communities begin to consider their own catastrophic disaster preparedness, the ability, 
or inability, to access key areas is a paramount planning consideration for strategy 
development and long-term planning. A lack of access to impacted areas will result in 
longer isolations of such areas, and will require that residents cultivate higher levels of 
self-reliance to buy time until disaster aid can be adequately delivered. If history is 
instructive, it is known that by mid-October, Puerto Rico still faced 27 impassable major 
roadways, 550 debris blockages, and at least 17 damaged major bridges.666 
This preparedness may entail accruing larger food and water stocks, identifying 
alternate sources of food and water, and municipalities procuring heavy equipment 
capable of clearing critical roadways, and organizing community members to perform 
emergency debris clearance. This method, which Palin refers to as a “tactical” debris 
removal plan, identifies priority areas and key infrastructure, debris storage sites, and 
 
664 Kaufman, “On Puerto Rico’s ‘Forgotten Island”; NBC News, “An Experimental New Project Is 
Helping”; Morse, “Google Officially Flips on Project Loon in Puerto Rico”; Guynn, “Google Parent’s 
Project Loon Delivers Internet to 100,000 in Puerto Rico”; Lavars, “Project Loon Balloons to Connect 
Storm-Ravaged Puerto Rico.” 
665 Associated Press, “Puerto Ricans Hunt for Precious Wi-Fi”; Holladay et al., “Utuado,” 11; 
Dickerson and Ferré-Sadurní, “‘Like Going Back in Time’”; Dickerson, “Stranded by Maria.” 
666 Palin, “Learning from H.I.M. (Harvey, Irma, Maria).” 
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ways to manage different types of debris (i.e., vegetative, household, etc.).667 The EPA 
developed a report pertaining to planning for natural disaster debris and included tangible 
steps communities can take to reduce the amount of debris they produce, such as bracing 
homes for disaster impacts, vegetation management, limiting the storage of chemicals, 
securing propane tanks and outdoor objects, etc.668 The agency also recommended that 
the same measures can be taken when identifying the community’s critical facilities, such 
as schools, nursing homes, hospitals, shelters, transportation routes, etc., that are 
vulnerable to disaster debris issues that may inhibit rapid post-disaster access.669 
Mobilizing the community is also a common post-disaster practice in Cuba whereby 
citizens come together to clear key roadways and facilities of debris to allow access for 
first responders and critical supplies.670 This approach may serve as a model and also as 
the only option for isolated communities to self-organize and open the roads when 
government or debris contractors are not able to deliver these services.  
Both RAND and the ASCE made recommendations following Hurricane Maria 
centered on roadway repairs, establishing quality control standards, increasing ridership 
on public transportation platforms, reducing the need to use passenger vehicles, and 
reducing the island’s reliance on the Port of San Juan.671 While these recommendations 
appear sensible, many are likely aspirational and out-of-reach of the island’s public 
financing capacity—at least over the near-term—that leaves residents in a vulnerable 
position in future disasters, a reality they must plan for in advance. Kim and Bui offer 
recommendations in their study stratified across the tactical, operational, and strategic 
levels that do offer some community-level involvement, such as pre-staging food and 
water on the island, pre-disaster mitigation, training and exercises, and building 
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U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2018), 10, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2019-05/
documents/final_pndd_guidance_0.pdf. 
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partnerships with a wide variety of community actors to bolster supply chain 
resilience.672 Similarly, the U.S. Committee on the Marine Transportation System 
created several recommendations to accelerate the restoration and recovery of the 
transportation infrastructure. Recommendations included the pre-staging of assessment 
teams and equipment, aiding port facility employees in returning to work, establishing a 
clear way to communicate a facility’s status, and a need for prioritizing facilities.673 
Citizen involvement in hazard mitigation planning, public funding priorities, and in 
understanding their community’s risk profile and potential for isolation post-disaster, are 
essential measures for knowing what to expect to plan adequately for disasters. 
Puerto Rico maintains some of the densest roadway networks in the nation. By 
working with local community groups and leaders, communities can plan for likely 
transportation impacts and structure preparedness strategies around known and likely 
vulnerabilities to prepare residents for potential periods of isolation, and devise plans to 
reduce the amount of time their communities remain inaccessible. Residents can also 
actively participate in driving the decision making of local and Commonwealth leaders 
on matters of long-term hazard mitigation.  
7. Hazardous Materials Lifeline 
Puerto Rico faces a variety of HAZMAT risks due largely to long-term 
infrastructure degradation because of fiscal constraints and divestments from the 
island.674 The poor safety track records of drinking and wastewater facilities and high 
rates of exposure to HAZMAT from a number of industries, such as farming, 
pharmaceutical production, petroleum facilities, coal plants, and others, serve as major 
public risk factors requiring consideration in planning for future catastrophic disasters.  
As of February 2018, 96% of drinking water, and 98% of wastewater facilities 
were still operating below full capacity while non-PRASA systems displayed variant 
 
672 Kim and Bui, “Learning from Hurricane Maria,” 6–8. 
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water quality.675 RAND noted that ill-performing water facilities increase the risk of 
transmitting waterborne diseases and exposure to toxic compounds.676 When considering 
Puerto Rico’s path to full recovery, RAND suggested prioritizing safe and reliable 
drinking water via infrastructure re-investment and system maintenance, such as dredging 
reservoirs in neglect.677  
Many issues concerning post-disaster HAZMAT exposure can be avoided by 
avoiding floodwaters when possible, and securing reliable disaster-resilient and 
community-based alternate water facilities for instances when primary systems fail. At 
least one community has shown that security safe water sources are possible via 
community organizing and planning for a resilient future. Residents of Toro Negro, a 
community in the municipality of Ciales, were without power and potable water for over 
eight months following Hurricane Maria.678 Since that time, the community has been 
able to secure a safe mountain aqueduct as a disaster-resilient water source to hedge 
against future isolating and contaminating effects of disasters.679 
As Puerto Rico considers future disaster preparedness, access to resilient water 
systems will be a vital consideration in avoiding HAZMAT exposure, particularly in 
areas that proved difficult to reach after Hurricane Maria. In addition, it is important to 
note that communities need not wait for the largely government and utility-centric 
recommendations of such organizations as RAND to be implemented. Communities like 
Adjuntas, Jayuya, Ciales, and others, show that positive outcomes are possible through 
community action and the formation of local cooperatives.680 
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Lastly, it is imperative that communities understand toxic hazards in close 
proximity that may pose risks amid disaster. By engaging local leaders and becoming 
active in local emergency planning councils, communities can work cooperatively to 
understand the risks they face better, identify, and implement mitigating measures pre-
disaster. While some mitigating measures may be as complex as working with large 
industries and local leaders on the cleanup of hazardous chemical storage sites, others 
will be as simple as messaging fellow community members to wear protective clothing, 
to avoid floodwaters as much as possible, and establishing a means of securing safe 
drinking water supplies before future disasters strike, such as Toro Negro and other 
communities have since Hurricane Maria.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
All research projects are bound by resource availability, with the greatest resource 
being time. Therefore, the following areas were identified throughout the writing of this 
thesis as potentially impactful areas for future study based upon their ability to create 
generalizable conclusions that result in concrete recommendations to further Puerto 
Rico’s disaster resiliency. Conclusions for further research may also inform other 
resource-constrained communities around the globe, to one degree or another, via a 
comparative analysis as they seek to build catastrophic disaster preparedness: 
• deeper research on specific community lifelines or critical infrastructure 
sectors 
• evolution of community-based organizations of Puerto Rico 
• impact of cumulative disasters on overall disaster resiliency 
• exploration of the role of social capital in Puerto Rico amid disasters 
• examination of how to rebalance the role of disaster preparedness and 
response from local, state, and federal levels from a policy standpoint 
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D. SUMMARY 
This study aimed to provide readers with a comprehensive examination of 
Hurricane Maria’s impact on the island of Puerto Rico. Utilizing a community lifeline 
approach, critical preparedness gaps were revealed that could be instructive to ongoing 
preparedness efforts and the building of long-term disaster resilience. Other communities 
facing catastrophic threats and hazards may also find comparative lessons in the Puerto 
Rico’s experience and find useful conclusions to put toward their own endeavors.  
In addition to substantial preparedness gaps, this study revealed decisive ad hoc 
measures taken by communities and informal actors to adapt and bridge critical gaps in 
disaster relief resources, such as food, water, shelter, medical care, power supply, and 
water provision. In the context of Puerto Rico, considerable opportunities are possible to 
re-imagine disaster preparedness, and integrate informal actors as a vital part of the 
solution to wicked preparedness problems as an isolated island commonwealth. In the 
event of a national catastrophic incident, other communities may also find themselves as 
literal or figurative islands for substantial periods of time should the NRF partially or 
completely collapse, and therefore, may find utility in the lessons of Puerto Rico.  
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